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ABSTRACT
Women have become an essential part of Western militaries. Particularly
concerning the experience of NATO militaries in Afghanistan, there has been much
public attention on the role of women in the military. While Western militaries are often
studied as a whole with regards to military operations, there is variation in both how
women are employed in the military and the experience they have as service members.
This dissertation seeks to understand the cause of this variation by examining three
critical cases: France, Norway and the United States.
In this dissertation, I argue foundational beliefs about gender equality affect the
institutional trajectory of military integration. Thus, variation in how gender equality is
defined and operationalized across the Western world help explain the variation in
women’s integration into militaries. The differences inherent in these beliefs can best be
understood and operationalized through tracing the way in which women’s movements
interacted with the government and society, and the differences in the claims made about
women’s participation in public life. As an institution of the government, the military
rarely makes policies about women’s service in a vacuum, but rather as a result of or
response to broader equality law or shifts in attitudes about women’s roles in public life.
While policies about women’s service set the stage for women’s integration,
integration is a result of the interaction between claims about women’s military
ii

participation and broader military culture and history. When the claims made about
women’s service are compatible with the role and culture of the military, there is a high
level of integration. When the claims about women’s service and military culture are in
conflict, there is a low level of integration. In France, the claims about women’s
participation and military culture have largely been in concert with one another, resulting
in a high level of integration. In Norway, there have been periods in which they
coincided, and periods in which they have been in tension, resulting in a moderate level
of integration. In the United States, they have largely been in conflict with one another,
resulting in a low level of integration.
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CHAPTER 1
Shoulder to Shoulder yet Worlds Apart:
The difference in Women’s Experiences in the Military

While women in the military have been instrumental for centuries, modern
experiences have put the role of women in the military at the forefront of public
consciousness. Women have been key to the tactical successes seen in Afghanistan since
September 11, 2001. In particular, women have been an essential component to
counterinsurgency and village stability operations, engaging parts of the population that
traditional male infantrymen have been unable to reach. While the United States was an
initial leader in the combat operations, other nations quickly took on prominent roles. The
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was truly a joint mission that relied on
integrated strategic and tactical aims of all countries involved. As North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg exclaimed in a speech to the
troops on December 14, 2014, “for over a decade, the world’s largest coalition for peace
and stability has stood shoulder to shoulder in Afghanistan.”1 Indeed, the focus of the
Secretary General’s remarks at the close of official combat operations in Afghanistan was
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Opening remarks by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg at the last North Atlantic Council with
past and current non-NATO ISAF Contributing Nations, December 14, 2014. Archived at NATO.int
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on the joint nature of operations, how NATO and non-NATO International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF) militaries worked together as a nearly seamless unit to eradicate
Taliban and terrorist safe havens and promote local stability and rule of law. Though the
overall success of combat operations has been subject to scrutiny and debate, there have
been tactical successes, no matter how limited in their nature (See, for example, Lamb &
Cinnamond, 2009; Chaudhuri & Farrell, 2011; Barno, 2007). On the successes that were
seen in Afghanistan, it was noted that “efforts at the tactical level would not be possible if
gender roles and gender relations [were] not taken into account” (Lackenbauer &
Langlais, 2013, p. 4). Indeed, the importance of women for both localized tactical
successes and overall implementation of strategic aims, was nearly universally noted by
all levels of commanders in Afghanistan. NATO Deputy Secretary Rose Gottemoeller
noted, “the ability to apply gender as a perspective and an analytical tool has proven to be
vital to our missions and to our advising and training efforts to local security forces [in]
Afghanistan.”2 Yet while ISAF’s actions in Afghanistan brought the universality of the
need for a gendered focus in combat to light, it also highlighted some very important
differences in women’s experiences in the military between participant countries.

The Observable Difference
Given both the joint nature of ISAF’s mission in Afghanistan and the near
universal recognition for the importance of women, it would be easy to assume that
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Remarks at the Joan B. Kroc School of Peace Studies, University of San Diego, April 28, 2017. Archived
at NATO.int
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women in Western militaries, particularly those that participated in ISAF, can be studied
as a homogenous group. Throughout Afghanistan, units were organized into Regional
Commands (RCs), often led by officers from different countries. This created a
battlespace in which general officers were frequently tasked with employing foreign
troops on combat missions. Such activity assumes a great deal of interoperability between
international forces. Processes such as uniform rules of engagement and clear chains of
command helped ensure that ISAF forces could work together to achieve a common
mission (US Army, 2012). However, despite a convergence on most tactical aspects of
military service in Afghanistan, there was no uniform policy on women in ISAF forces.
This experience in Afghanistan highlights a puzzle: despite convergence of
organizational and tactical aspects of their militaries, Western Democracies remain
divergent on the integration of women in the military. Each individual nation maintains
its own policies and practices with regards to what women are allowed to do, where they
were allowed to be stationed, and the particulars around legal aspects of women working
with infantry, or other ground-combat units.
This dissertation examines the cases of the United States, France and Norway as
critical to understanding how despite having spent over a decade fighting “shoulder to
shoulder,” women experienced very different levels of integration in the military. Not
only were the tactical outputs of their participation different, but their experiences with
the military and their path to service has been very different. I argue that these differences
integration are a result of the interaction between claims made about women’s service in
the country as a whole and military culture and tradition that unfolds over time. These
3

differences seen not only in combat operations in Afghanistan but also the domestic
experiences of women. Understanding these differences cannot be done by looking at
military conflicts alone. They are the consequences of a long and slow-moving process
that has taken place against the backdrop of domestic fights for gender equality and
military responses to a changing global order.
The United States, Norway, and France are critical cases to understand these
variations in the process and outcomes of integration. All three countries have been active
proponents of increasing women’s presence and participation on the global stage, and
have all been active in international military operations. Yet the paths to military
participation women in each country took varied. While much attention has been paid to
the outcomes of utilizing women in the most recent wars, there are few studies on how
women came to be integrated into their various roles. In this dissertation I look at the
process of integration and find that it is an historical process that it has been, in large part,
dictated by varying national beliefs about gender equality and their ability to resonate
with military culture.

Argument in Brief
I argue foundational beliefs about gender equality affect the institutional
trajectory of military integration. Integration is a process that is driven by beliefs about
the way in which equality should be practiced, and the resulting level of influence
government has in shaping conditions for equality. The differences inherent in these
beliefs can best be understood and operationalized through tracing the way in which the
4

various women’s movements interacted with the government and society, and the
differences in the claims made about women’s participation in public life. As an
institution of the government, the military rarely makes policies about women’s service
in a vacuum, but rather as a result of or response to broader equality law or shifts in
attitudes about women’s roles in public life.
While policies about women’s service set the stage for women’s integration,
integration is not set by policy along. It is a result of the interaction between claims about
women’s military participation and broader military culture and history. The difference in
claims is driven by differences in beliefs about equality. Military culture is driven by
beliefs about the military’s place in the geopolitical order, its history of warfare, and its
responsiveness to changing global politics. This can be operationalized in the degree to
which the conduct of violence is emphasized as a source of authority for service
members. Though the military is the legitimate institution of political violence, it has
functional roles that exceed killing or physical destruction. Indeed, achieving the political
aims of military action often rests on restraint in using force. The centrality of combat to
the military identity varies across the Western world and between the countries examined
in this dissertation. Additionally, military culture is manifested in the degree to which
citizenship claims hinge on military service. This can be seen in the degree to which
militaries embody the “schoolhouse for the nation” idea professed by Ronald Krebs
(2006) in which militaries serve to make citizens by uniting diverse individuals into a
common identity. Changes to global politics have made certain aspects of military culture

5

more desirable and conducive to women’s integration, and militaries have adopted to
these changes in varying ways.
When the claims made about women’s service are compatible with the role and
culture of the military, there is a high level of integration. When the claims about
women’s service and military culture are in conflict, there is a low level of integration. In
France, the claims about women’s participation and military culture have largely been in
concert with one another, resulting in a high level of integration. In Norway, there have
been periods in which they coincided, and periods in which they have been in tension,
resulting in a moderate level of integration. In the United States, they have largely been
in conflict with one another, resulting in a low level of integration.

6

Table 1: Relationship between claims about women’s service and military culture
Country
Claims about
Role & Culture of
Result
Women’s Service
the Military
France
Institutional
Adaptable and
High level of
Equality: High
innovative;
integration. Space
emphasis on
reflective of changes for women to make
difference between
in global political
the claim that they
men and women,
relationships
were needed “as
High level of
women”
government
involvement to
ensure equality
despite difference
Norway
Citizenship
Focused on making
Moderate level of
Equality: Low
Norwegian citizens
integration. Initial
emphasis on
and differentiating
space for women to
difference between
themselves from
make great progress,
men and women,
Scandinavian
but as geopolitical
High level of
neighbors
needs change
government
progress stalled
involvement to
ensure equality
United States Individual Equality: Combat-centric and Low level of
Mixed emphasis on focused on
integration. Little
the difference
conventional force
space for claims
between men and
projection
about women’s
women, Low level
value outside of
of government
combat operations.
involvement to
ensure equality
In France, where there was a strong legacy of institutional equality, the women’s
movement lobbied the state to ensure that provisions were made to account for and
mitigate any differences between men and women that could potentially be detrimental to
women’s advancements. The military was one of the first places for women to experience
professional equality, as it was impacted by the public policies created to ensure
structural equality between men and women. The beliefs about the role of government in
7

promoting equality, namely that formal public policy has a role in not only promoting,
but shaping public values, meant that women were able to promote further change once
in the military. The military’s history of adaptability and response to changing global
politics led to a military that valued restraints on the use of force and adoption of
gendered policies in peacekeeping and counterinsurgency. Such a culture is amenable to
the claim’s made about the benefits of the unique characteristics that women bring to the
military. The high level of women’s integration in France is a reflection of the fact that
women, acting as women, have contributed not only to the adoption of new policies that
better account for the differences women face, but have also had the ability to have an
impact on both military tactics and strategies.
In Norway, the women’s movement emerged from a society that was rooted in
beliefs about citizenship equality, downplaying the differences between the genders and
focusing instead on the import contributions made by all citizens. In the early 1970s,
wide-sweeping policies were made to bring all citizens into the military. A combination
of the de-gendered nature of the claims made by the women’s movement, and focus on
normalizing an inclusive citizenry resulted in policies and practices – from physical
requirements to bunking accommodations – that view men and women as virtually
identical. The military’s focus on making citizens and preserving the values of “true
Norwegianness” coincided greatly with the second wave feminist argument about
citizenship equality for women. However, as the military needed to respond to changes in
geopolitics that necessitated gendered engagement with other cultures, the gender-neutral
claims about women’s service began to conflict with military ideals, stalling further
8

progress on women’s integration. The result is a moderate level of integration in the
Norwegian military. While many of the cultural problems of “hyper masculinity”
frequently associated with the military have not been present in Norway, some of the
particular benefits from women’s service haven’t been quickly or easily realized either.
While women in the Norwegian military were among the first to make strides in the
infantry and senior leadership world-wide, the continued focus on de-gendered
citizenship has meant that women have had moderate success in influencing military
policies, tactics and strategy in a changing world.
In the United States the women’s movement lacked a cohesive claim about
women’s participation in public life and instead sought to empower individual women to
prove their value in society. The United States also has a history that relies much less on
state-led policies to legislate equality. Women’s participation in the military was either
driven by tactical necessity or framed as individually empowering, a means by which
women could prove their strength and grit. The combat focus of the United States
military has left little space for claims about women’s service beyond national security.
Women that have joined the military typically conform to the dominant male ideology,
focusing on achieving individual success rather than changing the institution. As a result,
laws around women’s participation in the military frequently had to play catch-up to what
women were already doing. Little formal change – either in policy or culture – was made
by women, resulting in a low level of integration in the United States Military.
Understanding the process by which women have been integrated into the military
has both scholarly and practical benefits. From a scholarly perspective, it focuses on the
9

military as an institution of democracy and part of the makeup of a country’s identity,
rather than just a tool of violence. The exceptional nature of the violence that military is
capable of frequently overshadows the other functional roles the military plays – such as
promoting democratic norms and values, and preserving human rights. However,
viewing the military as part of the larger set of democratic institutions, we see that
women’s integration into the military is not only a strategic or tactical innovation, but
also a mechanism of social change. The military has a long history of being a tool of
citizenship, both in giving previous out-groups claims to expanded sociopolitical rights
and in indoctrinating new citizens into a political culture (Krebs, 2006). Indeed,
institutions in democracies seek to be expansive and reflective of their population in
order to build robustness and durability (Olsen, 2009). The military is often viewed as
excepted from this due to its unique role in engaging in violence on behalf of its people
(Goldstein, 2001). The need to do violence has often been used as an argument to keep
people out. However, I argue that despite its exceptional capacity for violence, military
is, in fact, an essential institution for expansion. Looking beyond the violent aspects of
military functions is an important part in understanding this integration and the degree to
which women have been able to leverage it.
While present in nearly every democracy, variation exists in both the degree to
which the societal role of the military is emphasized and the way that militaries have
evolved with regards to changes in global politics. Carl von Clausewitz noted nearly 200
years ago that war was the “continuation of politics by other means.” It is not violence for
violence’s sake, but the specific and disciplined use, or threat of use, of violence to
10

achieve a particular political objective. In the 200 years since Clausewitz noted this,
global politics has changed. So, too, has the conduct of war, and by extension the
composition and role of the military in society. Understanding integration requires a more
nuanced look at the different ways that militaries have been used in response to the
changes in global politics.
Viewing the military as a government institution, rather than just a tool of
violence, allows better differentiation between integration, and inclusion. Much of the
current focus on women’s participation is on the way in which women have been
included. However, to truly understand the difference in women’s participation, we need
to better understand integration. Integration is not merely bringing women into the
military to fight, but a process of structural allowances, participation, and meaningful
impact that allows women to leverage their unique contributions in order to better the
military’s policies, tactics and strategies. Integration thus allows women to influence the
military in a way that is reflective of the unique benefits that women bring to the public
arena. France, Norway, and the United States despite all having made strides in including
women in their militaries, have different level of integration. Understanding why these
differences exist will help explain the observable variations in women’s experiences in
the military, as well as their ability to affect tactical outcomes.
From a practical standpoint, understanding the differences in levels of integration
is of great interest to military leaders. As shown by the recent ISAF mission in
Afghanistan and beyond in the Global War on Terror (GWOT) coalition forces are
becoming standard practice for Western militaries in today’s national security arena.
11

Women are increasingly seen as necessary in these operations. It is thus very likely that
military leaders will have female troops from other countries under their command.
Understanding the differences in women’s integration in various militaries will help
commanders to best employ women.
Further, throughout the Western world, women in the military remain a topic of
discussion and policy debate. From 2000-2016, nearly every NATO member state and
member of the partnership for peace has said that they have “enacted new policies” or
“engaged in studies” aimed at increasing the number of women in the military or
increasing retention rates of women in the military.3 A large majority of these studies
include wide-sweeping reviews of other countries’ experiences with women in the
military as a baseline to set new policies (Berkshire Consultancy Ltd., 2009; Burrelli,
2012; Cawkill, Rogers, Knight , & Spear, 2009; Trucano, Myers, Corbo, Hare, & Gaddes,
2017). However, rarely, if ever, are the programs and policies of other countries put in an
historical or cultural context. While there are commonalities between NATO allies, there
are historical and cultural differences that must be taken into account when making
policies aimed at encouraging more participation by or greater retention of women. By
approaching integration as a process and situating it within its cultural and institutional
historical context, I shed light on what parts of integration are generalizable and what
parts are particular to a particular country’s cultural view of gender equality and military
institutional history.

3

NATO Committee on Gender Perspectives Annual Reports 2000-2016. While not every country enacted
new policies or commissioned studies every year, each did at least once.
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Plan of the Dissertation
This dissertation consists of three parts. Part one (Chapters 1, 2 and 3) explains
how the various beliefs about gender equality interact with military culture to explain
variation in women’s integration. It shows how this study differs from previous attempts
to understand women’s military participation by introducing a definition of integration
that goes beyond the measures of inclusion typically used. In the remainder of this
chapter I discuss my approach, case study selection, and briefly address alternative
explanations for the puzzle of variation in gender integration. Chapter 2 introduces the
various beliefs about gender equality and highlights how the women’s movements in
France, Norway and the United States contributed to the claims made about women’s
service. In particular I focus on the degree to which the claim had universal appeal and its
strength in appealing to the various military culture. In Chapter 3 I differentiate between
integration and inclusion by arguing that what is missing in the current studies of
women’s military participation is an outcome-driven study of integration. I argue that a
cornerstone to understanding the observable differences in these cases is in looking at
historical evolution of the process of integration, rather than its individual aspects or
particular moments of inclusion. I conclude Chapter 3 by discussing how claims about
women’s participation and military roles and culture interact to drive the process of
integration.
Part 2 (Chapters 4-6) consists of in-depth case studies of France, Norway, and the
United States. A structured-focused comparison of each country first examines the role of
the military in society, and then traces the way that the claims about women’s service
13

coincide and conflict with it. I look a three particular time periods that are reflective of
major changes in global politics. The first is the 1970s – early 1990s. This period
represents the early legislative impact of second wave feminism to the end of the Cold
War. The second is the early 1990s – 2001. This period represents the end of the Cold
War through the attacks of September 11, 2001. The third is 2001 – present. This period
represents the post-9/11 world. Through tracing the process of integration in each
country, I show how the differences in initial policy conditions and claims about service
ultimately resulted in the observed different levels of integration.
In Chapter 4 I discuss women’s integration into the French military. In France, the
women’s movement focused on institutional equality, highlighting that there were
differences between men and women and that formal government apparatuses should
mitigate that difference. The work of the women’s movement resulted in legislated
equality for women in all public employment (to include the military) and focused on
creating a formal support network to address those areas (primarily child care and
parental issues) that disproportionally impact women’s ability to engage in public life.
The military’s culture was conducive to women participating “as women,” and formals
mechanisms allowed women to impact and change the military to make it more
accommodating for women coming after them. Further, military doctrine reflected the
unique contribution of women in both tactics and strategy.
In Chapter 5 I discuss women’s integration into the Norwegian military. The
Norwegian women’s movement largely aligned with ideals of citizenship equality.
Norwegian women downplayed their gender differences, focusing on the role that all
14

Norwegians played in promoting a stable and prosperous society. As a result, policies
were made that impacted “Norwegians” without differentiating gender. Political and
social structures were largely de-gendered, to include military service. The military’s
focus on making citizens, coupled with their emphasis on restraining the use of violence
made them a pioneer in women’s integration. Since they began the process of integration,
a modest, but steady, number of Norwegian women have consistently been in, and
remained, in the military. Yet while an initial leader in women’s participation, the gender
neutrality of the policies has resulted in women’s “stalled” participation when faced with
a changing global political order. The experiences of the Norwegian military in
Afghanistan has highlighted the need for increased women in the military, resulting in
new policies being made to attract and train all-female special operations units and
attempt to increase women’s integration.
In Chapter 6 I discuss women’s integration into the United States military. For the
United States, I show how the absence of a unified claim about women’s service and an
historical distrust of government intervention for social equality, led the women’s
movement to largely focus outside the formal government apparatus and encourage
women to prove that they deserve equality. The degree to which men and women are (or
are not) different has been the subject of a great deal of tension in the American women’s
movement. The military’s commitment to a combat-centric identity has further made it
difficult for women to make strong claims about their participation broadly. Policies
about women’s participation in the military have frequently been a response to what
women were doing, or needed to do, in the conduct of war, and were often temporary.
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Though the United States has a relatively high percentage of women in the military at any
one point in time, due to a lack of supporting policies, very few women remain in the
military to achieve enough seniority to effect change. This has, in turn, impacted the way
in which women have been used to face the challenges of the current security arena.
Because of policies and a dearth of senior female combat leadership, women have been
specially trained to augment all-male units. While individual women have been very
successful in military careers, they have largely done so by proving their own personal
worth, and conformed to, rather than pushed to change, the military.
Part 3 (Chapter 7) explores the implications of the differences of integration and
examines how these differences may be leveraged. As highlighted in the beginning of
this chapter, these three countries, along with other NATO allies and coalition forces, rely
on joint operations to meet today’s global security challenges. Additionally, NATO
countries frequently engage in joint training exercise and military educational exchange
programs. However, despite increased exposure and the convergence of other tactical
areas, the integration of women has remained culturally specific. Understanding how
women have been integrated into different militaries is indeed helpful to joint operations,
as it will help commanders to utilize the different strengths that have resulted from the
various processes.
Additionally, understanding integration of women into the military as a process
opens the door for many more research questions. When we move beyond inclusion to
integration, we are more richly able to explore the impact that women have on the

16

institution. In part 3 I will introduce some of these potential questions and address their
possibility to impact both scholarship and policy.

Historical, Process Driven Approach to Understanding the Differences in
Critical Cases
Approach
I argue that women’s integration into the military is a cultural process, driven by
the interaction between claims made about women’s service and military identity and
tradition. I take an historical-institutional approach to understand the different levels of
integration seen in the France, Norway, and the United States.4 Integration is a process
that takes place over a prolonged period of time, and is thus illustrative of the type of
variable that Paul Pierson calls “cumulative and continual” (Pierson, 2003, p. 179). Such
variables unfold over a prolonged period of time, and build upon themselves. Most
studies looking at women’s participation in the military have focused on the impact of
singular moments or policy decisions, treating the cumulative processes as fixed in a
particular moment of time. While these studies tell us a great deal about those particular
moments of inclusion, they do not capture the temporally dynamic process of integration.

4

While Israel is a case worth of study for understanding women’s integration into the military it did not fit
the most similar design of this dissertation for several reasons. First, Israel does not have the shared history
with second wave feminist movements of the countries examined in this case. Second, Israel is involved in
kinetic conflicts with its geographic neighbors, a reality that gives the military a different place in society
than those countries who are primarily involved in operations abroad. However, while not included here, it
is worth studying in the future to understand the role of culture in women’s integration.
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Indeed, there are particular moments and events that are critical to integration, but these
moments are only one part of a longer process of institutional evolution.
Taking an historical institutionalist approach also allows for an examination of the
constraints of institutional social change that are imbedded both within the institution
itself and the society working to change it (Berry, Forthcoming). Using such an approach,
I conceptualize integration as what James Mahoney terms a “self-reinforcing sequence,”
in that it is “characterized by the formation and long-term reproduction of a given
institutional pattern” (Mahoney, 2000, p. 510). Integration is a temporally dynamic
process that produces differing outcomes when applied to different countries. The
differences in beliefs about equality, and the resulting claims about women’s
participation underpin the reproductive process. The process is constrained by beliefs
about the role of the military and the military’s internal culture. Thus, even if seemingly
identical laws and policies about women’s military service are passed in each country, the
variation in culture and institutional evolution result in different levels of integration.
Using differing beliefs about gender equality as the underlying mechanism for
understanding military integration is unique. Most studies of women’s inclusion in the
military focus either on the gendered nature of the violence that the military is charged
with conducting, and the paradox of women engaging in such violence, or the legal
changes that allow for women’s participation in an historically male institution. They
highlight how critical moments, such as total war or economic crisis, overcome this
paradox, and allow society to better accept women participating in the typically male act
of conducting war (See, for example: Carreiras, 2006; Goldstein, 2001; MacKenzie,
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2015; Segal, 1995; Eulriet, 2012). However, these studies do not capture the iterative
nature of women’s service or the cumulative impact of social engagements that have led
to variations in participation. They look at external shocks that see more women serving
rather than internal learnings that shape the way that women service and the military as
an institution interact with one another. Tracing the way in which that the claims made
about women’s participation either coincided or conflicted with the role of the military in
society and historical military culture thus gives insight into the slow moving yet
dynamic process of integration.

Case Study Selection
The United States, Norway, and France are critical cases in understanding this
difference. They are similar in many ways, yet reflect differences in foundational beliefs
about gender equality. They thus represent a most similar research design and provide
critical insight into how the nature of the interactions women’s groups had with political
institutions and the kinds of claims they made about equality influenced the process of
women’s integration into their militaries. All three countries are all wealthy and
established democracies with both a democratic citizen-soldier tradition and formal
civilian control of their militaries. They are also all early members of NATO, active both
in balancing the Soviet Union and in integrating former Soviet states. They were all
instrumental – and had active leadership roles – in ISAF’s mission in Afghanistan, with
women winning numerous award for valor and conduct during combat. Culturally, they
all had strong second-wave feminist movements in the 1960s-80s that actively lobbied for
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expanded social, economic, and political rights for women. As of 2015, all three
countries legally allow women to participate in all occupational specialties in the
military.
However, the underlying belief about gender equality is the key variable in
explaining the difference in military integration. Despite all being liberal democracies
that promote “equality,” both domestically and internationally, they do not conceptualize
equality in the same way. France represents institutional equality, with a focus on a high
level of difference between men and women, and an emphasis on the government
enacting laws and policies that ensure that this difference does not results in equality.
Norway embodies citizenship equality, emphasizing the similarity between all citizens
with an emphasis on citizens receiving much from the government in return for
substantial service. In the United States there has historically been an emphasis on
individual achievement and a lack of social or cultural cohesion. As a result, there was
little consensus on the nature of role of men and women in society, resulting in an
absence of a uniform claim about women’s equality. These differences led to cohesive
claims about women’s military participation in France and Norway, and individualized
efforts on the part of women in the United States.
The “women’s movement” of the United States and Western Europe frequently
get lumped into a generic category, as they all focused on ensuring greater sociopolitical
rights in established, liberal democracies (Rowbotham, 1996). A closer examination of
the movements, though, shows that while all possessed a macro-focus on “women’s
rights,” the types of claims, and the specific actions taken by women’s groups in various
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countries were constrained by foundational beliefs about what equality looks like. In
teasing out the differences in these views, I take Judith Butler’s advice to not allow the
“universal subject of women … to override or reduce the distinct articulations of gender
asymmetry in different cultural contexts” (Butler, 2011, p. 48). These differences are
frequently overlooked when comparing women in the military. By taking them into
account, I am able to tease out the critical difference in the path to and process of
integration that have resulted in the observed variation in outcomes and experiences of
women in the Norwegian, French and United States militaries.
There are also differences in beliefs about the military’s role and culture. The
militaries in each of the countries reflect different orientations with regards to their place
in the world. These differences have resulted in variations in the sources of authority for
leadership and legitimacy. The United States has long been seen as a “superpower,”
emphasizing military might and conventional combat. As a result, the infantry has been
seen as the primary source of authority. France and Norway have both largely enjoyed
the United States’ security umbrella, and have thus placed their sources of authority in
military aspects other than combat. Norway’s historical subjugation to Denmark and
Sweden has resulted in a military that is focused on the differential aspects of Norwegian
culture that set it apart. The military is largely seen as the protector of Norwegian values
and the maker of “true” Norwegian citizens. France’s military culture is shaped by its
colonial legacy and current relationship to its former colonies. It is largely adaptable to
the changing international political arena and rewards innovation in both tactics and
strategies.
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Taken together over time, the interaction between the claims made about
women’s military participation and military culture, result in differences in the levels of
women’s integration into the military. From the way women are talked about by their
peers and senior leaders, to policies on coed bunking facilities, to provisions for child
care and parental leave, despite years of fighting side by side, women have very different
experiences with military service. These differences are reflective of differences in the
integration process as experienced by women in the United States, France, and Norway.
There have been differences in the way in which women have been able to impact the
military as an institution, both in terms of policies and strategy. Taken in total, these
represent differences in levels of integration in the countries considered.
Table 1.2 highlights the key similarities and differences that influenced case
selection.
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Table 1.2: Overview of Case Selection
United States
Similarities
- Liberal
democracy
- Civilian control of
military
- Early NATO
member
- Military strategy
includes promoting
democratic values
- History of
women’s
participation in the
military
- Participation in
operations in
Afghanistan
- Active women’s
movement
Difference –
Belief about
Equality
Level of
Integration

Norway
- Liberal
democracy
- Civilian control of
military
- Early NATO
member
- Military strategy
includes promoting
democratic values
- History of
women’s
participation in the
military
- Participation in
operations in
Afghanistan
- Active women’s
movement

Individual Equality

Citizenship
Equality

France
- Liberal
democracy
- Civilian control
of military
- Early NATO
member
- Military strategy
includes
promoting
democratic values
- History of
women’s
participation in the
military
- Participation in
operations in
Afghanistan
- Active women’s
movement
Institutional
Equality

Low

Moderate

High

Alternative Explanations
There are currently three primary lines of arguments used to explain women’s
increased participation in the military: to support the war effort, competition for
employment, and reflection of societal views about women. While these arguments have
historical validity and are foundation for the study of women in the military, the fall short
of explaining the current variation in women’s integration, especially among ISAF
countries.
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Supporting the War Effort
The need for women to support a national war effort is the most common and
universally used explanation for women’s increased role in the military. Indeed, it has
been used both as justification by policy makers (the “Free a Man to Fight” logic) and as
an explanatory tool by academics (Enloe, 1980; Eitelberg, 1988; Higonnet, 1987) to
explain why it becomes both legally and socially acceptable for women to increasingly
engage in military service. As Segal (1995) explains, as the threat to national security
goes up and states need bigger militaries to confront this rising threat, women are seen as
necessary in order to meet the needs of the growing size of the military. The exceptional
nature of war-time means that states will take “seemingly exceptional” measures,
including recruiting and expanding the role of women, in order to meet their security
needs (Goldstein, 2001). This approach uses participation in war and the size of
militaries as the primary independent variables.
This approach fails to explain the current variation in levels of integration. The
United States, Norway and France have been engaging in most of the same international
conflicts since the end of the Cold War, yet experience different levels of integration.
Additionally, it cannot explain why all Western militaries are focusing on measures to
increase the presence of women in their ranks, despite drawing down the size of their
militaries. For this logic to hold, given the comparatively rapid rise of women in Western
militaries, we would expect to see an increase in the number of wars being fought by
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Western militaries and a growth in the size of militaries. However, neither of conditions
are met in the post-Cold War era.

Figure 1.1: States Experiencing Warfare

Source: Center for Systemic Peace, systemicpeace.org
Figure 1.2: Total Force Numbers for Select NATO Forces 1990-2014

Source: World Bank Data
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As Figure 1.1 shows, war has been generally on the decline. NATO and Western
militaries, in particular, have decreased their number of military interventions as well
(Kisangani & Pickering, 2008). Additionally, as shown in Figure 1.2, the size of
militaries has been trending downward or holding steady. Further, most NATO nations
have participated in the same conflicts since the end of the Cold War,5 making war an
inadequate explanation for the variation in women’s integration.

Competition for Employment
As militaries have professionalized, economics increasingly plays a role in the
personnel composition of the armed forces. When men no longer have to serve in the
military, they are more likely to choose jobs that are less dangerous, more stable, and
offer better pay in the private sector. As a result, states must increasingly turn to women
to fill the ranks of the military (Stanley & Segal, 1988; Segal, 1995). This logic is
primarily related to the legal provisions of women’s participation, offering evidence as to
why states open positions to women that seemingly contradict social norms (Eulriet,
2012). If this approach were true, we would expect to see low male unemployment (as
men have secure private sector jobs) when seeing an increase of women in professional
militaries. As Mady Segal asserts “high [male] unemployment rates are associated with a
ready supply of men for the armed forces, and relatively low opportunities for women”
(Segal, 1995, p. 767). But when unemployment rose in the early 1980s, opportunities for

5

http://www.nato.int/cps/eu/natohq/topics_52060.htm
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women in the military contracted (Stanley & Segal, 1988). Therefore, given the stark rise
in women’s military participation since the end of the Cold War, we would expect to see
very low male unemployment. Figure 1.3 shows the trend lines of male unemployment
in select NATO countries. While unemployment was falling in the 1990s, it rises sharply
beginning around 2000. It is in the early 2000s that most NATO countries saw their most
dramatic increase in women in the military, making explanation via economics less
likely.

Figure 1.3: Male Unemployment Rates of Select NATO Countries
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Source: World Bank Data

Reflection of Societal Views on Women
A final argument explaining women’s integration rests on the fact that
professional militaries become more representative of the societies they protect.
Therefore, as society’s values and attitudes about social norms (whether race or gender)
change, the military should reflect that change (Abrahamsson, 1972; Allen, 2000; Armor
& Gilroy, 2009). As social attitudes change and the citizenry accept women in non27

traditional roles, it becomes more acceptable for women to engage in a profession of
violence (Carreiras, 2006).
If this logic were to hold true in explaining the observable differences in Western
militaries, we would expect to see states in which women we more present in the public
workforce have more opportunities and higher levels of women’s integration in the
military.6

Figure 1.4: Women’s Workforce Participation
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Figure 1.4 shows the public workforce participation of women in select NATO
countries. Used as an operationalization of attitudes and values about women’s public
participation, it is moderately useful in explaining the various levels of women’s
integration in militaries. In the case of the countries with the highest women’s

6

Operationalization from: Carreiras, Helena. Gender and the military: Women in the armed forces of
western democracies. Routledge, 2006.And further explained in Alexander, Amy C., and Christian Welzel.
"Empowering women: four theories tested on four different aspects of gender equality." Annual meeting of
Midwest Political Science Association. Chicago: Palmer House Hotel. 2007.
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participation (represented by Norway and Canada), it is a plausible explanation for their
high degree of military integration. However, the other countries are more problematic.
For example, despite their relatively high rates of workforce integration, the United States
and United Kingdom have a relatively low level of overall military integration.
Similarly, this approach cannot explain countries such as France and Belgium’s relatively
low workforce participation yet high level of military integration.

A Note about Women in the Military and Levels of Integration
This dissertation focuses on the different levels of integration of women in the
French, Norwegian, and United States’ militaries as a way of understanding the observed
differences of women’s experiences in Western militaries. While I operationalize
integration, and place a value of “low,” “moderate,” or “high” on the three countries, this
is a comparative value, not a values judgement on who a country has engaged with
gender integration. As highlighted on the NATO committee on Gender Perspectives’
annual reports, women in the military remains a contentious and unsettled topic in nearly
every country. Both government and military leaders continue to grapple with both policy
provisions and culture issues around the topic. My intent in labeling the levels of
integration is not to highlight a “right” or “wrong” way, but to create a viable means for
comparison.
It is also important to note that individual women in all three militaries still
believe that there is much work to be done to improve both the experience of women and
the overall effectiveness of the military. This reality highlights the need to look at
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integration rather than just inclusion. Indeed, in all three countries, women are legally
allowed to participate in any occupational specialty, and their numbers are growing. The
fact that despite this, women still feel as though their potential is not fully realized shows
that there is still work to be done. My hope in highlighting the cultural and historic
institutional constraints placed on the process of integration is that it will ultimately be
able to help determine those spaces for opening more opportunities for women to be more
fully integrated and utilized in their nations’ militaries.
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CHAPTER 2
Beliefs, Laws, and Action:
Views about equality and claims to women’s public participation

Military participation is one way in which women participate in public life.
Though there is a commonality among women’s movements that women should have a
greater participation in public life there is not a unified reason as to why. These claims are
largely rooted in foundational cultural beliefs about gender equality. The variations in
these claims are one of the driving forces in understanding the variations in the process of
integration. Further, the way that claims interact with role of the military in public life
and military culture creates either permissive or restrictive condition for the process of
integration. In order to better understand the differences in claims made about women’s
military service, I turn to the second wave feminist women’s movements in France,
Norway and the United States as a way to understand the foundational differences in
beliefs about gender equality. Though women’s movements were active on specific
issues in the early part of the 20th Century, particularly workers’ and voting rights, the
second wave feminist movement expanded the focus of women’s issues to engage with
the totality of women’s position in society. Second wave feminism moved beyond
specific legal demands (such as voting rights) to discussions of how to change large scale
social, political and economic attitudes and opportunities for women ((Katzenstein &
31

Mueller, 1987). While the women’s movement rarely engaged directly with the military,
the language used concerning women’s equality and the way in which women’s
movements interacted with the government laid the groundwork for the claims made
about women’s military service.
It is important to look beyond individual women’s organizations and to view the
women’s movement in a given country as a “broad political force” that weaves
throughout a country’s many ideologies, identities, and moments of history (Katzenstein,
1987) in order to better understand how the women’s movements impacted women’s
integration into the military. I thus focus on the underlying beliefs about equality and the
role of women in public life that transcended specific groups and result in unified claims
about women’s service.
The impact of these underlying beliefs on women’s military integration fall into
two primary categories. First is the way that underlying beliefs about equality influenced
the type of claims made about women’s participation and roles in the military. Women in
Norway, France, and the United States, as well as officials in the militaries in which they
served, made claims about why women should (or shouldn’t) serve in the military. These
claims are largely influenced by the beliefs about women’s equality espoused by the
movements in the various countries. The language of the women’s movement permeated
into social dialogue about women’s participation such that even groups not directly
targeted by the movement adopted their language of equality.
The second area in which women’s movements had an impact on military
integration is in creating initial structural enabling conditions. Legal provisions for
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military service not only include what women are allowed to do in the military, but also
enabling provisions, such as child care and maternity leave, that ensure the familial and
social expectations placed on an individual because of one’s gender are not a limiting
factor to service. In all three countries, women’s movements were largely responsible for
lobbying for, and often drafting, the legislation that led to such policies. The variations in
parental leave and childcare policies seen in the three countries are reflective of the
variations in the underlying beliefs held by the women’s movements.
In this chapter, I discuss the three broad categories of belief about equality7 that
differentiate the women’s movements in France, Norway, and the United States:
institutional equality, citizenship equality, and individual equality. The differences in
these categories will be traced through two factors: women’s self-identification compared
to men, and beliefs about the government’s role in ensuring gender equality.
I begin this chapter by discussing some of the key differences in foundational
beliefs about equality. I then go into more detail about how each country’s women’s
movements defined and professed their self-identification in relation to men and their
interaction with the government. Throughout the chapter I highlight how these
differences resulted in different types of legislation concerning the key structural
enabling conditions of child care and parental leave. I conclude this chapter highlighting

7

These are based on the work of Mary Fainsod Katzenstein and Carol McClurg Mueller who focuses on
the difference between institutional and citizenship ideas of equality. Combining their work with that of
Lee Ann Banaszak, Karen Beckwith and Dieter Rucht I added the idea of individual equality to better
capture those movements that primarily worked outside the state to promote gender equality in the private
or social sectors.
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how these differences resulted in differences in both the strength and type of claims that
helped inform and constrain the process of women’s integration into the military.

Beliefs About Equality
Studies of feminism and women’s movements have a prominent focus on second
wave feminist movements of the 1960s and 1970s. The era of second wave feminism was
one of global change and idea diffusion (Klein, 1987). Additionally, feminist journals and
magazines were published in many countries across the West during this era, allowing for
both the sharing of ideas and access to primary source materials. While the diffusion of
ideas did result in some commonalities between countries, a closer examination
highlights that there were variations in the way in which women’s movements talked
about equality. National cultural and political history and traditions contribute to these
variations that can be seen in the different self-identifications and beliefs about the role
that government plays in ensuring gender equality. We can see these differences through
outcomes in terms of both policy achievement and social claims about women’s role in
public life throughout the Western world (Katzenstein & Mueller, 1987; Banaszak,
Beckwith, & Rucht, 2003).
While the Western world is frequently thought to be blanketly “liberal” with
regards to social and political equality, there is quite a bit of variation in how that
equality is understood, practiced, and manifested (Hindess, 1993). Equality is broadly
talked about throughout the West, particularly as a foundation for democracy. However,
it is not practiced or conceptualized in a uniform manner. Understanding that political
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culture, institutions, and historical experience all contribute to shaping socio-cultural
ideas of equality, the following three broad categories of gender equality help our
understanding of variations in women’s military integration.

Table 2.1: Categories of Gender Equality in Western Democracies
Category of
Characterized by
Example Countries
Gender
Equality
Institutional
France, Belgium,
- Gendered focus on differences
Equality
Netherlands
between men and women
- Government seen as responsible
to ensure that differences don’t
result in one gender being
preferenced over the other
- Women fill public roles that
men can’t
- Unified claims around the
benefits of gendered actions
Citizenship
Norway, Denmark,
- De-gendered downplay of
Equality
Canada
difference between men and
women
- Government provides large
amount of equal social
provisions for all citizens
- Women viewed as citizens with
the same obligations to the state
as men
- Unified claims around degendered responsibilities
Individual
- Individual ability, not gender, is United States, United
Equality
Kingdom
the basis for equality
- Government may be pressured
to provide equality of
opportunity, but no focus on
equality of outcomes
- Limited obligations of citizens
of either gender to state
- No universal claim about
women’s public participation
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Because the military is both beholden to public policy decisions and reliant on
citizens to make up its ranks, the underlying beliefs about equality held by the women’s
movements and their interaction with the government shaped the way that women’s
integration took place. Further, because the militaries of the United States, France, and
Norway all rely on women volunteering to serve, the claims made about women’s role in
public life influenced the choices that women made to join and remain in the military.
Below, I briefly discuss the three different categories of beliefs about gender equality.

Institutional Equality
Institutional equality is characterized by a high level of difference in women’s
self-identification from men and a high level of government involvement to promote and
ensure equality. Gender differences are not muted, but emphasized as necessary, and
diverse characteristics that complement one another are highlighted. These differences
are seen as necessary and it is incumbent on society to both protect and promote them.
Institutional equality is frequently accompanied by a strong strain of intellectualism,
focusing on the sources of inequality experienced by out-groups and the requirements to
ensure social, political, and economic equality between them (Lovenduski, Women and
European Politics, 1986). The focus of such intellectualism is often to guarantee that
differences – whether innate or socially constructed – do not become “synonymous with
oppression,” (Duchen, French Connections, 1987) but are properly leveraged to promote
a diverse, yet equal, society. In this vein, the role of the government is to ensure that
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differences do not put one group at a disadvantage to another in the formal or public
sector. Public policy must provide the resources to mitigate any potentially adverse
externalities resulting from differences and ensure a truly opportunity for equality.
Women’s movements based on institutional equality tend to lobby the
government for policies that make up for both the biological and socially constructed
differences between the genders. Rather than downplaying femininity or attempting to
dismantle gendered structures of power, the feminine is highlighted as a necessary
complement to the masculine that has typically dominated society. Both must act together
to ensure a well-functioning sociopolitical order. Formal institutions, from education to
parliament to the military, are targeted in order to ensure that gender imbalances are not
perpetuated and to ensure that public policy does not preference men. Universal child
care, women’s health care, and parental leave are examples of policies for which such
women’s groups lobby, as they help to mitigate some of the differences between men and
women that have traditionally hindered women’s ability to achieve full equality in public
life. In return, women participate in the public as women, often engaging with formal
institutions in such a way that they adopt more feminine characteristics or are made
aware of more feminine approaches to their work.
France typifies institutional equality. French feminists highlighted the unique
characteristics of women, and demanded institutional change to ensure that women would
not be disadvantaged because of their differences. The government was lobbied to break
the hold of the “institutions of the patriarchy”8 (Duchen, 1987). The words of Simone

8

Term originally coined by Collette Guillaumin writing in Questions Feministes in 1979.
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Veil, a French politician, exemplify this approach, noting that “a democratic system must
ensure equal participation of all its citizens” (Quoted in Banaszak, Beckwith, & Rucht,
2003, p. 74). An example of this can be seen in how child care was framed as a necessary
provision for women’s participation in society. French feminists attacked the “unbearable
conditions imposed on mothers” (Gallimard, 1973) and thus insisted that public policies,
such as crèche care, were necessary to ensure that motherhood did not inhibit women’s
ability to engage in public life on equal footing with men. Childcare remained a
“woman’s issue,” and the differences between men and women were not muted, but
highlighted as an essential part of a diverse public citizenry.

Citizenship Equality
Citizenship equality centers around the idea that individuals – regardless of
gender, race, religion, or ethnicity – are seen as citizens first, and any other particular
identity groups second. From a gender perspective, citizenship equality is characterized
by a low level of difference in women’s self-identification from men and a high level of
government involvement to promote and ensure equality. Differences between
individuals or identity groups are downplayed, and instead the similarities of both
obligations and benefits of citizenship are emphasized. Often seen in social welfare
states, citizenship equality is usually accompanied by generous benefit provision from
state institutions given equally to all identity groups (Borchorst & Siim, 2008). Because
of the high levels of benefit provision from the government, increased social, political
and economic rights are often bargained for in return for service to the country or the
38

public good. Equality in benefit provision by the government to all groups can be seen as
an instrument of social integration, as benefit provisions help ease the transition of a
previous out-group into the social order (Banting, 1995). For example, immigrants who
become citizens are given nearly the same benefits as those with birthright citizenship.
Such universal provision works to create a more homogenous society and associated with
“equality of the highest standards, rather than minimum need” (Epsing-Andersen, 1990,
p. 27). To ensure equality for all citizens, governments frequently provide such benefits
as education, employment, healthcare, and parental benefits at the same level for
everyone, regardless of their belonging to any particular identity group or gender.
Norway is an example of a country rooted in citizenship equality. Even when
lobbying for those issues or benefits traditionally seen as “women’s rights,” such as
childcare, education, and parental leave, women’s movements did not frame them
explicitly beneficial for women, but as a positive benefit for all of society. To combat the
historical patriarchal nature of the state,9 Norwegian women focused on sociopolitical
homogeny. As women organized and lobbied for increased medical, social, economic,
and political rights, they did so by stressing their sameness to their male counterparts as
citizens, and willingly engaged in the same obligations, from increased taxes to universal
military conscription. Women argued to be treated as citizens – and therefore afforded all
the social welfare guarantees of their male counterparts – in order to expand the labor
pool and defense market, something that would benefit all Norwegians, not only women
(Hernes H. M., 1988). This is highlighted in the case of universal childcare. Rather than
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For a discussion on the debate around the patriarchal nature of welfare states see O’Connor, 1993
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being framed as necessary for women to have equal opportunity, Norwegian women
argued that “working citizens” should be sociopolitical norm (Leira, 1992). Stateprovided childcare would thus free more citizens to work, resulting in net benefits for
society. Childcare thus became de-gendered, and seen not as the responsibility of women,
but of “parents.”

Individual Equality
Individual equality holds that it is each individual’s responsibility to overcome
any perceived disadvantages or hardships and prove themselves based on merit.
Individual equality is characterized by a lack of a unified belief about the difference in
women’s self-identification from men and a low level of government involvement to
promote and ensure equality. Government plays a minor role in ensuring equality,
ensuring only that there are no formal structural restrictions on individuals achieving the
same level of social, political, or economic success. The overarching focus of those
rooted in individual equality is on empowerment of individuals and removing formal
barriers to success without guaranteeing any particular outcome. Structural, institutional,
or social mechanisms of inequality are greatly downplayed. With regards to gender, there
is little consensus as to the differences between genders, whether those differences are
biologically or socially constructed. As a result, rather than focus on group characteristics
or differences, individual choice and ability is emphasized (Brenner, 1996). Unlike either
institutional or citizenship equality, very little is expected from government, and, in
return, there are lower expectations of public service for those groups that adhere to
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individual inequality. Instead, it is up to the individual to choose the path that is best for
them. Public policy is an “insufficient means of producing social change … [as] it denies
autonomy, and forces a one-size fits all solution to a complex problem” (Costain, 1992,
pp. 8-10). Proponents of individual equality thus seek to use the experiences and abilities
of individuals that have been successful as proof of equal opportunity, highlighting
success without assistance from formal government policies or structures.
For women’s movements in individual equality, feminism, and the resulting
identity vis a vis men, is seen as an individual choice. If there are perceived gendered
differences that result in inequalities, it is up to the individual to compensate for them.
The United States exemplifies individual equality. While women fought for increased
recognition and rights, they appealed to individuals much more than the government.
Harriot Stulman, a women’s activist and member of Students for Democratic Society,
noted in 1967 that “women will always be invisible in [government] power … so we
bypass the government” (Quoted in Evans, 1979, p. 167). Indeed, the tactics of the
women’s movements reflected the historic belief in the United States that the government
should not interfere with personal matters, to include gender relations (Evans, 1979;
Banaszak, Beckwith, & Rucht, 2003; Costain, 1992). The absence of a national child care
system is an example of how individual equality plays out in practice. Though groups
such as the National Organization of Women (NOW) lobbied for federally-funded child
care centers, the political opposition was strong,10 so groups did not devote resources to
formal political lobbying (Mink, 1998). Rather, women’s groups encouraged individual
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women to form child-care co-ops to “encourage community involvement in empowering
women and direct social change” (Banaszak, Beckwith, & Rucht, 2003, p. 1). It was
believed that seeing examples of success in individuals would better direct change than
government-led programs.
As noted above, women’s self-identification in relationship to men, and beliefs
about the government’s role in promoting and ensuring equality are prominent
differences between the various beliefs about equality. Taken together they result in
different claims about women’s roles in public life. Table 2.2 highlights the differences
for the countries included in this dissertation.

Table 2.2: Overview of Self-Identification, Government’s Role, and Claims
SelfGovernment’s
Claims about
Identification
Role in
women’s role
Equality
France –
Difference
Government
Women need to
Institutional
between women must make up
do what men
Equality
and men
the difference to can’t
ensure equality
Norway –
Little to No
Government
Women have an
Citizenship
Difference
policies shape
obligation to be
Equality
between women social attitudes
active citizens
and men
USA –
Individual
Minimal
No unified claim
Individual
characteristics
intervention
about women’s
Equality
service
Below I trace how this self-identification and beliefs about women’s equality
combine in each country to result in claims about women’s’ role in public life. I then
identify how the variation in these claims help us better understand the variation
women’s military service.
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France: Different Can be Equal
Self-Identification: Strong emphasis on the difference
French Feminism, and the women’s movements that it spurred, strongly adheres
to the belief that there is a difference between men and women. While there was
disagreement among organizations during the second wave feminist era as to whether the
difference is part of the inherent natural differences between men and women or a result
of social and political expereinces,11 there was agreement that they were fundamentally
different. Both the intellectual roots of the women’s movements, and the experience of
women during World War II were instrumental in emphaiszing this difference and
contributing to solidifying it in the French consciousness.
The intellectual roots of French feminism provide a strong body of work that
focus on the difference between men and women. The source of that difference, as well
as how it should be addressed, is the subject of a great deal of French feminist writing.
The idea of the difference between men and women was so important to intellectual
feminists that an entire issue of Questions Feministes12 in 1979 was dedicated to debating
both the source and nature of difference in an attempt to find unity among feminist
movements. The hope was that by engaging in dialogue about the source of the
difference, women’s organizations could discover that they had more in common than
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The two major French women’s organizations, Psyche et Po and Mouvement de Liberation des Femmes
(MLF), highlight this divide. While Psyche et Po focused primarily on the natural origins of the difference
between men and women, MLF emphasized sociopolitical and economic roots of the masculine/feminine
divide. Disagreements about the roots of the difference resulted in a great deal of discord among the
women’s movements.
12

A French feminist journal that ran from 1977-1980. It was originally founded by Simone de Beauvoir.
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previously thought, and work together to advance a common cause. Collette Guilliam, a
prominent French feminist intellectual, asserts in the introduction to the volume “as
[women] we must address the heterogenous nature of our difference. By heterogenous I
mean that it covers both anatomical and physiological features and also social-psycho
phenomen” (Guillaumin, 1979).
The focus on the heterogenity of differnce, like many of the intellectual roots of
French feminism, can be traced to Simone de Beauvoir’s The Second Sex. An example of
the dual nature of difference can be seen in de Beauvoir grappling with the relationship
between the act of sex and marriage:
…It is still a difficult problem for [women] to reconcile their
conjugal life with sexual satisfaction. A marriage generally
does not mean physical love, it would seem reasonable to
clearly differentiate one from the other. A man can
admittedly make an excellent husband and still be
inconstant: his sexual caprices do not in fact keep him from
carrying out the enterprise of a friendly communal life with
his wife… One might allow that it could be the same for the
wife; she often wishes to share in her husband’s existence,
create a home with him for their children, and still
experience another embrace… But for women, the love act
is still considered a service a wife must perform, the possible
result of which makes her shakeled to her husband. (De
Beauvoir, 1949, pp. 596-597)
In this passage, we see de Beauvoir highlight how biological differences, namely the fact
that women are the child bearers, are exploited through the socially constructed
expectations in the institution of marriage. Throughout this seminal work, she highlights
how both social institutions and formal laws take advantage of women’s biology and
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therefore lessen their worth, chastising the French government for creating “a system
based on women’s dependence” (De Beauvoir, 1949, p. 721).
Illuminating how laws and policies created an environment where women were
considered second class citizens, often based on their biological differences, was a
primary focus of the intellectual pursuits of French feminists. Indeed, they did not
theorize for merely the sake of creating new ideas, but with a focus to change the policies
that had allowed the government to continue to reproduce the patriarchy. The desire to
work to change the system is characterized by the introduction to the first issue of
Questions Feministes: “Questions Feministes is a theoretical discourse that attempts to
explain the causes and mechanisms, the why and the how of women’s oppression in
general, or of one of its specific aspects; it welcomes any discourse that tries to draw
political conclusions, which suggest a strategy or tactics for the feminist movement.”
The writings contained in Questions Feministes served to enlighten and embolden
women in a way that would result in lasting change. Intellectual feminism existed to
“analyze and demystify the patriarchy and to project a reconstruction of a society where
relations of domination are eliminated” (Duchen, 1986, p. 83).
The focus on women’s difference was not only seen in intellectuals. Women in
France became acutely aware of the differences between men and women during the
Resistance to Nazi occupation during World War II. The women of the Resistance
provided a practical model to highlight the benefits of leveraging the difference between
men and women for the good of the country. With their role in liberating France, women
of the Resistance and the Women’s Corps proved that national defense was not only a
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man’s job. The influence of the Resistance women on claims made about the benefit of
the difference between men and women on future generations is seen in the trial of
Marguerite Gonnet. Ms. Gonnet, a mother of 9, was a successful fighter in France’s
resistance. However, due to the formal restrictions that were still in place regarding
women’s participation in combat and possession of firearms, she was put on trial in 1942.
Upon being asked why she broke the law and “picked up a gun,” she responded, “quite
simply, Colonel, because the men had abandoned their weapons” (Transcript of the trial
in Douzou, 1995). Throughout the trial the message remained clear: women picked up
arms because the men, charged with the defense of the country, had failed.
Throughout the Resistance, women were able to largely do what men were not.
From bombing Nazi barracks to leading raids on Nazi strongholds, women proved
essential to the liberation of France (Weitz, 1995; Diamond, 2005). It is worth noting that
women, by in large, acted in line with social gender norms when carrying out combat
actions. They adapted to cultural norms about women’s role in society, often seducing
officers to get information or access to intimate spaces. Rather than engaging in overt
offensives, the women of the Resistance used their femininity to move through occupied
France with little suspicion and launch covert attacks. The success of female members of
the Resistance resulted in women experiencing both validation and a form of freedom
previously unknown. As Jean Paul Sartre wrote in the Atlantic, “Never were we freer
than under the German occupation … for they forced us all to be Frenchmen in the ways
in which we knew how” (Sartre, 1944, p. 43). This freedom, for women to live as equals
to their male counterparts while maintaining their femininity, and have their differences
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celebrated as necessary for victory, would serve as a foundation for the claims made
about women’s public service throughout the Fifth Republic.
Recalling their roles in particular combat operations, partisans13 noted that their
success was largely due to the fact that they were able to leverage their differences and
move through occupied France in a way that their male counterparts were not. Reflecting
on her assassination of a Vichy military officer, “Claude”14 spoke of wearing her best
dress and a hat with an ostrich feather to woo him at Maxime’s, a fine dining
establishment where German and Vichy military officers would dine. After a flirtatious
evening, she escorted him out a rear door, leading the officer to believe that their evening
was “off to a grandiose finish” (Interview in Schwartz, 1998). Outside, she led the officer
into the backseat a cab driven by a member of the Resistance, and met his advances with
a shot from a revolver to the head. She exited the cab, and walked through the streets,
passing the Gestapo checkpoints without suspicion while her comrade disposed of the
body. Similarly, Fanny Dutet and Betty Jegouzo15 recall carrying weapons in shopping
bags undetected into Nazi barracks and safe houses to conduct raids and assassinations.
Gender norms made women particularly adept at urban guerrilla warfare, as they
were able to move through urban settings seemingly undetected and strike when Nazi or
Vichy soldiers were unaware. Due to their tactical success, women were promoted into
command positions in organized Resistance fighting units. Women in command were
13

Term female members of the Resistance used to self-identify
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Due to the sensitive nature of her work as an assassin, this particular woman has refused to be recorded
in interviews or write an official memoir. However, he story is recounted exactly the same way in
Schwartz, Diamond, Weitz, and reported in The Atlantic.
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primarily stationed in Lyon and Limoges, areas where urban guerrilla warfare was the
most common tactic to defeat Nazi occupation (Baudoin, 1962). The groups commanded
by women would frequently conduct raids of city halls where occupying forces were
holding meetings or the living quarters of the Nazi soldiers. As a result, women found
themselves frequently fighting house-to-house in urban combat. Urban units also played
to the benefits of having mixed gender units. Male and female officers in the resistance
would frequently live together, posing as a couple, in order to infiltrate affluent Nazi or
Vichy neighborhoods.
Both the intellectual conceptualization about the differences between the genders
and the practical experiences of women being successful “as women” during the
Resistance are the foundation of many of the claims about women’s role in public life, to
include their military service. Throughout the 20th and into the 21st Centuries, women
would continue to emphasize the importance of their difference to meet the changing
nation security arena.

Role of the Government: Take Responsibility and Provide for the Differences
The French women’s movements emphasized the differences between men and
women, and many French feminists focused on the government as one of the primary
drivers of inequality that resulted from those differences. Indeed, the government was
often seen as being responsible for creating the conditions that created or intensified
women’s inequality. French feminists often referred to “structures of patriarchy” created
by the government as the root of social, political, and economic inequality:
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We believe that [inequality] is socially constructed, that it is
one of the pillars of patriarchy, that it is not a ‘moral’ norm
but a political strategy which makes it possible to keep a
system going, to perpetuate it, hide its contradictions, mask
the oppressors and above all divide us. (Icamiaba, 1981)
The women’s group Psyche et Po catalyzed around this idea by asserting in their charter,
“We are not in the margins; we’re here to explode the structure that says we are
marginal” (Pysche et Po, 1978). The focus of French women’s movement on trying to
change formal structures through government actions is reflective of a history of
previously marginalized groups lobbying the French government for policy changes to
address inequality (Lovenduski, 1986; Banaszak, Beckwith, & Rucht, 2003; Hill & Hupe,
2002; Hall, 1986). Despite different flavors of policy prescriptions held by the French
right and left, government intervention in “labor market policy, social protection policy,
and issues [related to] structural inconstancies” has remained constant (Levy, 2005, p.
107).
The women’s movement took great care to properly engage with government
policy. Edith Lhuillier, a prominent voice in the feminist movement, asserted in a Parti
Socialiste (PS) meeting that the “if [feminists] are going to play the institutional game,
and are obligated to play it properly” (Transcript of the meeting in Duchen, 1986, p. 116).
To this end, feminists partnered with politicians (particularily in PS), to pursue policy
changes that helped revise the structures of inequality and ensure that women had truly
the same access to political, social and economic opportunities as men, without having to
compromise on the unique characteristics that made them women. In the words of
political activists, the overarching theme of engagement with government was for a
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woman’s “right to be different biologically … but to squash any resulting political
difference” (Guillaumin, 1979). Among the most radical factions of French feminists
there was a distrust of male politicians, and a move to only support female legislators.
Such activists believed that “it was up to women to formulate women’s politics”
(Duchen, 1987).
It is important to note that French feminists did not see the government’s role as
changing societies’ views about the gender norms, nor did they focus on convincing men
to do traditional “women’s work.” Rather, they believed that the government was
resonsible for ensuring that the differences between the genders did not result in
inequalities. When they used the clause in Constitution of 1946 that asserted that all
French citizens were equal before the law to strengthen their claims to increased social,
political, and economic access, they did not substitute equality with “sameness.” In
seeking liberation and equality, French feminists rejected the idea that they had to be
“just like men,” and instead focused on the important differences between the genders
and the unique role for women in society (Jardine, 1979). In order to guarantee equality,
they focused on public policies that made up for any differences could disadvantage
women.
The focus on the government’s role in mitigating any negative outcomes from
gender differences cut across political ideology. For example, conservative politician
Simone Veil stated, “I believe that men and women are rich in their differences and that
they are complementary. It is, moreover, in the name of these differences and of all that
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women can offer that it is necessary to demand equality in politics.”16 The ability of the
French women’s movement to appeal to both radicals and conservatives would help
solidify it as a cross-cutting force throughout the latter half of the 20th Century and the
beginning of the 21st and shape the claims that would be made about women’s role in
public life.
Laws around child care highlight the beliefs in the government’s role in ensuring
that women’s differences are not a disadvantage. The lobby for universal child care was
rooted in The Constitution of the Fifth Republic’s legal guarantee for the “right to work”
for all French citizens. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, women were committed to
guaranteeing that they actually had equality in the workplace. Women quickly realized
that guaranteeing work could not be done without overcoming many other structural
hurdles women faced with regards to gender-based workplace discrimination (Mazus,
1995, p. 49). In order to ensure workplace equality, reforms and laws would have to be
made that extended beyond employment. For example, child care, health care, and
maternity leave were part of ensuring equal opportunity at work that would result in equal
pay. Without them, women would not be competitive with their male colleagues.
The most wide-sweeping government response to women’s equality was the 1972
Law of Equal Pay between Men and Women.17 While the law was foundational in
ensuring gender equality, it is the interpretations and follow-ons to the law that are the
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most illustrative of the government ensuring conditions are met for equality. In a 1972
report to the Counseil Economique et Social, Yves Chaigneau writes
It would be illusionary to think that a legislative text could
by itself automatically solve completely the problem of
salary equality within the firm… in terms of other
contributing factors in disparities [between men and women
workers], they will disappear only with the formulation of
much broader and better adapted policies on women’s equal
right in all areas, especially in the employment, training and
social promotion. The success of such policies depends on
the modification of resources available and values around
womanhood when it involves the professional future of
young girls and women. (Chaigneau, 1972)
To that end, a series of structural reforms that further enhanced equal opportunities for
women were passed. As a result of the work of the Comite d’Etudes et de Liaison des
Problemes du Travail Feminin (CETF) and the writings of several prominent feminist
intellectuals the in early 1973 Prime Minister Pierre Messmer issued formal clarification
on the 1972 Equal Pay Law. In a decree dated March 27, 1973, PM Messmer asserted
that simply offering equal pay was not enough, and that “conditions for equality” must be
set by all employers, public and private.18
The conditions to which PM Messmer alluded would be codified in a series of
laws and edicts issued throughout 1975. For example, protections were codified for
pregnant women that both forbade employers from using pregnancy as grounds for
refusing to hire or terminating employment, and guarded women against having to reveal
pregnancy to their employers. Employers were also banned from firing women during
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medically advised maternity leave periods, and mandated that employers either pay
women during this period or face penalty fines.19
The importance of meeting women’s unique needs was further emphasized in a
series of decrees issued in March of 1984. While childcare and maternity leave were
codified in response to interpretations of the 1972 Equality Law, the decrees of 1984
emphasized the importance of structural reforms to the principles of the Equality Law.
The decree strengthened the child care system, requiring increased education for care
providers and expanding access for rural women. It also affirmed the equal “importance
of the roles of men and women in all stages of life … [and] that a woman’s life stage
should not inhibit her from economic equality.”20 The recognition both that womanhood
was valuable in society and that women may need support at various life stages would
prove essential for claims about women’s role in public life.

Claim’s About Public Life: Don’t Send a Man to do a Woman’s Job
The claims about women’s role in public life were a result of the focus on the
differences between men and women coupled with an emphasis on women fulfilling a
unique role in French public life. The focus on the contributions that only women can
make are seen in several aspects of public participation. In elected office, women are
often “othered,” and subjected to discrimination based on their gender. French politics
was no different, and when women first entered elected office they were often “teased
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about being different” or forced to serve only on committees related to family and social
services (Sineau, 1988). However, rather than downplaying their difference, or
attempting to assimilate into the previously all-male Parliament, women “aspired to
change the acceptable ways of doing politics” (Jenson & Sineau, 1994, p. 247). In
particular, women claimed that they were essential to changing the language of politics
and creating new norms and practices that would ensure equality for all citizens. As
Simone Veil, a former Minister of Health, Member of Parliament, and President of the
European Parliament stated, “I believe that men and women are rich in their differences
and that they are complementary. It is, moreover, in the name of these differences and of
all that women can offer that it is necessary to demand change in politics.”21
In the political arena, claims focused on the benefits brought about as a result of
the difference between men and women were successful in both increasing the number of
women in French politics and changing the character of the political process. Despite a
slow start to representation, in the past two decades, the number of women in the
National Assembly has increased from around 6% to nearly 40%.22 More important than
the increase in number of women has been the changes in the way women candidates
present themselves publicly, and the impact that elected and appointed officials have had
on the political process. In 2000 the Parite law was passed, requiring that parties run
equal candidates of both gender in national election. Additionally, parties must address an
equal number of “women’s issues” to those issues traditionally considered part of the
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political arena (defense, infrastructure, etc) on their official party platforms. While
individual women in politics still assert that cultural norms of sexism are present in the
political office,23 the reframing of women and women’s issues as a central part of the
political identity has invigorated and elevated the discourse around women’s public life
(Defossez, 2017). Such claims were ideologically independent and nearly universal. On
both the right and the left, these claims have been used to successfully elevate both
female candidates and women’s issues.
Claims about women’s economic participation are similarly rooted in beliefs
about the benefits of the difference between men and women. Traditionally, the claims
around the benefits of women’s workforce participation were used to lobby for increased
protections and benefits from employers. However, as the economy has shifted from
manual labor to a more service-based workforce, women have been able to more
effectively leverage their claims of difference to make inroads in the economy (Unit D2
“Gender Equality”, 2013). The claims have resulted in a proliferation of women in the
quickly-growing biotech and emerging technology market. France has one of the highest
percentage of female managers in the service sector in Europe.24 Under women’s
leadership, tech firms have led the way in economic growth, due in large part to
innovative work environments that have adopted to differential family situations and
retained employees in ways that the traditional economic sector has not (Feinstein, 2017).
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While the claims about French women’s participation in politics and the economy
resulted in increased participation by women, more notable is the impact that women
were able to have. Women not only joined politics and the workforce, but changed the
character and dialogue. Indeed, the focus of French women’s claims is not so much that
“we deserve to be included” as “we can make unique contributions.” These claims were
echoed by women in the French military, and top military leaders working to expand
opportunities for women.

Norway: A Nation of Citizens
Self-Identification: De-gendering Norms for a Norwegian Identity
The gender-neutral beliefs of Norway’s second-wave women’s movement have
roots in the struggle for Norwegian independence, drawing on Norway’s strong
egalitarian history as a means of differentiating itself from Denmark and Sweden. This
history can be seen in the late 19th Century, when Norwegian women appealed to their
economic contributions as citizens, focusing on the fact that they were active and
engaged citizens as a means of claiming more political rights. In the years leading up to
the 1905 referendum for independence from Sweden, focused on their economic
contributions to make the argument that that they too were citizens and deserved the same
benefits as their male counterparts. The way in which women in Norway characterized
their claims for enfranchisement were the foundation of de-gendered nature of the
Norwegian feminists in the second wave.
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Though women could not vote in the referendum for independence from Sweden,
they were active public advocates for the vote. The degree of Norwegian advocacy was a
result of the demographic difference between Norwegian and women in Western Europe.
Compared to much of Western Europe, Norwegian women were more likely to remain
unmarried or marry later in life, pursuing careers before domestic lives (Blom, 1980).
Participation in the workplace gave them credibility for their interactions and advocacy in
the public sphere. Additionally, compared to other women in Western Europe, they had
more “leisure time” to devote to political advocacy, as they had less expectations of
housework and childcare obligations (Hernes, 1987).
Women’s history of lobbying and interest-group organization made them
successful political activists for equality throughout the 20th Century. As the number of
women in the workforce grew, they began to demand more political involvement to
secure better working conditions, forming Norsk Kvinnesaksforening (Norwegian
Feminist Society) to formally lobby the government for increased rights and protections.
Norsk Kvinnesaksforening worked to create legislation to benefit all workers and ensure
that equality prevailed throughout the workforce. Political equality was included in this
quest for workplace equality. Given the gender-neutral nature of Norway’s constitution25
women made a claim for enfranchisement on the basis of their economic contributions to
the country.26 They emphasized their sameness with men due to their public economic
25
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contributions in order to appeal for increased sociopolitical benefits and protections (Van
der Ros, 1994). However, as long as Norway was legally under Swedish control, it would
unlikely that women would gain increased political rights. Women’s suffrage advocates
thus had to appeal to their male counterparts to gain independence from Sweden,27 in
order to secure their own rights.
The way in which women appealed to men to convince them to vote for
independence and thus women’s suffrage, was consistent with the Norwegian cultural
history of egalitarianism. As an independent country during the Middle ages, “aristocracy
or bourgeoisies in the European context was completely nonexistent” in Norway
(Norwegian National Commission, 1989). Formal class divisions were first imposed
when Norway was under Danish control in the 17th Century and then further entrenched
during subjugation to Sweden in the 19th. An assertion of independence was thus also a
call for a rejection of all things foreign, and a return to the foundational Norwegian
principles of egalitarianism. Women capitalized on the historically Norwegian nature of
egalitarianism to argue for independence. Regarding the importance of the referendum
for Norwegian independence to women, Martha Thynas, standing in for her husband as a
Labor party representative asserted:
Given the option to vote, no Norwegian women would
answer “no” to the question which will be posed on the 13th
[The date set for the referendum]. Yet alas, this is not a
plebiscite of the whole people but only of Norwegian men.
It undermines the value that women bring to Norwegian
society, in culture, economics, and status. We women feel
that we, too, belong to the people and wish to be regarded as
part of Norway, and cannot be so until we are free from
27
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existed for Swedish citizens in local elections.
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[Sweden’s] influence. (As quoted in Social-Demokraten, 10
August 1905)
The referendum was successful, with less than 100 people voting against it. Norway now
operated under gender-neutral Constitution of 1814, and women were grander suffrage.28
The appeal to the sameness between men and women continued after
independence, and is echoed in the way in which women made claims for legislation on
“women’s issues” during the second wave feminist movement. In the first half of the 20th
Century, women in the Sorting focused on offloading such things as child care and
domestic work from individual women to public society through welfare state reform
(Epsing-Andersen, 1990; Hernes, 1987). Concurrently, they sought to elevate the
financial status of single or stay-at-home mothers by reframing mothering as “work”
rather than a women’s burden, and providing stipends, health care, and pensions for
mothers (Sainsbury, 1999). By 1915, policies on public childcare and motherhood
salaries were in place. This framing of women’s issues as work was unique among social
welfare states. Women being compensated for providing a public good moved social
policies away from been interpreted as “protective” of women or “paternalistic,” and
towards inclusive egalitarianism.
The women’s movements focus on men and women as identical was a vital part
of the ideal Norwegian society. Writing in the Journal of the Norwegian Women’s
Movement, Bjornstjerne Bjornson asserted, “a modern woman is a woman … who
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While women were given legal suffrage as part of the referendum on independence, the practice was
phased in between 1905-1913. Initially only women that paid taxes (i.e. were working citizens) were
allowed to vote. However by 1913, all citizens, regardless of income, were enfranchised.
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understand that the fate of her children is mainly decided by society, and that her work is
pointless, maybe even in vain, if that society sees her as different” (Transaltion in Blom I.
, 2004, p. 125). Such an assertion downplays gender differences, even when related to
parenthood. Raising children, something that for many women’s movements was seen as
the crucial difference between men and women, was seen as being in vain if men and
women were to be perceived differently from one another.
Because of the way in which child care, early childhood education, and healthcare
opportunities, were framed, as well as the introduction of compensated parental leave,
women were able to navigate the public arena more easily knowing that they could
openly discuss issues of childcare and health without repercussion. Norway became a
state that “[did] not force harder choices on women than on men … women could
continue to have children, yet there were also other roads to self-realization open to them
… women did not have to choose futures that demanded greater sacrifices from them
than were expected of men” (Hernes, 1987, p. 15).
The similarity between men and women was codified with the Equal Status Act
(ESA) of 1978. While policies to ensure workplace equality had begun to be
implemented in the early 20th Century, in the second half of the 20th Century women
wanted to ensure that gender was not grounds for social discrimination either. The ESA
ensure that men and women were not only treated the same but given the same amount of
attention and exposure in society. For example, the ESA “mandates that books, audio and
video tapes, and other materials used in educational institutions promote the ideas of
gender equality” (Kelber, 1994, p. 75). In practice, this meant that everything from math
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problems to the literature assigned in school represent an egalitarian society and actively
promote the equal status of men and women.
Egalitarian gender neutrality, a framework initially used by Norwegian leaders to
differentiate Norwegian culture from that of the Swedes and Danes, became an important
identifier of the women’s movement. Women were able to leverage the memories of the
past to appeal for increased rights in the present. The result was a deliberate effort to degender typical “women’s” issues and universalize citizenship.

Role of the Government: Offload the private to make it part of public life
As part of the historical commitment to egalitarianism, the Norwegian
government was proactive in introducing legislation that muted the difference between
the genders in the years following independence from Sweden. The gender-neutral
language of the constitution, coupled with a cultural dedication to social equality, resulted
in the welfare of all citizens being greatly improved after independence. Throughout the
early part of the 20th Century, the Norwegian government was actively engaged in
creating a redistributive welfare state that preferenced worker’s rights. Between 19051909, a series of labor laws were passed that limited work hours, regulated workers
conditions, and supported the family life of workers. Childcare allowances were
integrated into the national welfare scheme, as were social security payments for families
that required one parent to leave the workforce for a period to care for a family member.
These provisions were enacted to promote the “independence, value, and continued
contribution of all Norwegian citizens” (Unidentified member of the Sorting quoted in
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Flora 1986, 125). The Nordic Women’s Rights association was at the forefront of
revisions to labor policies, arguing that a universal eight-hour work day would ensure that
all citizens could adequately contribute to the economic well-being of the country while
also ensuring that essential domestic tasks did not go unfulfilled (Paletschek, 2005).
Explicit in their argument was that women had a place in the public workforce, and men
had a place in domestic roles. Such policies not only directly benefited workers, but
shifted social norms. Not only did it become acceptable (and even encouraged) for
women to be in the public workforce, but men were expected to be part of domestic life.
Such government policies worked to change social attitudes about acceptable behavior
and gender roles.
Women also benefitted from both a legislative and executive branch that was on
the forefront of policies aimed at redistributive egalitarianism. As political scientist and
Labor Party politician Helga Hernes (1988) describes, the government was committed to
being an active participant in the quest for equity, not just equality, for all of its citizens.
The commitment to economic parity resulted in less of a disparity in professional
valuation than is seen in other Western countries. Whereas traditional “women’s” work,
such as nursing, elementary education, and child care, often have relatively low salaries,
Norway has very little gendered gap in income disparity.29
Like other aspects of Norwegian legislation, the ESA focused on shaping attitudes
more than on delivering actual provisions. It was largely a symbolic measure on the part

29

World Economic Forum has deemed Norway the second most equal country with regards to economic
opportunity and access with more than 85% of all economic gender gaps closed. This compares to a 59%
average for the United States and Europe.
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of the Sorting to recognize the importance of egalitarianism among Norwegian citizens.
As Beatrice Halsaa, political scientist and member of the Equal Status Council, remarked,
On the one hand, the Act is intended to ensure substantial
equality of treatment in all areas of life. On the other hand,
the law is intended to influence attitudes about sex roles,
committing the authorities to work actively for equal status
through instruments that may not specifically be outlined in
policy (Halsaa, 1989, p. 25).
The instruments that Dr. Halsaa was referring to were found in the community. Indeed, if
equal status was actually to be achieved, it would be through changes in beliefs that and
behavior so that equality was practiced in the way that the legislation intended.
Child care was similarly implemented to both provide a social necessity and shape
attitudes and values towards gender neutral egalitarianism. Norway’s policies encouraged
a dual-earner socioeconomic model whereby both the mother and father were
incentivized to work and be engaged in childrearing (Esping-Andersen, 2002; Korpi,
2000). In 1975, the federal government created a shared local-federally funded child care
scheme that ensured that all working citizens would have access to childcare as they
needed it to engage in Norway’s economic public life (Havnes & Mogstad, 2009). In
1978 the Sorting introduced gender-neutral leave, with each parent getting 18 weeks of
paid leave upon the birth of a child. Parental leave was extended to 12 months in 1993
and to 13 months in 2002. Further, as part of the 1993 act, a portion of leave was
explicitly designated for fathers that was non-transferable to mothers (Duvander,
Lappegård, & Andersson, 2010). The implications of the so-called “daddy quota” was
that nearly 70% of Norwegian fathers take the full portion of parental leave after the birth
of a first child and over 80% after the birth of a second (Lappegård, 2008).
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Norway’s childcare system was the result both of a social welfare state that
valued a productive and egalitarian workforce and a women’s movement that emphasized
the importance of social equality. Indeed, the emphasis on the “daddy quota” is a “break”
with traditional feminist policies. While historically women’s movements had worked for
policies that made women equal to men, the Norwegian women focused on
simultaneously brining men into equality with women (Brandth & Kvande, 2009). The
shape of government policies echoed this, with egalitarian policies that helped to flatten
society and shape social attitudes towards a rejection of traditional gender roles and a
focus on the obligations of citizenship.

Claims about Public Life: Recipients and Participants in the Welfare State
Women’s claims to public participation are based on citizenship rights and
obligations. Rather than emphasize the unique role that women play in society, they
emphasize that women are part of the broader society. Women have been careful to
emphasize that they desire to improve equality in general rather than specifically improve
women’s historically subordinate position (Van der Ros, 1994). Women’s claims to
equality were reinforced by Norway’s early experience with women’s formal political
representation (Blom I. , Women's politics and women in politics in Norway since the
end of the nineteenth century, 1987). By 1983, over 37% of elected officials were women
and in 1986 the Labour Party government was headed female Prime Minister who
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appointed 40% female cabinet ministers.30 Especially when compared to the rest of the
developed Western democracies, women occupied a large place in public office.
While women continued to increase in prominence in public life, they rarely used
their positions to attempt to change the process or structures of government. Women
campaigned and were elected on their contributions to society (Skjeie & Forde, 1989).
The tradition of “moral representation” in Norwegian politics, a focus on policies that
emphasize the good of the collective over individual identity groups (Gilbert, 1995),
helped women assimilate into political life and gain popularity for their gender-neutral
practices.
In the economic sphere, women similarly claimed that equality was grounded in
their role as citizens. Women’s increased labor force participation has largely been a
result of wide-spread campaigns about social obligation coupled with a service-heavy
economy. Due to Norway’s resource wealth, it boasts a disproportionality high level of
service-sector jobs. Also, it transitioned quickly to a service economy while other
countries were focused on manufacturing and agricultural labor (Johnsen, 2012). Physical
ability has thus not been a prominent factor of economic participation, removing one of
the traditional barriers for women entering the workforce. Because the primary economic
drivers are not very gendered, women have been able to enjoy nearly equal footing to
men in competition for employment, and by the 1970s had nearly identical workforce
participation to men (76% vs 80%).31

30

Source: World Bank Data

31

Source: OECD Data
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Both the political system and the service-heavy economic foundation of the
country have reinforced women’s claims for equality based on their sameness. This
undercurrent of equity is prominent on the right and the left. Even among groups and
individuals that espoused more traditional gender norms, they did so in such a way that
emphasized that motherhood and domestic work was work. Such groups also advocated
for increased domestic participation by men. Women were unified around the belief that
there was little difference between men and women. Further, the nearly gender-neutral
social benefit provisions have a created a dialogue around equal obligation for Norwegian
women. As I will show in Chapter 5, both the history of gender-neutral political and
economic participation and the benefit provision are leveraged to make claims about the
need for women in the Norwegian Armed Services.

United States: Individuals and Empowerment
Self-Identification: The Same or Different?
Compared to Norway and France, feminism in the United States has a much more
recent history. While there was a consolidated and organized women’s suffrage
movement in the 1910s, after the passage of the 19th Amendment to the United States
Constitution (1920), the women became less organized, and as a group less politically
active until the 1960s. When women did organize and emerge as a political group, they
were not homogenous, but “diverse and dis-unified … mirroring the complexity of
American society” (Costain, 1992, p. 26). Much like the diversity of politics in the United
States as a whole, the women’s movement lacked a cohesive or unifying identity. Such
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discord is common in contentious social policy issues in the United States, with issues
rising to prominence only to be dropped when a new ideological identity comes into
favor (Baumgartner & Jones, 2009). One of the biggest sources of discord and disunity
among women’s groups in the United States was the identity of women compared to
men. The roots of this disagreement are seen in the aftermath of the ratification of the 19th
Amendment, with disagreements as to whether women should have the same legal rights
and responsibilities as men, or whether biological and/or social differences warranted
laws specifically tailored to meet their needs (Lemons, 1973). A fissure developed among
the women that had fought for the right to vote, between those that believed that true
equality would only be achieved when women were seen as the same as men, and those
that believed that women could be different and also equal.
Women on both side of the argument emphasized that their view would be the
best for individual women. Proponents the belief that men and women should be subject
to the same rights and responsibilities asserted that as long as men and women were
treated differently, women would not be able to live up to their potential. Women
adhering to this belief called upon women to recognize their identity and value beyond
the socially mandated roles of wife and mother in order to find their humanity. Betty
Friedan, writing in 1963’s Feminine Mystique, asserts “In a sense that goes beyond any
woman's life, I think this is a crisis of women growing up—a turning point from an
immaturity that has been called femininity to full human identity” (Friedan, 2010, p.
136). Friedan’s argument hinges on the belief that traditionally prescribed gender roles
are constructed to keep women subservient and beholden to a “feminine mystique” that is
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created by men to keep women out of the public arena. If women are to recognize their
potential, they must focus their effort on ensuring that women are treated the same as
men. Women that adhered to a belief in the sameness of men and women appealed to the
growing discontent of housewives in the United States in the post-World War II era.
After the war, women left factories and service jobs to reassume their domestic identity
now that the male labor force had returned. In the decades that followed the War, there
was a further emphasis on growing the American population. As one woman that left her
job to raise a family asserted in response to why she supported formal equal rights:
It makes me mad – makes me feel like a child – when I have
to ask my husband for money. My mother was always
dependent on my father and so fearful of life. She is lost now
without him. It frightens me, the thought of being dependent
like my mother, even though I have a happy marriage. … It
improves your sense of self-worth when you don’t depend
on your husband for everything good in life, when you can
get it for yourself. I don’t want [my daughter] to have the
fears that paralyzed my mother and that I’ve always had to
fight. I want her to have real options. (Tong, 2013)
To overcome the fear and humiliation associated decreased social status of wives and
mothers, women argued for equal treatment with regards to economic opportunities that
would allow women to be untethered from their husbands.
The emphasis on the sameness between men and women most closely aligned
with liberal feminist beliefs. The basic tenets of the liberal women’s movement adhered
to women’s legal equality with a focus on personal liberty and individual rights (Banks,
1981; Ferree, 1987). Equality in access to education, political rights, economic rights and
property ownership were framed as promises guaranteed by the Declaration of
Independence’s focus on each individual American’s right to life, liberty and the pursuit
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of happiness. Liberal feminists based their claims on the belief that women’s capacity to
freely compete and participate without prejudice or favor would benefit the most
individual citizens (Brenner, 1996). There was little discussion about whether any
accommodations were needed to ensure equality for women as the focus was more on
equality in access and opportunity than in result.
Not all women activists in the United States’ second wave movement argued that
women should be treated the same as men. There was a strong faction of women that
promoted differential treatment from men. Though arguing for different policies and
social norms, these women appealed to the logic that it was in the best interest of
individual women and their ability to live up to their potential. Though an ideological
fissure existed, the appeal to individuality was the same.
Women that stressed the difference between men and women focused on the
mother-child bond or the uniqueness of pregnancy as both a medical and psychological
condition as the roots of this difference. They viewed these as differences to be
celebrated, and advocated for a strong understanding of these differences in order to
ensure women were prepared if they chose to enter public life (Chesler, 1988). They
argued that men and women had different roles in society and that they had to approach
public life differently. Further, they asserted that if the difference between men and
women was not emphasized, that women be forced to adopt “male-defined abstract
standards … and attempt to assimilate into male norms” (Brenner, 1996, p. 46). If forced
to do so, women would not be able to realize their potential in society.
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The emphasis on the unique character of women came from both the left and right
of the political spectrum. On the left, Zillah R. Eisenstein (1978) critiqued the assertion
that men and women should be viewed as the same in society as privileged in that ignores
the compounded impact that race and class have on women’s inequality. She argues that
womanhood is incompatible with a “mutually reinforcing dialectical relationship between
capitalist class structure and hierarchical sexual structuring,” and that a socialist model
that incorporates and represents the differences was necessary if women were to
experience equality in public life (Eisenstein, 1978).
A backlash to the idea that women were to be viewed as the same as men also
emerged from conservatives. Phyllis Schlafly (1977) attacked the “women’s liberation”
movement as being focused on the sameness of men and women “at the expense of
women, babies, and society itself.” To be successful, she asserted, women must
“understand the differences between men and women,” and rather than fight for political
economic equity, leverage their difference to “motivate, inspire, encourage, teach,
restrain, and reward men” (Schlafly, 1977). While not exhaustive, Eisenstein and
Schlafly’s critiques of the liberal feminists’ emphasis on sameness highlight the extent of
the disunity experienced in the United States women’s movement. Women were neither
unified by political ideology nor belief about the role of women in society.
The lack of agreement around the self-identity of the women’s movement in the
United States was further heighted by the often-contentious relationship between the
women’s movement and the Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s. On the one hand,
injustices faced by the African American community and the lack of political and
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economic opportunities for women shared a common enemy: the white patriarchy.
Individual white women became active and instrumental in the Civil Rights movement,
both by challenging the segregation of Southern churches and the prohibition against
interracial matrimonial relationships. As Lilian Smith, a prominent white anti-segregation
activist and author argued “southing was wrong with a world that tells you that love is
good and people are important and then forces you to deny love and humiliate people”
(Smith, 1994, p. 28). Much of the language of de-segregation was also used by feminists.
Women attacked the system that viewed them as different. Whether they were formal
prohibitions against women’s participation in economic systems, or informal expectations
on women’s role in society, women had largely become second class citizens. Some
women, such as Lilian Smith, saw civil rights as going hand in hand with women’s rights.
The work in the civil rights movement gave some women both the credibility to speak on
public issues and the tools to organize and lobby for social change.
However, women’s involvement in the Civil Rights movement also highlighted
many of the problems brought about by the intersection of class, race and gender that was
present in the United States. It became increasingly evident that “white women”
feminism was not universal for all women in the United States. The case of white
women’s involvement in student protests highlights some of the discontent among the
women’s movement. Throughout the 1960s, young black women increasingly joined the
Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), a student-led group that engaged
in direct-action protests against segregation throughout the South. Though initially
welcoming of white members, black women in the SNCC became increasingly suspicious
71

of white women. While members of the SNCC were being harassed, arrested, and often
physically harmed by the police, white women were able to “return to a white refuge”
that benefited and protected them (Belfrange, 1965, p. 80). Particularly under scrutiny
from the SNCC and civil rights leaders were liberal feminists. The lack of
intersectionality practiced by liberal feminists and the underlying assumptions that all
people were equal was deemed the province of rich white women.
The contention over the identity of women further manifested in debates and
beliefs about higher education. For those that emphasized men and women being the
same, college was seen as an essential step in a women’s development because it was
often the first time in a woman’s life that she was held to academic and intellectual
standards that did not have any regard for sex or gender (Evans, Personal Politics: The
Roost of Women's Liberation in the Civil Rights Movement and the New Left, 1979).
College campuses were seen as essential places for women to understand their humanity,
not just the expectations that society has for them. Those that emphasized the differences
between men and women, and focused on women’s unique role asserted that college was
a time for women to better learn how to “inspire in her home a vision of the meaning of
life and freedom … help her husband find values that will give purpose to his specialized
daily chores … [and] teach her children the uniqueness of each individual human being”
(Adlai Stevenson quoted in Friedan, 2010, p 53). This disunity in the role of hinger
education further hindered women from having a unified claim about their role in public
lives. College and university campuses were essential places for activism and the homes
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of many prominent women’s rights groups. However, despite often being co-located with
one another, women’s groups did not always have unity of effort.
Even when high-level women seemingly came together in the 1960s to advance
the causes of women’s rights, there remained disagreement about women’s self-identity.
In the report provided to President Kennedy, the President’s Commission on the Status of
Women opened with saying that “one of the greatest freedoms … is the freedom to
choose among different life patterns” (President's Commission on the Status of Women,
1963). The emphasis on the ability to choose one’s “life pattern” set the stage for a report
that walked a fine line between advocating for women in the workforce and women in the
home. The overarching theme of the report was that women should be free to pursue
whatever course in life was best for them. It did not make a cohesive claim about what
women should do in the public life, just that they should be free to pursue the options that
best suited them. The report also fell short of making any specific policy
recommendations with regards to the traditional women’s issues such as child care of
parental leave. Rather, it emphasized the need to support female individualism.
The lack of a cohesive understanding about the self-identification of women and
their role in public life resulted in an unharmonious and contentious practice of feminism
in the United States. Due to this, there was an emphasis on individual choice and
responsibility. Often, both the structural and cultural roots of women’s inequality were
left unaddressed. The only agreement was that individual women should be successful
within the system in the way they wanted.
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Role of Government: Limited Intervention to allow for Individual Responsibility
The United States’ political model is characterized by limited government
intervention into the lives of its citizens. There is an historic belief in the ability of liberal
markets to create a beneficial equilibrium and a distrust of government intervention to
promote socioeconomic equality (Baumgartner & Jones, 2009). Efforts at adopting parts
of a welfare-state model of equality assurance, especially with regards to employment,
have failed because of the interferences of “status groups and echelons in private
industry” (Epsing-Andersen, 1990, p. 97). The only government action or intervention
that is celebrated is removing the barriers to competition. In the absence of government
intervention, there has been a focus on individual empowerment to obtain the tools
necessary to achieve equality.
Despite the historical hands-off approach of the United State government’s
involvement with social issues, there was a concerted effort to lobby for women’s
formalized legislative equality. By the early-1970s a group of politically astute and elite
women coalesced with the goal of changing the political landscape in a way that would
be favorable to women (Ferree & Hess, 1994). The growth of the National Organization
of Women (NOW) into a formidable lobbying force emboldened feminists to pursue the
Equal Rights Amendment (ERA).32 The ERA would prove to be a litmus test both for
beliefs in the role of women in society and the role of government in intervening in
matters of social and economic equality.
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During the 1970s NOW’s lobbying budget grew from $160,000 to $500,000. Source; National NOW
Times, October 1982.
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When the ERA was introduced in Congress in 1971, it enjoyed great bipartisan
support and by 1972 easily passed both the House of Representatives (354 yeas, 24 nays,
and 51 abstaining) and the Senate (84 yeas, 8 nays and 7 abstaining), thanks in large part
to the lobbying efforts of NOW. The text of the ERA was simple and direct:
Section 1. Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or
abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex.
Section 2. The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.
Section 3. This amendment shall take effect two years after the date
of ratification
Despite the legislative support, the ERA ultimately failed to be ratified by the states. Its
failure illustrates both the disagreement that existed (and continues to exist) in the United
States’ women’s movement and the wariness of Americans towards government
intervention in social policy. As Senator Lloyd of Utah noted, most Americans supported
equal rights for men and women, but not in a way that “gave the appearance that the
government was changing social roles” (Berry, 1988, p. 100).
While NOW had influence with enough key politicians to garner support for the
ERA in congress, divisions among women still resonated among the general population.
In an effort to block its ratification after passage, the ERA was painted as government
overreach attempting to erode values and social roles. The primary ideological challenge
against the ERA was mounted by self-described “traditionalists” who argued that
ratification of the ERA would result in a “substantive change in women’s roles … and a
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government-mandated change to the social order” (Mansbridge, 2015, p. 20). Phyllis
Schlafly’s Eagle Form drew parallels to the government-mandated desegregation of
public restrooms as a result of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to argue that passage of the
ERA would “impact the privacy and safety of women and girls by forcibly removing
gender designations for bathrooms, locker rooms, jails and hospital rooms.”33 Concerns
over unisex bathrooms and forced mixing of the sexes were used to emphasize the extent
to which the government would intervene into the everyday lives of Americans if the
ERA were to be ratified.
Government overreach was used as a primary argument against the ERA because,
even among traditionalists, there was general support for a women’s choice to enter the
workforce and an overall positive attitude about women in politics and higher education
(Donnelly, 2013). The contention came around the government’s role in promoting social
change, or potentially forcing individuals to adopt a particular way of engaging in the
public sphere.
Ultimately, the traditionalists were able to mount enough of a campaign against
the ERA that in 1982 it failed to gain enough state approval for ratification. The failure
was largely a result of the traditionalists’ ability to drum up fear about what the
government possibly could do to dictate women’s roles, rather than the reality of
women’s experiences (Ferree & Hess, 1994).34 The United States is unique among
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President Nixon’s veto of the Comprehensive Childcare Act, after its passage through both houses of
congress represents another example of legislative decisions based on fear (“the Sovietization of American
children”).
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developed democracies in that it does not have a national gender equity policy. In the
absence of such, women’s activists have reverted to a model of individual liberalism,
stressing the importance of women making their own personal and professional decisions
(Ferree, 1987; Brenner, 1996).
Women activists in the United States have done this through two primary strains
of action. First is the backing of individual female political candidates. Facing defeat of
the ERA and a conservative executive administration voted-in in 1980, progressive
women’s organizations reasoned that getting women elected to public office was the only
way to keep women’s equality in the public discourse (Costain, 1992). NOW initiated an
“elect women” campaign both to substantively ensure women were in seats of power and
to symbolically elevate the discourse on women’s rights. Second is the targeting of
private industry and celebrating the accomplishments of women’s success in the private
sector. Indeed, while the federal government failed to ratify the ERA, the private sector
has emerged as a place of equality. Women in business mentorship programs, and
women’s conferences began to emerge.35
The strides made by female politicians and women in the private sector reflects
the values of individual equality, and also the often problematic fissures in the United
States’ women’s movement. While individual women have been successful in both
politics and the private sector, they are overwhelmingly women from privileged
backgrounds with access to privately-funded childcare and medical care (Gordon &
Chase-Lansdale, 2001). Indeed, though the government does not restrict women’s
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participation in any aspect of social, political, or economic life, it does not enable it
either. Legacies of oppression due to race, social class, or religion have gone
unaddressed. And while there is an emphasis on the choice of individuals to participate,
the responsibility to overcome structural inequalities is also left up to them.

Claims about Public Life: Ask what you can do, and do it.
In the United States, there is not a universal ideal claim about women’s public
participation. Rater, there is a focus on equal opportunity and equal status under the law.
Both the de-centralization of political power of the federal government and the historical
commitment to the primacy of the liberal markets has made the United States focused on
the role and impact of individuals. The success of individual women has been held up as
proof that women have equal rights and opportunities (Nelson & Carver, 1994).
However, the success of individual women has not translated into a more general
improvement for women. While the United States has a high, and increasingly growing
number of female CEOs and members of boards of directors, it simultaneously ranks
below other developed democracies in terms of the average wage gap and other gender
equality indices (World Economic Forum , 2016). The success of these individuals has
not translated into an overall increase in the quality of life or opportunities for women.
Additionally, though women have increased in political representation, there has
continued to be a failure of women’s issues to be broadly advanced among the national
legislatures. Especially in the 1970s and 1980s, women that ran “as women,” or
campaigned on a platform centered on “women’s issues” deviated from it once in office
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(Plutzer & Zipp, 1996). Once in office, women tended to put the interests of their race or
social class above that of their gender in making decisions as to how to vote or what bills
to introduce (Vega & Firestone, 1995). In the absence of claims that were able to advance
the condition of women broadly, women’s movements turned their attention to the
success and empowerment of individual women.

Claims and Integration
In this chapter, I highlighted how different starting points in beliefs about equality
informed claims about women’s service in public life. These claims provide valuable
insight into understanding the variation of women’s integration into the military. Both the
strength and universal appeal of the claims, as well as their ability to coincide with
military culture help to better explain the environment in which integration was taking
place. In most of the studies of gender integration, laws and policies about women’s are
the starting point. Introducing claims about women’s role in public life starts the inquiry
a step earlier.
Understanding how claims drive the integration process is especially important
given recent scholarship on the important link between the security of women and the
security of states. As evidenced through the work of Valerie M. Hudson, Bonnie BallifSpanvill, Mary Caprioli, and Chad F. Emmett (2012), the way that women are treated in
society is a key predictor to overall security, stability and prosperity. Including women in
security forces has been a method used to safeguard against potential abuses of women
(Simić, 2010). However, laws and policies for inclusion are not sufficient to capture the
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full benefits from women’s participation. The way in which these laws are implemented
and the process by which women come to participate in public life matters for a
successful capture of these benefits (Ruppel, 2008; Budgeon, 2001; Razavi, 2016).
Indeed, the differences in the pathway matters.
In chapter 3 I highlight how these differing beliefs allow for a rich study of the
variation in gender integration. In doing so, we are able to view military policies as a
result of broader sociopolitical beliefs and examine the roots of their differences.
Additionally, the strength of the claim matters. In both France and Norway,
women’s claims about their role in public life had near universal appeal. They also
worked to increase the status of women more broadly, through the implementation of
national level policies aimed at gender equality. Conversely, in the United States, the lack
of a universal claim meant that the success of some women did not necessarily translate
into improved status or opportunity for all. In chapters 4-6 I will show how these claims
interact with military culture to provide either conducive or restrictive environments for
women’s integration.
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CHAPTER 3
From Inclusion to Integration:
Talking about the military and women in it

The differences in beliefs about gender equality discussed in chapter 2 are
exemplified by how women were used in the military. The United States had to contend
with restrictive laws about what women were allowed to do in combat environments. In
combat, women were used in temporary positions to meet mission needs. For example,
Female Engagement Teams (FET) teams augmented infantry units engaged in village
stability operations (VSO). These teams, attached to infantry units to engage with women
in villages, followed very close legal guidance to ensure they were in alignment with the
so-called “combat exclusion” policy that was in place when the United States invaded
Afghanistan in 2001 (Lemmon, 2015). Women received differential initial training from
their male counterparts and were kept in separate quarters aside from the time spent
conducting missions. While FET teams were essential for success that the United States
military had in VSOs, the women that participated in them were never fully viewed as
part of the infantry units to which they were attached.
Norway’s employment of women in is exemplified by the appointment of Colonel
Ingrid Gjerde, a decorated infantry officer, as commander of all Norwegian forces in
Afghanistan. While her gender was touted by the international community, the
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Norwegian military greatly downplayed it, focusing instead on her proven leadership
ability and combat proficiency (Matlary & Petersson, 2013). Her service is reflective of
the sameness of service experienced by men and women in Norwegian society.
simultaneous development and security, using purposely designed mixed-gendered
infantry teams to gain the trust of the local population while engaging with the enemy.36
The French military employed tactics and strategies that were consistent with the
belief that men and women were different, yet of equal value. Women were often
specifically chosen to conduct certain missions, and identified as essential for the
realization of long-term strategic plans. When the French were given control of the Tagab
Valley, an area that the Soviets couldn’t pacify in the 1980s and in which the British had
suffered their greatest losses in the previous months, they developed a strategy of
simultaneous development and security, using purposely designed mixed-gendered
infantry teams to gain the trust of the local population while engaging with the enemy.37
Such tactical innovation is indicative of the way in which the French have employed
gender integration and the resulting high level of integration that they experience.
These differential ways in which women were employed resulted in differential
outcomes in Afghanistan and has been the subject of much military study. The director
of the military studies department at Army Command and General Staff College notes
that the “women in Afghanistan, to include FET teams, and the work of our NATO allies
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is one of the most popular topics of study for our students.”38 For example, Lieutenant
Colonel Tyra Harding found that FET teams attached to United States’ infantry units
were essential to successfully moving from the “hold” to the “build” phase of the clearhold-build counterinsurgency triad.39 However, getting “buy in” from infantry
commanders was exceedingly difficult. Especially when compared to coalition allies,
United States’ platoon and company level commanders frequently “left the women
behind” on missions because they were “not part of standard infantry tactics or training”
(Harding, 2012, p. 18). In her final paper for the Naval Postgraduate School, Stephanie
Erwin compared Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) in Afghanistan, highlighting the
differences of women’s roles in the militaries of the various countries that had control of
the different RCs. In her analysis, she found that degree of women’s participation in the
military impacted not only combat outcomes, but the ability of ISAF forces to engage
with the local population and create indigenous governments (Erwin, 2012). She
highlights Faryab Province, under Norwegian control, as being an effective example of
women-led provincial rebuilding.40
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In addition to different use in and impact on combat operations, women have had
different experiences in the domestic context of military service. This difference is
highlighted through recent notable events. On March 4, 2017, Thomas Brennan, a former
United States Marine and journalist, reported for The War Horse that a website, “Marines
United,” with over 30,000 current and former members of the United States military as
subscribers, had uploaded thousands of pictures of scantily clad or nude female service
members. Some of the photos were taken unwillingly, while others were shared in a
“revenge porn” manner, but all contained descriptions of rape, violence, and lewd sexual
activities that visitors to the site wanted to engage in with those women. Members of the
military, veterans, politicians, and citizens of the United States were outraged. Senator
Gillibrand’s comments echoed the sentiments of many when she asked, “how can a
country that sends so many women to war, women who are willing to die for this country,
produce Marines and Soldiers who are willing to do this.”41 Indeed, the United States has
one of the highest percentages of women in their militaries, yet still has what service
members have dubbed a “cultural problem” (Ackerman, 2015) that hinders women’s
ability to both be seen as equals and influence change among the ranks.
In 2016, Jegertroppen, or Hunter Troop, an all-female elite special forces unit,
completed training in Norway, as part of a pilot to test whether women had the ability to
endure the country’s hardest military training and harshest environmental conditions
without assistance from their male peers (Braw, 2016). The women-only makeup of the
Troop was a departure for the Norwegian military, historically emphasizing gender
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neutrality. Three years earlier, universal conscription was passed, and gender-neutral
bunking and berthing was adopted after a long-running study found that gender-neutral
standards dramatically reduced (to less than 8 reports/year) instances of sexual
harassment or assault (Fasting, 2011). Yet despite these advancements, officials in
Norway continue to pursue measures as to how to increase both the number of women in
the military and number of women who make a career out of service. As Frank Steder,
special researcher on women in the services for the Norwegian Defense Research
Institute stated, “Norway should continually be a pioneer for gender equality in all
aspects, we’re not doing enough to engage women, to encourage them, to keep them as
valuable members of our armed forces.”42
Newly elected French President Macron, in a March 2017 interview with
Reuters43 asserted that France was facing “turbulent times” with an increase in homegrown radicalization and the targeting of French Citizens abroad. To combat this, he
called for the recruitment of 60,000 more French women into the military, citing women
as “proven to fight radicalization in a way that men cannot.” His statement was met with
over 80% approval rating from the French public, and French Defense ministers began to
deliberate on how to appeal to female recruits to meet the needs of their country.44
Using both the impact that women have tactically and their experience in the
military to understand women’s integration is unique in studying women in the military.
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In this chapter I discuss the evolution of the study of women in the military and introduce
my theory of how claims about women’s participation in public life contributes to gender
integration. I highlight how there have been great strides made in understanding the
autonomy of women to choose to participate in the military despite the permeation of
masculinity throughout Western military culture. However, I also point out the
deficiencies in much of our understanding of women’s military participation, noting that
the focus tends to be on either the legal or numerical inclusion of women, and the
military is still essentialized as solely focused on violence and killing. I then go on to
discuss the importance of the military’s other roles, and discuss how military culture and
the response to changing global politics have influenced what roles are the most
emphasized. I operationalize integration through the impact that women have on various
aspects of the military, and introduce the components of integration. I explain how
integration is a result of the interaction between legal provisions and functional
participation, spurred and constrained by the interaction between claims about women’s
service and military culture. I end by briefly highlighting the differences in women’s
impact on the military observed in France, Norway and the United States and how they
are reflective of high, moderate, and low levels of integration respectively.

The Evolution of the Study of Women in the Military
Historically, the scholarship on women’s inclusion in the military has treated it as
a one-way process. Women join the military. The military changes women, or forces
them to conform to their historical masculine culture. Most of the variation studied
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centers on the differences in number of women in the military or laws about women’s
participation. These is little examination as to what impact women have on the military or
the relationship between military service and broader public life. I argue that to
understand integration, we must examine impact. While the current scholarship has been
instrumental in elevating the importance of women in the study of war and the military, it
falls short in explaining the more nuanced variations we see in women’s integration into
Western militaries. This failure stems largely from both the segmented operationalization
– focusing either on number or laws – of women’s participation and the essentialization
of the military. An emphasis on laws over-simplifies many facets of military service,
especially as militaries have professionalized. As a result, the emphasis has been on
inclusion, bringing women into the military, rather than integration, incorporating women
in such a way that they are able to have a beneficial impact on military tactics and
strategies. The existing studies have set the stage in highlighting both that there is
variation in women’s participation and that this difference matters. Yet do not fully
explain the current variation or how women have been able to impact the military.
Studies of women’s participation in the military have grown out of the broader
literature on women in war. A consequence of the growth of feminist discourse in
political science and international relations in the late twentieth century has been a move
to understand women “outside the homogenous bonds of motherhood and reproduction”
(Ferguson, 1988). Understanding women’s role in war, to include their participation in
the military, is one such area that has expanded. Particularly in the women, peace, and
security (WPS) arena, the literature has been moving beyond assuming that women are
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essentially pacific in nature, and towards understanding the totality of women’s
participation during war and conflict.
The recent emphasis on the importance of gendering security studies in WPS
scholarship represents an important evolution in the study of women in the military.
Broadly, there has been an accelerated interest on the role that gender plays in security
and stability. Gender equality and inclusion has been found to be directly related to a
state’s peace and stability (Hudson, Ballif-Spanvill, Caprioli, & Emmett, 2012). Further,
gender equality generally in governance generally promotes more peaceful and lasting
outcomes to potential inter- and intra-state conflicts (Caprioli, 2005; Castillejo, 2009).
Through the work of scholars such as Valerie Hudson and Mary Caprioli, we have
empirical evidence that the role of women in society matters. Their work has created a
cornerstone for academic and political activists to work for more inclusive governments
in order to promote security, stability, and prosperity. However, despite the increased
attention on women’s inclusion in formal politics, women’s participation in the military
has largely remained an outlier.
Early arguments about women as they related to the military were primarily
focused on the importance how women were affected by war or military actions (Enloe
1980, 1983, 1990; Elshtain 1981; Cohn 1987). Historically, military studies have been
both male-focused and dominated by male scholars. By asking a simple question, “where
are the women?,” (Enloe, 2014) a new movement in scholarship and public conscious
was born. International relations and war studies were on longer solely the providence of
men. This early feminist scholarship was radical in that it asserted that women mattered,
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and a women’s perspective to conflict was as valid as the traditional male counterpart
(Tickner, 1992). These works laid the groundwork for a focus by both policy makers and
scholars on bringing women into policy conversations and studies, and considering
diverse views of both conflict and security.
These pioneering studies of women in war recognized that women had always
been present on the battlefield, and brought that presence into the security dialogue. Such
studies challenged both which actors we attended to during war and conflict and which
outcomes were of interest. By putting camp followers, comfort women, and mothers on
the same plane as soldiers, military action became not just a man’s world, but a social
enterprise. However, while these studies emphasized the importance of women, they
viewed women as largely passive. While the women’s perspective is deemed important,
war (and the military broadly) was operationalized something that happened to women.
In the introduction to the Women & War Reader, Jennifer Turpin asserts “war has
profound and unique effects on women” (Turpin, 1998, p. 3). This view places women
outside the institution, unable to shape or change it. The choices women do have are only
in reaction to or a byproduct of war’s conduct.
The literature has evolved from viewing women as passive and reactive to war
into viewing them as autonomous actors who make choices as to how they interact with
war and institutions of violence. Studies now acknowledge that women may also have a
roll in war’s conduct (Sjoberg & Gentry, 2007), and often focus on the number of women
that participate in war or are included in the military. Those looking at the number of
women in the military largely focus on understanding why women are allowed in an
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institution that has been historically characterized as the providence of men (Goldstein,
2001; Cockburn & Zarkov, 2002; Higonnet, 1987; Hacker, 1981; Herbert M. S., 1998).
They often emphasize the construction of masculinities and femininities, and how the
conduct of war either reinforces or conflicts with social gender constructions. Though
they recognize women’s autonomy, they typically still treat women as objects of war or
the military. They often are concerned with what the impact of fighting is on women, or
how the feminine identity may be at odds with military service. As Melissa Herbert
(1998) finds, though women have a choice to enter into the military, they do so knowing
that they will become more masculine. The underlying assumption is that if women want
to be included in the military, they must conform to the traditionally masculine norms
and rules associated with it. As Sjoberg notes, even as militaries have included women
and emphasized the importance of their participation, there has been a “preservation of
the discursive structures of gender subordination” for women (Sjoberg L. , 2007, p. 84).
Even when given autonomy over their participation, the relationship between the military
and women has largely been viewed as one way, with the focus on how women are
changed or subjugated by the military, rather than how they may impact it.
Some, however, also focus on the social implications of women’s military
participation, including attempts to understand why a society chooses to send women to
fight. Goldstein (2001) emphasizes that war is an exceptional phenomenon, and societies
must respond in exceptional ways. Such a logic helps to justify women’s participation in
an historically masculine enterprise, while maintaining generalized gendered beliefs
about the roles of men and women in sociopolitical life. There are also more practical
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approaches to understanding women’s participation in war. Such approaches focus on
needs of war fighting, emphasizing the manpower needs of the military to successfully
defend a nation. As Segal (1995) explains, as the threat to national security goes up and
states need bigger militaries to confront this rising threat. When men are unable to fill the
ranks, women are seen as necessary in order to meet the needs of the growing size of the
military. National security has traditional held an exceptional place in the national
consciousness (Goldstein, 2001), and as such provides the leverage for countering
traditional gender roles by recruiting more women for the armed services.
Social expectations are also used to highlight unnecessary gendered constraints
that have been placed on women. Often, the military’s role in conducting violence is used
as an excuse to keep women out of war, or at least certain military occupations. For
example, in her exploration of the United States military, Megan MacKenzie (2015)
focuses on the social (mis)conceptions of what violence is and who is capable of doing it.
She shows how overly essentialized gender ideals created a legacy of exclusion for
women in the United States military. She argues that women’s history of proving
themselves to be capable of the conduct of war is a necessary step in the military
becoming more legally inclusive. Her work is useful in explaining how women are able
to change social beliefs by their actions. It highlights how war as an enabling condition
for women to do exceptional things that challenge the existing social order. However, as I
will show in the case studies, some of the most prolific change for women came during
peacetime and was led not by women in the military but by civilian women or
government leaders.
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In addition to the focus on how many women participate in the military, there is
also a body of work that focuses almost primarily on the legal aspects of women’s
military service. These studies focus on what women are allowed to do in the military,
and how women’s roles have formally expanded over time. Mady Segal (1995), often
considered the pioneer of women’s military sociology, contributed greatly in
conceptualizing Western militaries, NATO forces in particular, as differential and
discrete units of analysis. Her work focuses primarily on the legal aspect of inclusion,
arguing that what women are allowed to do in the military is a product of the military’s
prominence overcoming social norms about women’s role in society and state
institutions. She hinges her argument on the experiences and priorities of Western nations
during the Cold War, focusing on how different priorities led to different opportunities
for women among NATO countries. Her work contributed greatly to understanding that
there is, in fact, variable experiences and outcomes between NATO countries. However,
the effectiveness of her argument diminishes in the post-Cold War era as NATO
members have increasingly converged on military priorities.
Segal also focuses on the legal ramifications of the professionalization of
militaries. As militaries have professionalized, economics increasingly plays a role in the
personnel composition of the armed forces. When men no longer have to serve in the
military, they are more likely to choose jobs that are less dangerous, more stable, and
offer better pay in the private sector. As a result, states must increasingly turn to women
to fill the ranks of the military. Segal asserts “high [male] unemployment rates are
associated with a ready supply of men for the armed forces, and relatively low
92

opportunities for women” (Segal, 1995, p. 767). Women’s inclusion in the military is
thus typically associated with low male unemployment. Conversely, there is a surplus of
male labor, women tend to lose military opportunities. Explicitly, it was found that when
male unemployment rose in the early 1980s, opportunities for women in the military
contracted (Stanley & Segal, 1988). However, while this patteren held for the first decade
after most Western militaries professionalized, it has proved more problematic in recent
years. In the 2000s, when Western military saw expansions in both the number of women
participating in the military and in laws accommodating them, much of Europe and the
United States was experiencing an economic recession and high male unemployment.
Economics alone cannot explain women’s integration.
In more recent years, there have been efforts to expand on Segal’s work and
account for changing global politics in the post-Cold War era. For example, Helena
Carreiras (2006) emphasizes the changing nature of the conduct of violence, noting that
both improvements in military technology and growth in the personnel requirements for
combat support,45 coupled with changes in geopolitics have played a substantial role in
states’ willingness to formally include women in their militaries. As militaries are less
reliant on combat foot soldiers, they are more likely to include women. Including women
in support positions does not challenge gendered norms as much as including women in
combat roles. Additionally, Carreiras provides evidence for the idea that as states
professionalize their militaries, they will need to expand opportunities for women in
order to have a large enough talent pool to fill the ranks, hinging her argument on women
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being more willing to participate in support roles than their male counterparts. While very
applicable to the post-Cold War era, her argument hinges on inclusion rather than
integration. Irene Euirlet (2012) furthers Carreiras’ arguments about military inclusion by
emphasizing the role of political culture. She argues that the stickiness of cultural norms
create political systems that are either permissive or restrictive to increasing formal
allowance for women’s participation in the military. I draw much from both Eurlet and
Carreiras’ work to explain variations in demand and allowance for women’s participation
in the military. However, their work does not explain why women are able to have
variable impact on the military and treat women as largely passive with regards to
military service. They focus on women being allowed into the military, but not on how
they can potentially impact military operations. The military is still the primary actor,
with women being impacted and often changed by their service.
Beyond the scholarly literature, focusing on either the number of women or the
laws about women’s service has impacted the way that governments have approached
understanding women in the military. There have been many studies undertaken by
Western governments on women’s military participation. Most of these focus primarily
on the number of women in the military (Steder, 2014; National Defense and the
Canadian Armed Forces, 2014; NATO, 2016). Much attention, especially since the
adoption of UN Resolution 1325 has been on increasing the number or share of women in
the military. Whether 10% or 50%46 many governments have set a target percentage for
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“success” with regards to women’s inclusion in the military. However, focusing on the
number of women results in little variation between Western democracies. Most NATO
countries have between 9-11% female service members47 (NATO, 2010-2016).
Additionally, this percentage has been increasing since the end of the Cold War.
According to the 2015 NATO Committee on Gender Perspectives report, women
represent 11% of all operational48 NATO forces, up from 3.7% in 1998 (NATO, 2016).

Figure 3.1: Women in NATO Forces
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Source: NATO Committee on Gender Perspectives49
The focus on numbers as the operationalization for women’s service is an
efficient way to compare militaries. However, it provides limited, and often misleading
information as to the quality of women’s participation. Hungary, for example, has the
highest percentage of women in the military of all NATO forces at 20.2%. Relying on
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numbers alone, one would expect that the military is more egalitarian, and even attractive
to women. However, there are no female senior officers or senior staff noncommissioned
officers, and only 6% of Hungary’s operational50 forces are women. The vast majority of
Hungary’s service women are of junior rank and in non-deployable service roles that
have little impact on either the military as an institution or its conduct of missions.
Despite being most inclusive of women, Hungary is one only two countries51 that do not
consider gender as a factor when planning military operations (NATO, 2016). Though
women are included in the military, they have not had the opportunity to make a
meaningful impact, therefore are not well integrated. Indeed, numbers are a useful proxy,
as they can neatly be discussed and measured as a way to operationalize women’s
presence or inclusion. However, they fall short in measuring the quality of women in the
military or explaining variations in the outcomes resulting from women’s service.
In addition to largely being constrained by a focus either on the numbers or legal
allowance for women’s participation, several studies also suffer from an oversimplification in the way they view the military. These studies largely assume that the
military is a masculine institution that is focused almost exclusively on the violent
conduct of war. The focus on the violent outputs of the military allows for a construction
of women and femininity as the “other,” a foil to military life (Goldstein, 2001, pp. 304305). Such an emphasis has resulted in discord among feminist scholars. Because military
service and the conduct of war is largely viewed as masculine by design, women are
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often emphasized in their roles opposing the conduct of war or militarism more broadly.
As Cynthia Cockburn writes in the introduction to her book on anti-war activism, a
feminist take on war is one that emphasizes that “women are less inclined to support war
… and need to tools to mobilize against it” (Cockburn, 2007, p. 1). Judith Hicks Steinem,
conversely, argues that women should reject the gendered norms of war and join the
military on the same terms as men in order to prove their equality (Stiehm, 1982). Where
there has been debate about the form that women’s participation during war takes, the
focus remains on the military’s output of violence, and sees the relationship between the
military and women as one-way. Whether opposing it or participating in it, women are
reactive to the military and changed by it.
However, as I will discuss in more detail below, women have had, and continue to
have an impact on the military. Indeed, to understand women’s integration, and the
resulting variations in tactical and strategic outcomes, I argue that we must look beyond
the numbers of women participating in the military or the laws passed about their
participation to the impact that women have had on the military. This includes both
internal military policies and tactics and strategies of war. To do this, we much
understand that the military-woman relationship is not only one-way, and examine the
impact (or lack thereof) that women have had on the military.
The first step in creating the framework for understanding women’s impact on the
military is to recognize that the military does more than just engage in state sanctioned
violence. It plays a vital role in promoting a country’s social and political values both at
home and abroad. The role of the military has shifted over time as well. As global politics
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have shifted, so, too, has military conduct. Particularly in the past decade, militaries in
Western countries have been less focused on killing and more focused on creating
beneficial conditions for democracy. As Colonel (Retired) Mike Shup, commanding
officer or Regimental Combat Team (RCT) 1 in the First Battle of Fallujah noted, “I
could have recruited anyone to kill Iraqis, what I needed was Marines who upheld the
moral values of equality … to model to the Iraqi people that democracy was something
worth fighting for … and they needed to model it to the American people when they get
home, too.”52 On the ground, commanders recognize the need to look beyond the
conduct of violence to understand military success and respond to global changes. In the
next section, I discuss the functional roles of the military beyond conducting violence and
how they have evolved, and highlight why they are important in understanding women’s
integration.

The Military: Beyond Killing People and Breaking Things
The idea that the military is an exceptional institution because of its capacity for
violence is prevalent throughout both policy debates and scholarship on expansion of
military service to women. “The military is not a social experiment,” is a common cry of
politicians and activists striving to maintain a masculine status quo. This assertion is
typically followed up with some derivation of the military’s purpose being “to kill people
and break things,” emphasizing sanctioned acts of violence over the political role of the
military both at home and abroad. The prominence of the military in public life can
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accentuate the traditional masculine character of the military. As Uta Klein asserts, the
more active a military in society, more obvious the gendered “division of labor” is.
Beyond any other function a military serves, violence “is essential in its formulation of
the masculine identity” (Klein, 1998, p. 149). However, when we look beyond the
outputs of violence, we are able to more fully understand the differences in military
cultures and ultimately women’s integration into them. Indeed, while all militaries
conduct violence, they all also serve other important functional roles. The degree to
which militaries emphasize these various roles differs and has evolved with changes in
global politics. This difference is part of understanding the differences in women’s
integration.
Moving beyond a focus on the military as solely defined by the outputs of
violence is more than recognizing that there are jobs in the military that may not directly
involve killing or destruction. However, in understanding women’s inclusion in the
military, the presence of non-combat jobs has been of particular interest. From
intelligence, to communications, to cooking, to supply and logistics, to administrative
roles, Western militaries have large support apparatus. Nearly 80% of military jobs are
not part of the “ground combat”53 specialties (Carreiras, 2006; NATO, 2016). A main
thread of argument for keeping ground combat positions closed to women has been that
there are so many other opportunities for service that don’t involve ground combat that
women are not actually limited in making military service a career. Helena Carreiras
(2006) and Mady Segal (1995) both highlight how the large support population of

53

Defined as infantry (both ground and mechanized), artillery, and tanks.

99

modern Western militaries have provided extensive opportunities for women, as they are
able to participate without disrupting too many gendered ideals on acceptable
professional behavior. However, while opening opportunities to women, this focus on
non-infantry jobs perpetuates the primacy of violence and combat as the area of
importance in the military, and continues the gendered essentialization of both women
and the military. All support elements exist to enable the infantryman to conduct
violence, and therefore success in a masculinized combat role remains the continued
focus of military culture.
However, recent arguments suggest that the focus of the military is on more than
just the infantry, and that military effectiveness includes actions that cannot be measured
in body counts or physical destruction. Particularly as global politics has moved away
from the bi-polar standoff of the Cold War towards economic and political globalization
and interdependence of the 21st Century, state politics has become less zero-sum and
more focused on consensus building (Lipschutz, 2012). As Risa Brooks notes, military
effectiveness is not just about the capacity to kill, but the ability to achieve specific and
strategic policy outcomes while continuing to adapt to changes in both domestic priorities
and the international security arena (Brooks, 2007, pp. 9-11). Even during the Cold War,
countries had strategic aims that involved more than killing. Beginning in the post-World
War II era, Western states have largely focused less on conquering and more on
promoting and preserving democratic values and beneficial political arrangements. This
can be clearly seen in the case of the United Kingdom. Once a military focused on
physical conquest, the post-imperial military named as its top priority “promoting the
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United Kingdom’s wider security interests through maintenance of international peace
and stability” (Dandeker, 2000, p. 33). In his assessment of this new priority, Charles
Dandeker (2000) finds that the idea of the “soldier statesman” has become as important
as the soldier-conqueror to ensure that the strategic purpose of the military is maintained.
In a security context where national strategic interests are more than national physical
survival or territorial expansion, soldiers must be more constrained in their use of force
and ensure that any violence that is expressed serves political ends.
The emphasis on the ability of western militaries to be more than an instrument of
brute force and violence has become central to their function in the 21st Century. Though
western military power during the Cold War was measured largely in terms of physical
capacity and ability to effectively balance against the Soviet threat, changes in the postCold War order have shifted the military’s purpose. James Rosenau refers to the
transition Western militaries underwent at the end of the Cold War as one in which armed
force was no longer the assumed outcome of military action (Rosenau, 1998).
Particularly for Western militaries, military power and effectiveness was measured in its
capacity to prevent violence, rather than enact it. Since the end of the Cold War, nearly
88%54 of NATO’s missions where infantry troops have been sent were non-combatant in
nature (peacekeeping, crisis response, natural disaster, training exercises, etc). General
Rupert Smith (2007) similarly notes, “the reality of contemporary conflict, and the new
paradigm, is that information – not firepower – is the currency on which war is
conducted.”
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Data compiled from NATO.int
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While militaries still have the capacity for overwhelming combat force, the focus
on international peace and stability and democratic values has taken center stage as the
purpose of military action. The security of Western democracies frequently rests on
“building relationships on a global scale,” and, as Rosa Brooks notes, the “military is the
only institution with the manpower to do it” (Brooks, 2016, p. 144). It is also in the best
interests of political leaders in Western democracies to promote democratic values
without bloodshed, as democratic selectorates preference systemic peace over increased
expansionism (Bausch, 2015). Indeed, to serve in this role, the military must constrain
force for much of its operational time. The concern with constraining force and modeling
democratic norms among militaries from developed democracies is correlated with
positive institutional outcomes in those developing democracies with whom they interact.
Modeling a purpose beyond the use of violence has positioned the military as an essential
tool of diplomacy in the post-Cold War era (Meernik, 1996). Even in terms of
conventional military force, norms around the use of military force have converged
towards restraint. While militaries have built large weapon stockpiles and invested
heavily in technology that increases lethality, their purposes tend to be more strategic
than practical, as a coercive tool of last resort (Farrell, 2007).
Modern peacekeeping operations highlight how the fundamental functions of the
military go beyond just the conduct of violence. Stability throughout the world is in the
political, economic, and security interest of West. However, many states, especially those
emerging from conflict, lack the internal capability to provide for both the domestic and
international security necessary to build robust and resilient political and economic
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institutions. Foreign powers thus step in to fill the security void, freeing domestic forces
to focus on internal capacity building. Foreign powers are faced with a two-pronged
dilemma; to be strong enough to enforce peace, while maintaining a light enough
footprint to not be seen as an occupying or imperial force (Edelstein, 2009). It is not just
violence, but the ability to tie its use to concrete policy objectives that define modern
effectiveness. Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis emphasize this in their
examination of “failures” of peacekeeping. They described failures as resulting from a
“troubling divorce” between political strategy and operations in the field (Doyle &
Sambanis, 2006, p. 185).
If we look beyond the physical conduct of violence, we see that the military is
engaged in a verity of tasks – from construction to intelligence gathering to education –
that are not merely needed to enable violence, but central to the political mission of the
armed forces. Top generals from every NATO country involved in the operations in
Afghanistan have noted some derivation of the idea that we can’t kill our way out of the
war. The conduct of violence is thus not the sole focus of military force, nor are nonviolent activities merely enabling violence. To achieve strategic political aims, militaries
must be equipped to engage in a range of activities. The more complex an international
security dilemma, the less likely that violence, alone, will solve it. In a comprehensive
review of 20th Century counterinsurgency campaigns, Kalev Sepp found that operations
led by “military goals, rather than civil politics [were] overwhelming disasters” (Sepp,
2005, p. 11). Effective militaries are not just good at fighting, but beholden to political
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control and reflective of the values of the society they represent and protect (Kestnbaum,
2012).
A historical institutionalist approach helps us understand that the functional role
of the military can change. Understanding how military culture and their role in society
changed in response to global political changes is essential for more completely
understanding the process of integration. I trace the process of integration through three
eras of global political change. First is the early 1970s – early 1990s. This era is the first
in which women made large legal strides in public life. Additionally, it is a time of
transition from “hot” proxy wars in the Cold War to an increased emphasis on
peacekeeping and development in post-Colonial Africa and South Asia. The second is
1992 (end of the Cold War) – 2001. In the post-Cold War era, the lines between war and
peace have been blurred, with no clear enemy or delineated battlefields. There was both
an increase in peacekeeping as well as an increase in non-state violence. The third is 2001
– present. After the attacks of September 11, 2001 in the United States, much of the
Western world’s security sectors have been focused on the Global War on Terror. The
nebulous nature of this conflict has resulted in a permeation of the role in the military
throughout society (Brooks, 2016). Additionally, it has often furthered the military’s role
in promoting values. Rather than “killing people and breaking things”, the military is now
expected to constrain the use of violence to only those times that it is politically
necessary. This is essential to winning on today’s battlefield. Hard-power and violence
have become less useful for meeting the threats Western militaries faced in the post-Cold
War (Nye Jr, 2008).
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Not all societies have adopted the belief that the role of the military is greater than
conducting violence to the same degree though. Beliefs about the military’s role in
society, and the emphasis placed on conventional military tactics varies between Western
militaries, especially since the end of the Cold War. As Theo Farrell and Terry Terriff
(2002) find, the divergence in the changes – both in doctrine and prominence in society –
to Western militaries in the post-Cold War global security arena is a result of a
combination of cultural inputs and public policy constraints. Domestic experiences with
war, the history of imperialism, the size and strength of the military budget, and beliefs
about social welfare and values have influenced military doctrine and policies. Risa
Brooks (2007) further emphasizes that sociopolitical and cultural beliefs influence both
the definition of military effectiveness and the means by which militaries achieve it. For
example, France’s colonial legacy has resulted in a military that is very responsive to
changing international politics, while Norway’s history of subjugation to its Scandinavian
neighbors has resulted in a military that is more entrenched in citizenship ideals. The size
and strength of the United States military has resulted in an enduring focus on combat
and conventional military strength, even in the face of changing political demands.
Tracing these differences in experiences, beliefs, and policy constraints is important for
fully understanding differences in integration. As I will show, the critical differences in
cultural beliefs about equality have impacted the way in which militaries have adopted to
new security challenges, and specifically affected attitudes toward women. This, in turn,
has created permissive or restrictive environments for women’s integration.
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The way in which the military has responded to changes in global politics is an
output of differences in military culture. A particular military may be more responsive to
some political changes than to others. For example, in the years immediately following
World War II, the United States’ military was used as a means of making citizenship
claims, with an emphasis placed on the military as a “schoolhouse for the nation” (Krebs,
2006). Military service was used to strengthen the Civil Rights’ movements. However, by
the latter part of the 20th Century and the introduction of the all-volunteer force, the
United States’ military had returned its focus outwards, with an emphasis on
conventional military tactics and force projection. The Norwegian military has
historically been focused on making Norwegian citizens, and highlighting those aspects
of culture that are distinctly Norwegian (Friis, 2000). The historical focus has been on
appealing to the values of equality and egalitarianism, and socializing young people into
the national sociopolitical culture. However, the demands of the international
environment, especially in the wake of operations in Afghanistan, have resulted in a more
externally focused military that must try to respond to the changing security landscape. In
France, the military has had strong conventional foci in various periods of its history
(Siegl, 2008), while also being dedicated to positive values engagement during military
conflicts (Bore, 2006) that have translated into its responses to the current environment.
The way in which militaries respond to changes in global politics is a result of a
larger military culture. Military culture can be best seen in the sources of authority55 for
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Sources of Authority is a term used by Dobbin, 1994 to help explain variation in industrial policies
between the United States, France, and the United Kingdom. He argues that the variations in authority over
economic policy (markets, firms, or central government) created differential outcomes despite similar
available policy options. Variations of sources of authority were reflective of a deeper sociopolitical and
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reward or promotion within a given military. Despite the changes in global politics and
the resulting nature of warfare, the ways in which service members gained credibility and
access to leadership positions has been relatively unchanging. These variations in sources
of authority represent some of the more deeply rooted aspects of military culture.
To understand the sources of authority in the military I look to the background of
and requirement for promotion to leadership ranks and the way that members of the
military can earn accolades and awards. In the United States, the source of authority lies
in the combat arms. Of the four-star generals that have been the most senior leaders of the
Army and Marine Corps, only one has come from a non-ground combat occupational
specialty. Combat service is seen as a requirement for military leadership. Additionally,
over 90% of the valor-awards since Vietnam have been awarded to members of groundcombat specialties. In France, the source of authority lies with furthering political norms.
There is a high concentration of intelligence officers in the general officer rank,
highlighting the emphasis on a values-based constrained use of force, and the importance
of information gathering and decimation. Norway places its source of authority in
citizenship ideals. Leadership promotions are based off of upholding the tenets of
“Norwegianness” and performance in skillsets based on classical Norwegian identity.
These variations in sources of identity are reflective of the deeper military cultural
identity that drives changes in orientation. Understanding the variations in these cultures
and identity is important for understanding the variations in integration. Over time, the

institutional culture. The source of authority guided both how the policy was enacted and the character of
the resulting economic and industrial development. In much the same way, I argue that there are variations
in the sources of authority in the military that are reflective of the deeper military culture.
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cultures are more or less responsive to the claims that women make about their service,
influencing women’s ability to influence military policies, tactics and strategy. It is
against the background of military culture that the process of integration takes place.

The Process of Integration: Women’s Ability to Impact the Military
Studies of women’s participation in the military that focus on numbers or law, do
not fully capture the variation seen in women’s integration in the militaries of the France,
Norway, and the United States. These approaches focus on women’s inclusion, viewing
the military as the primary actor and women as a subject to being allowed to participate.
While they offer great insight into the drivers of legal change or moments of time that
result in increased participation, they do not engage with the relationship between the
women and the military or explain the observed variation seen in both tactical outcomes
and the experiences of women in the military. To understand this, a more robust and
comprehensive measure of integration, with a focus on the interactive effect between
women and the military, specifically the impact that women are able to have on the
military, is needed.
Women’s participation in the military is not the only area where scholarship has
revealed a tension between inclusion and integration. Work on women’s participation in
parliamentary politics has been met with similar challenges. Early work on women’s
elected representation focused heavily on the number of women in parliaments, often
emphasizing quotas or electoral systems that best helped bring women into the elected
body (Caul, 1999; Caul, 2001; Squires, 1996). However, while this work revealed the
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importance of having women in parliaments, there was criticism and questions raised as
to the character and quality of the women elected, and if women had any meaningful
impact on politics or the political process. A common criticism to women’s inclusion in
politics was that women were essentially coopted by male party members, forced to toe
party lines, negating any benefit of women’s presence in government (Tinker, 2004). To
address this criticism there was a subsequent move to assess the actual impact of
women’s participation in legislatures, measuring the policy outcomes and debates that
women brought to the table by virtue of their unique social experiences (Ballington &
Karam, 2005; Hudson, Ballif-Spanvill, Caprioli, & Emmett, 2012). The driving scholarly
questions moved beyond “how many women” are in parliament to “what is the value
added by women’s participation in governance?” The study of women in the military is
due for a similar shift in focus, away from how many, and towards what impact they have
on policies, tactics and strategies.
To do this, I focus on the impact that women have on the military as the
dependent variable. To measure impact, it is best to view integration as a complex set of
legal, cultural, and practical factors (Vojdik, 2005) that interact to ultimately determine
the degree to which women have been able to change military policies, tactics and
strategy. More than numbers or laws, change in policy, tactics or strategies is indicative
of integration taking place. As March and Olsen (1989) find, institutions in democracies
change as they integrate individuals with different preferences. Christopher Anderson
(2009) similarly discusses the change in institutions that result from participation by
previous outgroups by emphasizing that institutional policies, practices and norms are
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“changed – whether strengthened or weakened – by new [participants’] priorities or
preferences” (Anderson, 2009, p. 317). We should therefore expect to see the military
change as a result of women’s increased participation if integration has taken place. To
understand how the change in the military occurs (or what inhibits its occurrence), it is
best to conceptualize integration as a process that has unfolded overtime.
Understanding the integration of women into the military as a process rests on
two important assumptions. First is the idea that institutions in democracies see change –
especially change that expands their participatory base – as both beneficial and desirable.
Democratic organizations must be both enduring enough to withstanding potentially
whimsical changes in popular sentiment, and nimble enough to improve with changing
sociopolitical beliefs (Nystrom & Starbuck, 1981). Identifying and responding to
beneficial moments of change is essential for a well-functioning democratic institution
(Olsen, 2009). Regarding the military there is evidence that militaries that are reflective
of their citizenry population are more effective and efficient at both their overall military
objectives and at acting as part of the total state political apparatus (Burk, 2002; Cottey,
Edmunds, & Forster, 2002). It can therefore be argued to be in their best interest to
continue to expand military participation to be more reflective of society. Additionally,
there are strong arguments to be made linking military participation to social and civic
rights and duties of previously excluded or newly enfranchised groups (Burk, 2001;
Krebs, 2006). Indeed, if the military is conceptualized as an institution that can take on
different roles and cultures (rather than solely a tool to commit violence for the state), we
can see how expansion of opportunities to women – who comprise 50% of the population
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and have an increasing state in the political, civic, and economic life of the state – can be
beneficial.
The second major assumption is that the requirements for participation remain
constant when the participatory based is expanded. Whether expanding voting rights
(Dalton & Grey, 2003) or military participation (Cohn, 2000), opponents of an increased
institutional reach frequently point to the possibility that the institution will have to
weaken its core competencies in order to account for the newly included group. Because
of the unique nature of the military in society, and the gendered nature of the conduct of
violence (Goldstein, 2001), this line of argument is particularly loud with regards to
women’s integration in the military. However, there is no evidence that democratic
institutions, including the military, have lessened or reduced standards or capabilities
when expanding to include previous out-groups (MacKenzie, 2015). While the military,
as an institution, may change requirements in order to meet changing security threats or
changing global politics, thay have not been lessened to accommodate newly integrated
groups, including women.56 Requirements for military service can be seen as a potential
constraint on women’s choice to participate. However, they are constraints that impact
all potential recruits, and thus are operationalized as an inherent part of the institution.
By conceptualizing of integration as a relational process we are able to identify
and measure individual components (such as legal provisions and numbers of
participation), while also capturing the ways in which women have actually changed the
military. It takes the often segmented measures present in most of the literature on
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See NATO country reports 2000-2016 for a list of training requirements.
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women in the military and interacts them. By taking an historical institutional approach to
studying the process of integration, I will show that the interaction between military
history and culture, and women’s claims about service create unique dynamics that help
to explain the variation in tactical outcomes we see in the cases of Norway, France and
the United States. The foundational beliefs about equality discussed in Chapter 2 greatly
influence women’s decisions about both whether and how to join (and remain) in the
military, and, in turn, their ability to influence military policies, process, and tactics. The
degree to which these claims coincide or clash with military culture creates either a
permissive or restrictive environment for the process of integration.

Figure 3.2: The Process of Integration
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Figure 3.2 highlights the process of integration. Integration takes place bounded
by the interaction between claims about women’s service and military culture and
tradition. Within these bounds legal provisions and functional participation interact to
allow for women to have an impact on the military. This, in turn, creates new legal
provisions and allows for new functional participation in military service. When claims
about women’s service and military culture are in agreement with one another, a
permissive environment is created for integration and the interaction of legal structure
and functional participation results in women having the ability to change military
policies, tactics and strategies. When claims and military culture are in conflict women
are less likely to affect change on the military. The interaction between claims about
service and views on the military role and culture help explain variation in women’s
integration. Because of this variation, even when laws about women’s service are the
same, or there are the same number of women in the military, we see differences in levels
of integration.

Operationalizing & Measuring Women’s Integration in Western Militaries
To operationalize the process of integration it is important to operationalize its
components. Referring back to Figure 3.2, we see that legal provisions and functional
participation interact to result in changes to the military’s policies, tactics and strategies.
Legal or structural provisions are necessary open military service to women. They are the
initial enabling conditions that allow women to be a part of the military structure.
Functional participation addresses not only how many women are in the military, but
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what women are doing in critical occupational specialties. It also addresses women’s
staying power in the military and focuses on women’s access to influential senior
positions. These components interact to ultimately result in women’s ability to impact the
military. I will next discuss the measures of each of these components.

Legal
Though not the sole factor, de jure provisions for women’s inclusion in the
military are an essential building block for integration. They formally open space in the
military for women to participate. The legal component, however, extends beyond just
what women are allowed to do, and also encompasses formal support structures that
promote or enable equality and egalitarianism between the genders with regards to
military service. In order to fully encompass the totality of the legal aspects of women’s
integration we must take into account three legal factors. The first is what women are (or
are not) legally allowed to do in the military. While I argue that this is not the sole basis
of integration, I do agree with Irene Eulriet that the law is the foundation of women’s
participation in Western militaries, especially in the post-Cold War era (Eulriet, 2012).
Throughout the history of women’s participation in Western militaries, there have been
restrictions placed on their service, particularity with regards to participation in direct
combat roles and service aboard ships with limited berthing spaces. The expansion of
what women are legally permitted to do, therefore, does represent a first and necessary
step in the process of integration.
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Simply allowing women the possibility to serve in combat roles, though, does not
account for integration. Even when there is legal equality in occupational specialties that
are open, there are structural factors that hinder the de facto equality of women. The
second and third legal factors are related to creating a structural environment that
mitigates any differences resulting from one’s gender that may disproportionally hinder
one’s possibility for operational success or promotion. Access to childcare and adequate
female-specific medical care was cited as one of the top concerns of service members
when asked what may hinder their career possibilities. In several instances, women were
unable to find childcare outside traditional working hours, despite the fact that military
operations take place 24 hours a day (DACOWITS 2016). Parenting is a condition that
overwhelming affects women. Nearly 30% of all service women across NATO forces are
single mothers (NATO 2016). For both biological and cultural reasons, motherhood is
often used as a reason that women should not participate in the military (Goldstein, 2001;
Van Creveld, 2001). Legally mitigating the differential in childcare requirements creates
an environment where gender equality can be more fully practiced, and women actually
able to integrate (rather than just be included) in the military. Access to childcare, or the
lack thereof, is thus either an enabling or constraining force to women’s service and
composes the second legal factor of integration.
Similarly, parental leave and pregnancy policies impacts women’s ability to
integrate. The physical aspects of motherhood do impact women’s ability to engage in
many military activities. From not being able to be on ships or shoot firearms, to limited
physical capability, pregnant women cannot participate in all aspects of military life.
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Policies around assigning pregnant women to non-physical jobs, and allowing for
adequate physical recovery time enable women to stay in the military and balance
motherhood with their professional duties.
Sexual assault and/or harassment is another explanatory factor linked to women’s
propensity to serve in the military (Cawkill, Rogers, Knight & Spear, 2009).
Institutionalized sexism manifested through both harassment and assault has been found
to be a structural barrier to women’s participation in Western militaries from both a
cultural perspective and lost training time (Fitzgerald, 1999; Morral, Gore & Schell,
2016; LeardMann, et al., 2013). As the traditional domain of men, introducing women
into the military has the potential to bring out “toxic, even dangerous” aspects of
traditional views on masculinity (Connell & Messerschmidt, 2005). While there is debate
around the interplay between culture and laws, legal conditions and processes are
measurable and offer a point of comparison between countries. To this end,
incorporating laws around sexual harassment and assault, as well as the degree to which
reports of such are investigated and prosecuted, provide necessary insight into to
structural conditions to create actual equality between men and women, and comprises
the third legal factor of integration.

116

Table 3.1: Legal Components of the Integration Index
Component
Description
Barriers to
- Occupational fields closed to women
Participation
- Geographical restrictions on women’s service
- Quotas/limitations on number of women able to
serve in a given unit
Childcare
- Provisions for childcare during all operational
hours
- Provisions for childcare during deployment
- Equality in maternity / paternity leave
Sexual Harassment
- Laws on harassment / assault (military and
national)
- Ratio of allegations to investigations
- Allegations / 10,000 military members
- Ratio female/male victims
- Ratio of trial / prosecutions
Functional Participation
In addition to considering the legal factors of integration, the nature of women’s
participation and the roles they hold in the military is necessary to understand integration.
Beyond just looking at what women are allowed to do, it is important to measure what
women are actually doing and their ability to access promotions and leadership roles.
Legal expansion to include women in the military does not guarantee that they will
choose to participate. As seen with the case of voter enfranchisement, we cannot assume
that expanding access to rights will result in more participation (Alex-Assensoh, 2005).
While laws may be more inclusive, and create conditions for participation, without the
choice to participate, the previous outgroup will never actually integrate. Additionally, all
participation is not equal. As Carole Pateman asserted, “participation,” must be viewed as
a “continuum of engagement” that encompasses various forms, qualities, and intensities
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of involvement (Pateman, 1970, pp. 67-70). This variation is the functional quality of
participation – how many women are doing what in the military.
Functional participation composed of three factors. First is the number of women
in the military as a percentage of the total force. While not the complete picture, it gives a
comparative baseline between countries. Understanding how many women participate is
necessary for understanding the potential breakdown of labor. When there are relatively
few women in the military (below 5%), women tend to be concentrated in a few
occupational specialties that are reflective of traditional gender roles. While there is not a
clear understanding as to why, the 5% threshold is correlated with women engaging in a
verity of occupational specialties (Segal, 1995; Carreiras, 2006). Capturing the overall
percentage of women is thus part of understanding what women may be doing.
The second component of functional participation is a breakdown of what
occupational specialties and roles women are actually doing in the military. To evaluate
this, I use the NATO standard of grouping military occupational specialties:
administration/support, medical, support aviation, combat aviation, supply/logistics,
ground combat, submarine, surface navy (shipborn), and intelligence. Breaking down
participation into the actual occupational specialties is important for two primary reasons.
First, it shows the degree to which women have permeated throughout the military.
Indeed, there is evidence that numbers matter, and success in newly opened occupational
specialties is dependent on women reaching a certain threshold of participation (Cawkill,
Rogers, Knight & Spear, 2009). Second, it allows insight into the supply side of military
participation. In Western militaries, military service is voluntary, to include a choice of
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occupational specialties.57 Women must therefore choose to participate in occupational
specialties that have previously been closed to them. This is a critical piece of the
iterative process of integration. If women are not choosing to participate, despite de jure
provisions that allow their service, full integration will not take place.
The roles that women have in the military, particularly those that result in
leadership and authority are also an important part of functional participation. For women
to have an impact on the military in a meaningful way – both that makes it stronger and
more conducive to future women’s participation – they must achieve a certain level of
seniority and be in leadership positions. We must therefore look beyond the numbers of
women who join, or what they are doing, and also examine the rate at which they stay in
the organization and their access to leadership roles.
Looking at evidence from women’s participation in politics, gender-differentiated
effects become more prominent when women reach a certain seniority of political office
(Caprioli & Boyer, 2001; Melander, 2005). It may logically follow that as women reach
more seniority in the military, they may impact both strategy and tactics in a way their
male counterparts do not. To capture seniority, I look at the percentage of women that
hold the rank of non-commissioned officer or field grade officer. Though countries vary
in their initial operational commitment, individuals cannot obtain these ranks during their
initial enlistment term. Additionally, these are the ranks at which individuals exert
leadership authority over others. For the NATO countries, these ranks are achieved
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Though the needs of the military will ultimately win out, in the countries considered, recruits are able to
express preference as to their desired occupation specialties. Currently, infantry occupations and special
operations are still completely voluntary for women.
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somewhere between 10-12 years of service.58 Additionally, I consider the retention rate
of women compared to men. A positive value means that that a greater percentage of
women as compared to men stayed on to their next term of enlistment. A negative value
means that a greater percentage of women than men who were eligible for separation due
to the end of contract left the military.
In addition to seniority I also look at the number of operational commands and
key positions that are held by women. Being in command gives one direct influence over
more junior service members. This exposure to leadership is essential to make the
military a more permissive environment and ultimately enact lasting structural change
that will easy women’s ability to join in the future. Further, receiving command
demonstrates the most senior military leadership’s confidence in women’s tactical
competency. Women receiving command billets also signals that they have been
normalized (and therefore integrated) into what is often conceptualized as a gendered
organization.
Finally, functional participation includes a measure of women involved in
overseas operations. The military has twin purposes overseas – a functional enactment of
violence as an extension of policy aims and a societal reflection and upholding of core
values (Feaver, 1996; Nielsen, 2012). The number of women involved in overseas
operations is a reflection of both the faith in women’s ability to engage in functional
combat operations and the centrality of gender equality to national priorities.
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Organizational requirements of NATO countries available at:
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/68147.htm#civilian
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Table 3.2: Functional Participation Components of Integration Index
Component
Definition
Level of Participation
- Women’s Participation as percentage of total force
Types of Participation
- Women’s Participation by occupational specialty
- Women’s Participation by rank
- Women’s Leadership positions
- Retention Rate of women
Overseas
- Women’s Participation in overseas missions
Participation
- Breakdown of combat vs peacekeeping vs training
missions
The Impact Women have on the Military as a Result of Integration: Changes in
Policies, Tactics and Strategy
Ultimately, the result of the process of integration is that women have an impact
on the military. This impact varies in the cases of the France, Norway, and the United
States. The variation can largely be seen in the degree to which the military recognizes
the benefit of women as women, and has allowed space for them to impact and shape
strategic policy outcomes while continuing to adapt to changes in both domestic priorities
and the international politics (Brooks, 2007, pp. 9-11). If we look especially in the postCold War era, women have been essential in both leveraging the currency of information
and achieving strategic policy outcomes for which the military was deemed the
appropriate tool. Further, the militaries of the France, Norway, and the United States have
all emphasized women’s rights and gender relations as a strategic priority, particularly in
their operations in Afghanistan. However, the degree to which strategic priorities beyond
conventional force has been adopted varies.
Understanding the degree to which women have had an impact on the military as
an institution can thus be seen in two ways. First is the policies that have made it easier
121

for women to join and remain in the military. Though men are capable of enacting
women-friendly policies, as the Commandant of the Marine Corps remarked, “I had no
idea that child care was even an issue we should be concerned with; however it turns out
it makes us better warfighters. Maybe we need more female senior leaders to make us
aware of these things.”59 Women can be influential in easing the structural constraints
that have limited their participation.
Second is in the adoption of strategies and tactics that play to women’s unique
strengths that also enhance the capabilities of the organization as a whole. Women have
proven beneficial in advancing national security priorities and policy objectives,
especially in peacekeeping and counterinsurgency missions. Including women in the
military does not necessarily result in them being used in any different way than service
members have been used traditionally. Historically, women have felt the need to adopt
masculine characteristics and adhere to the “male way of fighting” (Herbert M. S., 1998)
to be included in the military. Integration, conversely, results in the institution of the
military being changed by women. Therefore, in more integrated militaries we see the
adoption of tactics and strategies that harness women’s unique abilities to better achieve
their strategic goals.
Table 3.3: Impact on the Military
United States
Structural
Left up to the
Provisions
individual
Tactics/Strategies

59

Norway
Applied to all
citizens equally

Conventional Force

Remarks to DACOWITS, June 2017
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After Afghanistan
realize the value of
women in COIN

France
Refinement to
maternity policies
and childcare
Emphasis on
women’s specific
roles

Table 3.3 highlights the differences in the impact that women have had on the militaries
of the United States, Norway, and France.
Broadly speaking, women have had very little impact on the military in the United
States, despite their relatively high level of participation. Laws around their participation
have been slow to change, and enabling structures still are largely left up to the
individual. The lack of structural support for child care and motherhood contributes to the
negative retention rate. While the United States has a relatively high number of women at
any given point in time, the majority of them are junior enlisted or junior officers who
leave after their enlistment contract is up, citing family as the primary reason
(DACOWITS, 2016). Further, those women who do stay in the military tend to remain
single or not have children. As retired Marine Corps Lieutenant General Fran Wilson
stated, “being a woman in the [United States] military is all about survival. You don’t
make waves, and you sure as hell don’t offer up any ideas that may you’re your male
peers think that you want things ‘easier’ for other women.”60 As evidenced by her
remarks, despite the success of individual women, there was little space for meaningful
change that would either ease or encourage women’s continued participation in the
military.
Discussions around women’s participation in the United States military typically
hinge on whether or not they will be able to meet the male standards. For example, most
of the contention surrounding FET teams was on the ability of women to meet the same
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physical standards as men, and engage in the “masculine” enterprise of close-quarters
combat. Though FET teams were created specifically for gendered reasons, women were
encouraged to adhere to male standards and patterns of behavior in order to “fit in” to the
infantry units to which they were attached (Lemmon, 2015). Attempts to masculinize
women in FET teams is at least partially responsible for the hurdles for fully
implementing counterinsurgency strategies the United States faced in Afghanistan. After
what was seen as a “failed experiment” by many of the current administration’s
advisors,61 the United States continues to focus on conventional warfare, as evidenced by
President Trump’s recent assertion that the purpose of military action in Afghanistan is
“killing terrorists, not nation building.”62
In Norway, the ability of women to change the organization has been limited, but
is present. Concerning laws and enabling structures, Norway’s government has enacted
wide-sweeping laws and policies on parental leave and childcare that pertain to all
citizens. These policies minimize gender differences. For example, parental leave is
equal between parents, and fathers are expected to be as present in children’s lives as
mothers. Indeed, the so-called “daddy quota” mandates that fathers take the first 16
weeks of a child’s life away from work (Hernes, Scandinavian Citizenship, 1988;
Borchorst & Siim, 2008). The need for more specific policies directly aimed at military
women has been largely seen as unnecessary. Culturally, there is an expectation that
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government and parents will work together to ensure a proper work-life balance for all its
citizens.
The adoption of universal conscription further muted the differences between men
and women. A 2011 report on the potential impacts of universal conscription highlighted
how expanding to conscription to women would make women and men feel “more
Norwegian” knowing that all fellow citizens were subject to the same benefits and
responsibilities (Sand & Fasting, 2011). While historically men and women have been
viewed as equal in all ways in the military,63 experiences in Afghanistan resulted in the
creation of the “Hunter Troop,” an all-female special operations unit. Its creation was a
response to the lessons learned in Afghanistan as to the value of having women for
specific tactical and strategic outcomes. The unit has not yet been tactically employed,
yet its creation highlights the beginning of a women-led, meaningful change to military
strategy.
The French military is experiencing the highest level of women’s integration.
Since 1972, there have been more than a dozen policy changes aimed at revising the
maternity and childcare policies in the military, to include a 1984 order that deemed
childcare a national security priority. These laws have been aimed at both attracting
women and retaining them in service. Valerie Andre, the first female general in the
French military, writes in her memoir that it was her duty and responsibility to make it
easier for the women who came after her, and ensure that they never had to make the
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same choices concerning family or military that she did (André, 1954). Even early on,
there was a recognition of responsibility to ensuring that the institution made up for any
potential differences between the genders in order to create true equal opportunity.
Women have also been targeted for recruitment for the specific talents that they
bring, and integrated into infantry units purposefully for peacekeeping and
counterinsurgency operations. The focus on female-specific military talents have their
history in the role that French women played in the Resistance to Nazi-occupied France
and the role of women in counterinsurgencies in Indochina and Algeria (Weitz, 1995;
Hubin, 2012). Indeed, the role and success of women in these early wars has set the stage
for women to have a powerful voice when it comes to military tactics and strategies.
In the following chapters I highlight the historical process that have shaped
integration in France, Norway and the United States.
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CHAPTER 4:
France
Professional Feminization

Women have, and continue to have, a measurable impact on military tactics and
strategy. Claims rooted in institutional equality are compatible with a culture of
responsiveness to changes in global politics and a focus on innovative and humancentered tactics. Today, France’s military is at another pivotal moment of change, as it is
working to address the emerging threat of domestic terrorism and radicalization. The
current responses in calls for cultural training and engagement are in line with the
historical process of integration that women experienced.
The impact that women have had on the French military can be seen in their
operations in Afghanistan. The French military made technological and tactical changes
to harness women’s contributions to combat operations. Technologically, the French
redesigned their body armor and combat gear to fit women. Though they had been
working in peacekeeping operations, women had not been frequently engaged in
offensive combat. Therefore, there was not combat-specific body armor tailored to
women’s proportions. Combat-specific vehicles were also not designed for women’s
smaller frames. In evaluating the reason for combat deaths in 2008, ill-fitting equipment
was found at least partially to blame. Women were not able to maneuver easily, or
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upload/offload from vehicles effectively. Properly fitting personal protection equipment
and retrofitted vehicles allowed women to move more freely and effectively in combat
situations. As a result, by 2009, the French COIN forces had eliminated over half the
Taliban forces in the Kapisa Province (Le Nen 2010).
The success in Kapisa rested on a tactical doctrine that de-emphasized purely
kinetic operations and incorporated community engagement and capacity building. When
Colonel Chanson took control of the region, he emphasized that “spatial discrimination,
rather than large scale attrition, leading to a careful control of a few selected areas
through persistent presence in the villages,” would be the key to ensuring that the Taliban
would not return to gain control of the region (as quoted in Taillat, 2010). Rather than
focusing on capturing main supply routes by force, or conducting house to house raids
aimed at killing Taliban operatives, they focused on key village influencers, and used
persuasion and coersion to fortify against Taliban recitivism. France withdrew from
Kapsia in 2012, turning it over to Afghan security forces. Kapsia and the Tagrib Valley is
currently a contentious region, yet has not fallen to the Taliban.
While there has been debate about the overall effectiveness of ISAF operations in
Afghanistant, the Kapsia Vally is a succes story, in large part due to the actions of the
women in the French forces stationed in the Vally. The high level of intergration of
women into the French military was largely responsible for the French military’s success.
The process by which the French military came to be integrated in important to
understanding their recent actions in Afghanistan.
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France: High Level of Integration
The claims rooted in institutional equality and the policies resultant from the
women of the women’s movement contribute to the high level of integration of women
into the military in France. This can be seen both in the way in which policies
concerning women’s participation and the structural enabling conditions have been
refined as well as the degree to which the unique talents of women have been used to
strengthen military action. Laws have been continually refined to better accommodate
women’s needs, both easing their ability to join the military and increasing retention.
Additionally, France has revised strategic and tactical practices that emphasize to adapt to
changes in global politics that highlight the importance of gender and the values of
equality. For example, the 2013 Defense White Paper put an emphasis on human
intelligence as the foundation of defense policy, and the military’s role in preserving and
promoting values of equality and justice in both the near and far abroad (Ministry of
Defense 2013). Evidenced by the work in Afghanistan, and the peacekeeping operations
in Bosnia, women were an essential part in both gathering actionable intelligence, but
more importantly promoting values through their lived experiences. The focus of the
strategy outlined in the White Paper is on the military’s role in preventing conflict before
it starts. This is seen in President Macron’s call for female service members to fill roles in
intelligence, peacekeeping and crises mitigation.
The laws related to equal pay and work discussed in Chapter 2 were foundational
in setting the stage to begin the process of integration. While laws related to women’s
equality were necessary for France’s high level of integration, alone they were not
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sufficient. The permissive environment created by the positive interaction of claims about
women’s service and military culture has allowed women to influence the military
through their participation and access to key positions of influence. This influence comes
both in terms of military-specific policies, and tactical and strategic decisions. Table 4.1
shows the current measures of women’s integration.
Table 4.1: Current Measures of Women’s Integration into the French Military
Measure
Value
Legal
- No Restrictions on Occupational Specialties open to
Women
- No Restrictions on services on ships or in combat
zones
- No quotas (either positive or negative)
- Creche Care – national childcare program
- Guaranteed provisions for child care for night work
- Pre/Post partum leave (16 weeks)
- 156 weeks shared leave for mother/father in cases of
dual military families
- Themis Cell created a “prevention kit” for sexual
assault
- Approximately 60 cases/year of sexual harassment
reported
Functional
- 15.5% of military force
Participation
- 5.5% in ground combat force
- 7% in international operational forces
- + 6.3% retention rate
- 2% of flag officers
- 9% of senior officers
- 51% of Noncommissioned Officers
Institutional Impact
- Spreading the values of equality and security
worldwide is a national security priority
- Counterinsurgency and nation building activities
- Personnel policies refined to attract more women
While the individual components each represent a relatively high level of
women’s inclusion in the military, it is the process of their interaction that helps to better
understand the high level of integration experienced by the French Military. The legal
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and functional components interact in a way that is supported by institutional equality’s
focus on the government’s role in ensuring that differences are not detrimental. This can
be seen in the legal provisions for women’s service extending beyond allowance for
women’s participation to include targeted maternity and child care policies that make it
easier for women to both enter and remain in the military. The refinements to benefit
policies largely came from women having influence on decision makers. Additionally,
while France has an objectively high percentage of women in its military (15.5%
compared to a 2016 NATO average of 11%), what women do and their numbers in
leadership positions is more important when determining their level of integration.
Though still objectively low, at 5.5%, France has one of the highest percentage of women
in ground combat units. The presence of women in the specialty considered the “main
effort” of military operations, reinforces the unique role that women have in the military.
Traditionally, in order to participate in combat operations women had to adopt male
characteristics, and were treated more as a soldier than a woman (Herbert 1998).
However, the historical experiences of the military, coupled with the strategic
commitment to values transferal has resulted in women in the French military being able
to retain some of their uniquely feminine characteristics even while serving in combat
roles (Boulegue 1991).
Women’s ability to be both women and soldiers is reflected in a positive retention
rate (women are more than 6% more likely to stay in the military than their male
counterparts), and is also seen in their presence in leadership roles. Notably, staff
noncommissioned officers (SNCO) are majority female. SNCOs are primarily
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responsible for personnel management and the day to day lives of soldiers. The continue
refinement to policies that impact women are reflective of women being in leadership
positions that emphasize the wellbeing of soldiers.
As noted in Chapter 3, integration is more than either just the laws that allow
women to participate in the military or their degree of participation at any given point in
time. Rather, it is a temporally dynamic process of institutional change and participation
that interact to fundamentally change the institution. In this chapter I will show that
France did not achieve a high level of integration due to one policy change. Rather, they
engaged in multiple iterations of change that resulted from women being able to position
themselves in leadership roles such that they could influence claims about women’s
service and the conditions under which they serve. Because of policy change that made
military service more attractive, and a culture that valued women for their unique
characteristics, women remained in the military and gained influential leadership
positions. I begin this chapter by discussing the role of the French military and its
culture. I focus on its culture of adaptation through self-examination and how its history
has resulted in an emphasis on values and equality in response to changes in the
international arena. I further show how the structural results of the work done by the
women’s movement set the stage for women’s military integration, and the claims made
about women’s service in response to a changing international security situation echoed
the claims made about women’s equality. I then trace the process of women’s integration
through the three eras of global political change. In the first, the basis for integration is
set through initial equality laws that allowed women into the regular armed forces. In the
132

second, military policy was refined to better account for the experiences that women were
having in the military, and French military doctrine shifted from conventional combat to
values based intervention and norm defusing. In the third, French forces professionalized
and the military continued to refine its identity around values. In the fourth, I show how
current proposed changes are reflective of the past process of integration.

French Military Culture
The French military history of adaptation through self-examination (de Durand
2011, Hubin 2012). As Olivier Schmitt (2017) argues, the modern-day French military
has looked to their own history of colonial warfare – both its successes and failure – to
both strategically and tactically adapt to present circumstances. Historically, there has
been a tension over the role of the military in everyday French life. On the right, there has
been an historical argument for professional militaries as an essential function of
reproducing citizenship norms. For example, in discussing the importance of the military
to society, former Prime Minister Charles De Gaulle commented that military service was
the “right by which proper young men were initiated into becoming French citizens”
(Sorin, 2003). This assertion was predicated on this history of the warrior class that were
the keepers of French society and had particular appeal to the upper class. Prior to World
War II, military officers had primarily come from upper class families, and military
service seen as part of their duty to countries. The notion of gentlemen officers rooted in
the Napoleonic tradition was part of an officer’s ethos and education (Hughes, 2012).
However, on the left, there was a great distrust of the professional military, for fear of
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military power becoming concentrated in the hands of elite politicians (Kier, 1995).
Indeed, many former military officers pursued politics after their time in the military was
completed. It was worried that the military to politics pipeline would undermine the
diversity of representation that should be part of a democracy. In particular there was fear
that former officers would hold undo sway because of the allegiance to officers that
conscripted troops felt (Kier, 1995). The left therefore argued for short-term conscription
to keep the military decentralized and not powerful. They argued that if soldiers did not
have as much time to build an allegiance to their officers, members of the officer class
would not hold as much sway. The compromise on this tension was a reduction in
conscription time from 3 years at the end of World War II, to 12 months by 1970, and to
10 months by 1990. Concurrently, the percentage of the military that was made up on
conscripts was reduced to 29% by 1950. In adapting to these changes, the military was
able to keep the citizen soldier ideal through the continuation of conscription, while also
relying on the professional military to adapt to changes in global politics.
During and between the World Wars, and in the early years of the Cold War,
France had a conventional focus (Siegl, 2008). Its primary focus was on maintaining
control of its colonies and thwarting foreign invasion at home. French military personnel
were stationed throughout the French empire, charged with both protecting the colonies
and training indigenous forces in conventional military tactics (Chafer, 2002). However,
in the post-World War II era, the military focus shifted. During World War II, French
Africa had been an important part of the fight against Axis powers. However, in the
aftermath of the War, it because apparent that France would not longer to hold on to its
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colonial powers indefinitely and that conventional forces were not ideal for protecting
French sovereignty on the European continent. Military defeats by the Nazi forces, and
subsequent loses of colonies, resulted in a reevaluation and redefinition of the French
military tactics and strategies.
In the aftermath of the wars in Algeria and Indochina, the French military took a
critical look at itself, particularly around the way in which it viewed the use of force.
Constantin Melnik, a French political scientist and Army Officer who participated in the
war in Algeria from 1959 – 1962 noted that the extreme use of violence by the French
“ultimately resulted in support for the FLN, and hurt the French cause” (Melnik, 1964, p.
143). Melnik’s report officially documented and elevated to the highest levels of French
policy what many French officers noted in their reports during the war. The lessons from
the decolonization wars shifted the French focus from conventional force to restraint in
using force. For example, Captain Eyraud, a French officer stationed in the outskirts of
Algiers at the beginning of the conflict, went so far as to argue that the FLN should be
treated with dignity and respect, and that the French military should focus on constraining
rather than using force, especially in the more rural areas (Eyraud, 1958).
While there were immediate structural changes to the military in the 1960s and
70s (including the reduction of troops that trained for foreign invasion, the prohibition of
conscripts from engaging in foreign wars, and a tightening of the political control
exercised during war), it was during the 1980s that the military’s identity shift – away
from a focus on conventional warfare and towards constraint and the perpetuation of
democratic values – took place. Though France did not altogether abandon conventional
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tactics (it still maintained a conscripted ground force for the eventuality of a
confrontation with the Soviet Union, and was one of the early adopters of nuclear
weapons), its primary focus turned towards those military activities, such as
peacekeeping, that were less focused on brutality and more focused on utilizing the
diverse talent pool of French citizens. Retired French Colonel Henri Bore notes that the
most effective use of French military personnel is to “engage with the community,” rather
than enact violence (Bore, 2006).
The changing nature of the French military throughout the 1980s can be seen in
two primary areas: its role in the Peacekeeping and the doctrinal evolution between its
1972 and 1994 Defense White Papers. In discussing their role in the UN Missions in
Lebanon, a French officer noted that the most remarkable aspect of their mission was
ensuring that “over 9000 Palestinians were able to withdraw and return with dignity and
safety.”64 A stark contrast to the actions in Algeria, French soldiers were rewarded for
their restraint. Additionally, France was the lead nation in passing UN Resolution 13/141
(December 1988) that asserted that peacekeeping forces had an obligation to ensure
corridors of safety to ensure that victims of the conflict were able to receive humanitarian
assistance.
French military participation in peacekeeping operations in the 1990s greatly
increased. Citing the reviews they had done of their practice and policies post-Algeria, a
French military officer noted that the military was focusing on embracing the
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“ambiguity” and “human” aspects of military actions, and that peacekeeping fit will with
their new identity (Sorin, 2004).
The focus on restraint on the use of force was echoed in the differences in
France’s 1972 and 1994 White Papers. While the 1972 White Paper focused primarily on
the physical defense of France and its interests abroad, the 1994 White Paper focused on
a global need to promote democracy and curtail violence. The 1994 White Paper also
highlights that France’s defense interests are inextricably linked with humanitarianism
and human security (Balladur, 1994). The 2012 White paper further affirmed this, and
noted that national security issues often begin far from France’s boarder. Because of this,
they concentrated their efforts on expeditionary human security, focusing on peacepromoting and goodwill training missions to prevent some of the causes of conflict.
Under President Chirac, France began to commit itself to becoming experts at “Chapter
VI-1/2 Missions,”65 as they fit with both the value base of the country and the training
and force structure abilities of the military.
A 50,000-person strong expeditionary unit was formed that could “sustain itself
for at least 1 year” in overseas operations. The purpose of the unit was to be “on patrol”
around the world for crises response and humanitarian intervention. President Chirac
hoped that this force would help to establish France as a leader in promoting stability and
security (Isnard, 1996). Throughout the post-Cold War era, France further offloaded
immediate territorial defense issues to the European Defense Community to focus on
their expeditionary forces. Though a Western nuclear power, France decided to downplay
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its conventional forces and focus on strengthening its role in peacekeeping and human
security.
The focus on peacekeeping and humanitarian security also changed the way that
leadership was viewed and rewarded. While military might was favored in the colonial
wars, in the years that followed, political-military restraint surrounding the use of force
became more and more valued. This can be seen in France’s decision to differentiate
themselves from the United States’ response to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982.
Feeling that the United States was too eager to engage in kinetic operations, France
agreed to align with the multi-national force only under the condition that it could
maintain a distinct military presence to act as a “friend to all Lebanese factions” (Wood,
1998). Indeed, a positive emphasis on “soldier-diplomats” emerged by the 1990s
(Coulon, 1998). Throughout the years following the end of the Cold War, officers’
education was extended, and thoughtful response to crisis was preferenced over brute
force.66
The emphasis of French military doctrine of an operational culture that
“understands foreign cultural norms, beliefs and attitudes and is operationally relevant
…for general officers as well as infantry squad leaders to navigate complex human
terrain” (Bore, 2009) has positively interacted with the claims rooted in institutional
equality to provide a permissive environment for women’s integration. Throughout each
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of the three ears of global political change, this positive interaction supported women’s
integration into the military.

Era 1: The final years of the Cold War
Workplace Equality and the Feminization of the Military (1970-1992)
In the final two decades of the Cold War the French military underwent a process
known as “feminization”. It begins with the formalization of women’s military
participation in the professional armed forces in the 1970s and the adoption of the
Equality Law. This era was the first in which women were formal participants in the
military. In the first 2 decades after women were formally allowed into the military they
had substantial policy, tactical and strategic impact. In this first era of integration, claims
about women’s participation in broader public life coincided with the military’s
restructuring in the post-colonial era. This created a permissive environment for the
process of integration to take place.

Legal and Structural Provisions
The initial legal and structural provisions at the beginning of the first era of
integration were a result of the wide sweeping changes to laws about women’s
participation in public life. Table 4.2 summarizes the legal and structural provisions at the
beginning of this period of women’s integration.
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Table 4.2: Summary of Structural Provisions during the first era of Women’s
Participation
Component
Measure
Barriers to
- Access to professional military via 1972 Equality
Participation
Law and 1973 Statute
- 1973-1975 integration of military schools and MOS’
- Women not conscripted (men only)
- Some caps on school attendance and billeting on
ships
Childcare / Parental
- Maternity leave and provisions for motherhood
Leave
stipulated in the 1975 laws (applied to all French
citizens)
- Creche Care strengthened under 1973 Statue &
1985 Declaration
- Expanded night care opportunities
Sexual Harassment
- Outlawed under the Equality Law. All handled
outside the military
The 1972 Equal Pay act was instrumental in both women beginning to achieve
structural equality in the public sector, and in highlighting the impact of women’s
movement in shaping public policy. An additional, and potentially unintended,
consequence of the law was that it began the process of integration for French women in
the military. In debating the 1972 law, a prominent feminist lawmaker asserted that men
and women “serve the same Republic” and are therefore entitled to “equal pay, equal
rank, and equal opportunity for promotion.”67 The idea of “serving the same Republic”
would become seminal in opening the door for women’s military service.
Women’s integration was further helped by the military’s restructuring to focus
on retaining professional soldiers and relying less on conscripts. Throughout the 1970s
and 80s, the military focused on retention, with preference given to volunteers who
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would carry a continuity of service. Both the length of conscription and the degree to
which the military relied on conscripted forces. Historically, military conscription had
been a “socialization” process for French males into political society, resulting in a
masculine character to the military. A criticism of the French military’s ability to
successfully thwart the Nazi invasion is that the military was more a tool of masculine
cultural indoctrination and less of a force focused on meeting global threats (Boulegue,
1991). The success of women in the Resistance (as well as later success in Indochina and
Algeria) made it impossible to ignore the impact that women had on military success. To
both attract and retain talented women, the military focused on the professional nature of
service, and focused on its role as an employer, not just an army of conscripts.
As an employer, the military was thus subject to the provisions of the 1972 Equal
Pay Law. In interpreting the law for the military, the minister of defense went beyond
simply stating that everyone was to be paid equally, and stated that “all citizens wishing
to make a career of the armed forces shall have an equal possibility to do so.”68 Further
clarification of the application of the 1972 Equal Pay Law to the military was contained
in Statute passed on March 23, 1973.69 Of note, this statue integrated the previously
single-sex staff noncommissioned officer school and the advanced military officer
schools. Much like the trade unions identifying women for skills training that would
increase the likelihood of promotion, the 1973 Statue encourage commanders to identify
women that would benefit from advanced training. The formal opening of advanced
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military schools and academies created an environment where military leaders could
benefit from the diverse nature of all French citizens who chose to join (Reynaud, 1988;
Alexis & Dubois, 2010). Both the exposure to women and the unique perspectives that
they brought impacted the male students.
While women were allowed in the formal professional military, at the time that
the 1972 Equality Law was put into effect for the military there were still restrictions on
the roles that women could hold in the military. Women were prohibited from
participating in infantry units and submarines because of the “unique” and “exceptional”
nature of those jobs and their “unsuitability” for female participation (Sorin, 2003;
Prévot, 2010). Using the cost of providing billeting spaces and berthing as primary
rational, military officials placed caps on women’s participation in certain occupational
specialties ranging from 3.5% for combat support to 7% for shipboard service. Further,
no more than 20% of a given class at the St Cyr military academy could be female
(Belmokhtar, 1980). Additionally, the Gendarmerie requested a formal exception to
policy stating “qu'en raison des conditions de mise en oeuvre et d'intervention des
formations de gendarmerie et des sujtions du service, les emplois des sous-officiers et des
officiers de l'arme de la Gendarmerie ne sont ouverts qu'aux hommes.”70 His initial
request was granted due to what was perceived to be the exceptional nature of the work
of the Gendarmerie.
In addition to the structural provisions for equality that the 1972 law and the 1973
statute provided, women in the military benefited from the 1975 law forbidding

70

Translation: Due to the conditions and requirements for employment, NCOs and Officers of the
Gendarmarie’s armed units will only be men

142

pregnancy to be a consideration for employment. Prior to the 1975 law, the military could
discharge or separate women who were pregnant, or deny mothers recruitment into the
military. The 1975 law, however, applied to the military as well, and pregnancy and
motherhood were no longer disqualifying factors. Further, the law required that
employers make accommodations for pregnancy and motherhood. Creche Care
protections were also further expanded under the 1975 law, ensuring that women had
access to child care at all time they were expected to be at work.
The initial policies associated with the Equality Act in the early 1970s were
essential for allowing women to gain a foothold in the military service. Throughout the
1970s and 1980s there were many changes in the policies surrounding women’s
participation. In 1982, Minister of Defense Charles Hernu established the Committee to
Study the Perspective of Female Service Members (La Commission d’Etude Prospective
de la Femme Militaire). This Committee consolidated many of the recommendations
made by women service members throughout their initial years in service. The result was
a series of revisions to the personnel code aimed at better integrating women into the
French military between 1983-1984. Rooted in the language of the original 1970s’
equality legislation revisions and improvements to policies on child care, maternity leave,
and parental benefits highlighted the Committee’s engagement with female members of
the military. Examples of these policies were allowing service members to remain in the
same geographic region throughout their career (barring operational necessity), and
ensuring night childcare was available at every duty station for service members. All of
the policies were based on women’s suggestions, and with the hope of attracting women’s
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enlistment and retention (Reynaud, 1988). Additionally, between 1983 - 1987, overhauls
to facilities and equipment (including ships) were undertaken in order to ensure that there
would be no arbitrary constraints on women’s service due to berthing, hygiene, or
maternity facilities (Dufoulon, Saglio & Trompette, 1999).71 Under Ministry of Defense
directives, facilities had to be built or converted to accommodate as many women as may
possibly volunteer and be qualified to serve in a given position. This did away with the
caps that had been put on women’s service, as access to (or the cost of converting)
facilities could no longer be used as an excuse for limiting women’s service.
The 1980s also saw the restrictions on women’s service lifted. Decrees made on 9
May 1985 and 31 May 1985 gave women the ability to both serve in and rise to the
highest noncommissioned and commissioned officer ranks in combat arms units. Further,
the 31 May decree declared that not only could women attain these posts but that they
should. This exemplifies the belief that women should not only have the same
opportunities as men, but that there is benefit to be gained from women’s leadership. The
recognition by the government that women were beneficial for the military at large
helped to solidify women’s position in the French military, and codify the influence that
women were able to have on it.
There were also legal changes made to the Gendarmerie. Though not part of the
military per se, the Gendarmerie serves a military-like purpose. As noted above, the
Gendarmerie claimed exception to integrating women under the Equality Act. Due to the
exceptional nature of the Gendarmerie, this claim went largely unchallenged until 1983.
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On 10 February 1983, Decree 83-94 mandated that the Gendarmerie come into line with
the military services with regards to gender equality. When pressed on the rational for
excluding women, the Director-General could only speak to the history of the
Gendarmerie, and failed to produce any concrete evidence pointing to the need for
excluding women. The 1983 Degree thus sent a message that tradition or perception
were not adequate reasons for maintaining gender segregation.

Functional Participation
In addition to advances in the legal aspects of women’s service, there were
important advancements in the functional participation of women in the French military.
Table 4.3 highlights the functional participation of women in this first era.

Table 4.3: Summary of Functional Participation during the first era of Women’s
Participation
Component
Measure
Level of
- Increase from 2.74% to 8.5% of the total force (over
Participation
20% of professional forces)
Type of
- Primary fields: Information Technology, Senior
Participation
Administration
- Sharp increase in participation in infantry and
combat arms (including Gendarmerie)
- Between 20-30% of school classes and increased
participation as instructors
Overseas
- No numerical data, but antidotal information on
Participation
women’s participation in peacekeeping and in the
Gulf War.
Before embarking on a discussion of women’s functional participation during the
1970s and 1980s it is important to emphasize that conscription still existed for male
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French citizens. The reliance on conscription means that the vast majority of junior
enlisted service members were male. Conscripts were viewed as cheap, expendable, and
temporary labor, and therefore given the jobs that required the least amount of training
(Martin, 1981). Enlisted women, part of the professional force, were primarily in
positions that required more schooling and specialty training, such as intelligence, aircraft
maintenance, and medical services. As a result of the increased schooling timeline,
women entered the operational forces at a later time than men (Ministère des Armées,
1984). The continued practice of male conscription, coupled with the training-intensive
occupational specialties to which women were most often assigned, resulted in a figure
on women’s military participation that has been argued to be skewed in favor of men.
Indeed, throughout the 1970s, women only averaged 2.75% of the total military forces,
however 14% of the professional forces were women, as were between 10-25% of the
staff NCOs (depending on service), 12% of senior administrative professionals, and over
50% of the information technology specialists72 (Martin, 1982). In the 1980s, women’s
service continued to rise. By 1985, a quarter of new recruits and officer candidates in the
Army and Air Force were women and ascension into the Navy and Marines more than
doubled from the previous decade.
Table 4.4: Percent of New Women Recruits/Officer Candidates by Service73
Army
Air Force
Navy
Marines
1975
15
15
5
3
1985
25
25
10
7
Source: Monrique 2004

72

Early computer operators and cryptologists

73

Excludes Gendarmerie, since they did not admit women until 1983
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Notably, women achieved this level of participation despite some of the caps put on
aspects of their service.
Not only did women join the military, but they remained in it for a considerable
period of time. While there is not data on retention rates kept in the 1970s and 1980s, the
continued increased percentage of NCOs and Senior Officers indicate that women were
both remaining in the military and advancing through the ranks.
Table 4.5: Percentages of Officers and NCOs 196274 vs 1979
Army
Air Force
Navy
Sr. Officer
NCO
Sr. Officer
NC0
Sr. Officer
NCO
1962
0.5%
6.1%
0%
4.8%
0%
18.1%
1979
21.1%
36.9%
23.8%
24%
22.7%
18%
Source: Ducret-Schaeffer 1980
The percentages in Table 4.5 are the as a proportion of the professional force, that is they
exclude conscripts from the total numbers. Throughout the 1980s, the percentage of
officers rose by about 5% as well (NATO 2000). The sharp increase in women in
leadership positions, coupled with the fact that the percentage of women in more senior
ranks is higher than the overall percentage of women in the professional forces gives
credence to the assertion that women in the French military were dedicated to staying in
the military and make it a career. Not only were they included in the military through the
allowance for them to participate, but they remained in and were competitive for
promotion.
As women answered the call to military service, they proved themselves capable
of meeting the challenges. Not only did they meet the physical and tactical standards
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Data on 1962 is available as it is 10 years after women were first admitted into the military. While
numbers of the late 1960s and early 1970s are not available, Ducret-Schaeffer (1980) indicates that these
numbers are representitive of the averages just before the passage of the 1972 law and 1973 Statute.
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required of them for military service, they excelled in socializing their male peers to the
benefits of women’s inclusion in the military (Prévot, 2010). The relatively long time that
women spent in school had the advantage of allowing them to succeed in a lowconsequence environment and gain the trust of their male peers before having to engage
in operational activities. The ability of women to perform according to standards coupled
with the strategic benefit that they brought to units resulted in women being listened to
and respected as fellow service members.
Not only did the percentage of women joining in the military overall increase, but
the percentage of women in combat-related fields sharply increased. Women’s
participation in ground combat arms specialties rose by nearly 30% between 1975-1990,
outpacing the traditionally gendered specialties such as healthcare (8% growth)
(Monrique 2004). Additionally, by 1990, 25% of the women serving in the military (or
military-like activities) were in the Gendarmerie (Jauneau, 2012).
During this period of growth in women’s participation in the military, the military
response to global politics was rather calm. Coming off of heavy casualties in Indochina
and Algeria, the military used this time to embark on a period of regrouping,
restructuring, and training. The first opportunities for women thus came in the form of
domestic schooling and training. In 1977, women were admitted to the Ecole superieure
gu gurre (War College). This gave officers access to the flag rank, as school attendance
was mandatory for promotion to brigadier general. Additionally, the number of women
NCOs attending the newly-integrated NCO academies resulted in women having
leadership roles in the domestically based training exercises. Once senior level schools
148

were open for women, women comprised 20-30% of each class (Martin, 1982). From
1972-1979, the number of female NCOs in leadership roles rose from 6% to 30%
(Ducret-Schaeffer, 1980).
The domestic strengthening of France’s military was beneficial when global
politics turned resulted in attention increasingly abroad. In the 1980s, France turned its
attention to bolstering its presence in NATO. Though not part of the formal command
structure, French troops took active roles in leading NATO exercises and in occupations
in Germany. It is in such roles that women were able to tactically shine. As Katia Sorin
(2000) notes, women’s leadership in multi-national exercises began to re-shape the ideal
type military leader. One result of the military defeats in its former colonies was a loss of
faith in the traditional leadership styles of male service members. For many service
members, the style of male leadership was seen to be detrimental; the reason that they
lost colonies and suffered heavy casualties (Boulegue 1991). Women stepped in with
what Jean Boulege (1991) refers to as a “charismatic authority” that served as a foil to
traditional masculinity. According to surveys done by Boulege, though there was some
initial trepidation to women’s ability to perform in the military, those that had served
with a woman overwhelming saw their leadership style as positive and an asset to the
overall mission of the military.
The focus on peacekeeping in the 1980s also opened space for women to serve
internationally. In both Lebanon and Bosnia, there were women engaged positively in
peacekeeping operations. Women peacekeepers helped to prevent local women from
being used as human shields, and were instrumental in creating a permissive environment
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for humanitarian actions (Murphy, 2007). Indeed, even amongst the controversies that
have surrounded Western involvement in peacekeeping operations, the role of women has
generally been found to be a positive contribution in minimizing violence, and achieving
tactical and strategic objectives (DeGroot, 2001; Molloy, 2004).
The credibility brought about by women’s service in peacekeeping missions
resulted in their being instated as instructors and leaders in military academies and
specialty training schools. Their positions in schools was critical for women to continue
to influence policy and doctrine (Monrique, 2004). Not only did their roles as instructors
solidify the idea that women’s style of leadership was beneficial, but gave experienced
women the ability to influence military curriculum (Sorin, 2004).
Memoirs and statements from women who were among the first to achieve senior
ranks highlight that they both joined and remained in the service because they had the
opportunity to participate in meaningful ways as women (Bertrand, 2013: Sorin, 2003).
As one female Navy officer in the mid-1970s asserted,
for me it was always ‘the Navy or Nothing!’ when my friends
were competing for college or the workplace, I pursued the
Navy. … I knew it would be challenging, but it also the place
where these is a career, schooling, and responsibility.
(Unidentified officer quoted in Bertrand 2013)
Women not only achieved rank in the military, but positions of influence. The
arena where this happened the most was in schools. As noted above, the 1970s and 1980s
were relatively peaceful for the French military. As a result, leadership in schools as
among the most influential and prestigious that one could attain during this period.
Women were active both in the teaching and administration of military schools. In
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addition to active duty service members, many women that had been active in the
Resistance and in France’s military operations in Indochina took on tactics and strategy
positions (Sorin, 2004; Prévot, 2010). Women were not just able to join the military, they
did so and remained in, while having a meaningful impact.

Claims About Service and Interaction with Military Culture
The laws and statutes of the 1970s provided the conditions under which women
were able to join the military, and the changing personnel policies throughout the 1980s
are reflective of the claims that women made about participation in public life. These
claims were strengthened by the visibility of women in leadership roles in Lebanon and
Bosnia, their positions in military academies, and their enduring military service. The
claims rooted in institutional equality interacted positively with French military culture to
help create the permissive environment for women to join and advance in the military,
ultimately resulting in their ability to make changes to policy and tactics. Because of the
military’s de-emphasis on violence and killing, military leaders were able to frame a
career in the military as a means of serving the country as a woman, focusing on values
and a restraint of force. Socially, as women were increasing overall in the workforce, and
the role of the working mother being more accepted, military service was framed as a
way to be “a role model to France, and a role model to your daughter” (Monrique, 2004,
p. 21). The focus on the military as a career coupled with the values emphasis of the
military led women to be more open about their identities as both woman and soldier.
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Especially among more senior women, there was a growing comfort in identifying
oneself as feminine and capable of being a military professional.75
Many of the claims made by women drew from the stories and experiences of
women in the Resistance, Indochina, and Peacekeeping missions; and highlighted the
strategic and tactical importance of the “feminization of coercive power” (Boulegue,
1991, p. 350) to French military success. Because of the limited opportunities for
deployments during the 1970s and 1980s, women strengthened their claims through the
experiences of women in previous operations to highlight their importance. Women such
as Betty Albrecht, Georgette Gerar, and Madeline Riffaud,76 key figures in the Resistance
were employed to teach French counterinsurgency forces and codify lessons learned from
the Resistance into French strategy (Trinquier, 2006). The focus on brining women in in
to share their unique experiences and enhance overall military effectiveness is
emblematic of what French historian Jean-Charles Jauffret (2013) describes as the
“French touch” to military operations that is focused on the humanity and individualism
in both its troops and the enemy. The emphasis on the tactical impact of the difference
between men and women was well-received by the military culture. Unlike most Western
militaries that carried an expectation that women would conform to masculine norms if
they were to succeed in the military (Herbert, 1998), women in the French military were
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The interview transcripts from Sorin 2004 (conducted between 1989-2000) reveal a shit … by the mid
1990s, women frequently define themselves as both “woman” and “soldier” in the same interview,
suggesting a shift in cultural, such that being openly a woman was not a detriment to being a soldier.
76

For narratives of their actions see: Weitz, Margaret Collins (1995) Sisters In the Resistance: How Women
Fought to Free France 1940-1945. New York, NY: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
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expected to use their differences in ways that would benefit the overall strategic
objectives.
However, the focus on the difference between men and women did not always
result in increased participation by women in the armed services. Military leaders initially
used the difference between men and women to constrain the number of women serving
in particular units. Included in the equality laws of the 1970s were requirements to
provide accommodations for pregnant women and new mothers so that their biological
difference would not interfere with their competitiveness in the workplace. The military,
as an historically all-male organization did not have the infrastructure to support many
women-specific needs. Accommodating women would mean having to build new
facilities or retrofit existing ones, a costly proposition. This resulted in restrictions being
placed on women’s initial entry into the military.
The restrictions drew backlash. From within the military, women asserted that the
restrictions on the numbers of their service ran counter to the guarantees for equal
opportunity and evaluation promised in the 1972 and 1975 laws. Citing the historical
success of women in the Resistance and Indochina, women claimed that it was
detrimental to France’s well-being to artificially constrain the contribution of women. As
Catherine Bertrand, a French Naval officer from 1974-2000 asserted in a statement on the
condition of the military and personnel training for the French Army’s Historical Review:
The Secretary of State, in 1973, remarked that equality
between men and women is a Constitutional guarantee. And
France very much recognizes the role of women in the
military and the appeal that the military has to young girls.
Why are they limiting us? Just as the feminist movement is
giving space to women’s rights at home, we need it to give
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way to women’s rights in Defense. France may fall again if
we do not allow for full equality between men and women
in the military (Bertrand 2013, 7-8).
Assertions such as those made by Bertrand resonated with both women and military
leadership and resulted in changes to military policy that allowed women to more fully
participate.
The impact of women’s claims was further strengthened by the decrease in
reliance on conscripts. As Cold War politics were more reliant on deterrence and
containment and less focused on conventional warfare, the emphasis in recruiting shifted
to professional forces, preferencing skills over recruiting more bodies. By the mid-1970s,
less than ¼ of the force was comprised of conscripted soldiers (Belmokhtar 1980).
Indeed, the focus on recruiting professional soldiers rather than relying on conscripts,
coupled with the momentum from the women’s movement in encouraging women to
pursue employment opportunities resulted in a steady increase of women both joining and
remaining in the military as a career (Monrique, 2004). The interaction of the claims
made by women and the military culture resulted in a more robust supply of women who
not only needed to join the military but wanted to, seeing that their unique contribution
was valued and could impact the institution.
In many countries, women expressing discontent with “women’s issues” has been
used as a reason to discount their service, and used as rational for the claim that women
do not belong in the military (Gutmann, 2000; Van Creveld, 2000). However, the
emphasis on the specific aspects that women bring to the table was compatable with the
French military culture that was focused on cultural evolution and values. France stands
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out as exceptional in this case. This is not to say that the French military was exempt
from sexism. Like most militaries, women in the French military expressed discontent
with cultural issues around sexism and discrimination (Sorin, 2004). However, the fact
that their grievances were addressed rather than used to try and push them out, is
exemplary of both the acceptance of women’s role in the military as women, as well as
the beliefs rooted in institutional equality that the government has both the ability and
obligation to formally address the conditions of inequality to allow women to equally
participate and contribute. As the Cold War came to a close, women had not only proven
that they were necessary in military actions, but that creating enabling structures that
encouraged women’s participation was beneficial to national security broadly.

Outcome
The results women’s integration during this first period of global politics were
largely seen in changes to military policy. As women joined the military in increased
numbers, a process that became known as the “feminization” of the military began
(Prévot, 2010; Observatoire de la feminisation, 2006). While important changes were
made to military policy, the process was not always smooth for those involved.
Historically, conscription in the military was a cultural signal of the transition to
manhood. While women had been participating in military operations since the French
Revolution, they had largely done so outside of formal institutional channels. Despite
women being essential to tactical and strategic successes, the institution of the military
had long remained the domain of men, many of whom resisted the formal inclusion of
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women into their institution (Ehrenreich, 1999). Indeed, in the early years of all military
occupations being open to women, they were attempts to relegate women to gendered
roles such as quartermaster, cook, and supply (Observatoire de la feminisation, 2006;
Prévot, 2010; Monrique, 2004). However, as women continued to remain in the military
and make claims about the benefit of their participation to military operations the
“feminization” process took root.
The first outcome of the feminization process was changes to personnel policies.
For example, while the 1970s equality legislation addressed child care, and Crèche Care
had been established in the 1960s, child care still posed a problem for many women.
Despite the legal provisions ensuring care, there was still a sense that women were not
respected for their motherhood choices (Boulegue, 1991). As a response, the March 20,
1984 parliamentarian record emphasized that “men and women’s equality is necessary
for the security of France, and access to child care is part of that equality,” effectively
reframing Crèche Care into a national security issue. The proclamation recognized that
there is a difference between men and women with regards to their needs around
pregnancy, childbirth, and childcare and emphasized that provisions such as “free
medical and child care, as well as all necessary nutritional assistance … [in order to
ensure] equal access to all financial, cultural, social, and security aspects of French life”77
was to be guaranteed.
The Committee to Study the Perspective of Female Service Members (La
Commission d’Etude Prospective de la Femme Militaire) was another key outcome
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women’s integration during this first period. The Committee was established in 1982 by
Minister of Defense Charles Hernu as a formal channel for the growing number of
women in the services to voice their concerns and ensure that their needs were met. As
noted above, the number of women in the military grew form in the single digits
(between 2-4%) to around 10% very quickly (Monrique, 2004). Having a formal channel
for communication to political leadership ensure that women were able to voice their
concerns and impact structural change. The Committee’s recommendations, including
opening positions to women, dropping caps on service, and mandating that all facilities
are in line with the equality law, are the root of the substantive legal changes that set the
initial formal conditions for the second cycle of integration.
The provisions in the 1994 Defense White Paper further highlight the impact that
women had on the military. The White Paper is the first written after the end of the Cold
War and is primarily focused on how the military would evolve to meet the changing
world. Throughout the White Paper, new threats are identified, and holistic strategies
proposed to address them. Specifically, it mentions the increased threat of terrorism,
religious extremism, instability in the former Soviet States, economic uncertainty in
Africa, and propaganda from globalized information flows as the most pressing issues to
French security. The White Paper identifies the best way to face these threats as ensuring
that all military actions “emphasize the social dimension,” and focus on a “preservation
of life that is necessary to preserve French interests and the interests of the international
order” (Balladur, 1994). Peacekeeping missions also draw particular attention. Drawing
heavily from the lessons of Balkans on the importance of having both the capacity to
157

engage militarily but also the diversity of skills to effectively operate in culturally foreign
environment, the White Paper emphasized the importance of effective culturally sensitive
peacekeeping in preventing many of the contributors to extremism such as resource
degradation, religious antagonism, and the trauma of violence. Peacekeeping forces had
to be capable of militarily enforcing the peace when necessary, while also ensuring longterm conditions for peace were not disrupted (Lanxade, 1995). Drawing from the lessons
learned in Lebanon and Bosnia, women were an essential component in ensuring that the
cultural dimensions of peacekeeping were respected.
These lessons are echoed in the twin emphasis on military capability and cultural
sensitivity. Particularly in France’s role in establishing humanitarian corridors during the
mission in Bosnia, the ability to transition seamlessly from traditional combat activities to
social engagement was highlighted (Woodhouse & Ramsbotham, 2005). Women were an
essential part of this. With combat roles now open, there were infantry-trained women
that were able to both effectively engage militarily and serve as important liaisons in
society.
The dedication to restraining the use of violence and the emphasis on the postconflict environment was indicative of a permissive environment for women to continue
to join the military in meaningful ways. This was not only the case in the peacekeeping
environment, but also with regards to France’s participation in more conventional wars.
During the Gulf War, French generals credited the women in their units as a “positive
force for restraining force,” and making France a “model military” in living up to its
stated values (Monrique, 2004, p. 19). The role of women in the French military was
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impactful. Foreign observers remarked that France’s emphasis on incorporating women
into their tactical and strategic plans was their way of differentiating themselves from
other Western militaries (Riding, 1991). Indeed, throughout the 1970s and 1980s and into
the 1990s women’s impact was not only noticed but incorporated into the conduct of
military operations, furthering the feminization of the military.

Era 2: Post-Cold War
Professional Feminization into the 21 st Century
As the Cold War came to an end, not only did the French military continue to
refine its doctrine with regards to the promotion of values and restraint on violent action,
but it made a move towards full professionalization. The decision to end conscription in
1996 and transition to an all-volunteer force was primarily made out of forces structure
requirements. The length of conscription had decreased to only 10 months, resulting in
conscripts being viewed primarily as unskilled labor used to perform menial tasks.
Further, the military was primarily composed of professional service members rather than
conscripts (over 87% professional), alleviating concerns about being able to fill the ranks
with volunteers (Boene and Martin, 2000). Substantively, the move to professionalism
was largely symbolic, as the reframing of the role of the military in the 1980s and 90s had
made it an attractive career field for men and women alike (Moskos, Williams & Segal,
2000). The professionalization of the military, while not intentionally aimed at women’s
integration, created space for women to further influence the military. In this section I
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show how professionalization and France’s response to the post-Cold War changes in
global politics resulted in further integration of women into the French military.

Legal and Structural Provisions
By the end of the Cold War, there had been many improvements to the legal and
structural provisions that made it more accommodating for women to join the military.
Table 4.6 highlights these.

Table 4.6: Summary of Structural Provisions during the Second Era of Women’s
Participation
Component
Measure
Barriers to
- No Barriers
Participation
- End of Conscription
Childcare / Parental
- Expansion of Maternity Leave for Military
Leave
- Special provisions for dual military couples
Sexual Harassment
- Themis Cell “toolkit” on prevention
The most profound structural change was the end of conscription, resulting in the
full professionalization of the military. The decision to end conscription was made in
1996, with the timeline to phase it out by 2001.78 Though by 1996 the overwhelming
majority of forces were professionals, the ending of conscription had an important
cultural impact for both the military and the country as a whole. Despite women’s
increased participation in the military throughout the 1970s – 1990s, the continuation of
the policy of male conscription allowed for a masculinized nationality to endure. Even
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2001 was the first year in which there were no conscripts in the military.
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though conscripts were a very small minority of those serving, the gendered nature of
conscription could be used to undermine women’s contributions. Military was still often
seen as the passage to manhood. Though there were mechanisms for women to address
their grievances and the injustices that they faced, such as the Committee to Study the
Perspective of Female Service Members, cultural discrimination still existed with regards
to the role of men and women. The end of conscription was one of the final hurdles to
effectively overcoming gendered discrimination (Sorin, 2003).
Concurrent with professionalization, the French military drastically reduced its
size, cutting personnel by nearly 40%.79 French officials wanted to send a message that
the military was going to be focused on professionalism and recruiting the best qualified
individuals, not just having a large standing army, in order to ensure that the transition
away from conscription was a success (Boene & Martin, 2000).
There were also structural changes made that specifically impacted women. In
2000 maternity policies were overhauled. Mothers were given 16 weeks for their first
child and 26 weeks subsequent children, and 156 weeks of “flexible” time in which they
could take additional leave as necessary to fulfill maternal duties (NATO, 2016). Women
in the military were afforded 3-4 weeks more leave than their civilian counterparts in
order to address the physical and emotional aspects of motherhood more effectively.
The military also took direct measures to address sexual harassment and assault.
Though still prosecuted under civilian law, the Themis Cell developed a sexual
harassment “prevention kit” during the transition to the all-volunteer force. Part of the
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professionalization of the services was focused on troops not only being models of values
of equality to the international community, but among their brothers and sisters in arms
(NATO, 2013). Additionally, the Themis Cell worked to coordinate legal representation
for service members that had been harassed or assaulted, and ensured that all the proper
administrative work was done so that service members could continue to receive their
pay and benefits while going through the legal process (NATO, 2014).
Policy and structural changes that France made in response to the passage of UN
Resolution 1325 also influenced the military. As France set out to create its National
Action Plan (NAP) it focused on the goal of becoming a leader in combatting the crosscutting impact that conflict has on women.80 Elevating women into combat leadership
positions was seen as essential for ensuring France’s credibility in their commitment to
peace in post-conflict societies (NAP, 2010). Additionally, gender advisors were
incorporated into the military specifically to ensure that operations were planned and
executed with the multi-level considerations of gender taken into account. Not only were
French Gender advisors used in support of French operations, but also deployed in
support of NATO allies (NATO, 2016).

Functional Participation
In the years post-Cold War, women’s participation in the military continued to
expand. Women also continued to have longevity in the military, choosing to make it a
career. Table 4.7 highlights the functional participation of women in the military.
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Professionalization positively impacted the total percentage of women in the military, as
conscripted forces no longer diluted the gender balance. Yet not only did the total
proportion of women increase, but women also continued to increase their presence in
operationally deployed forces and in leadership roles.
Table 4.7: Summary of Functional Participation during the Second Era of Women’s
Participation
Component
Measure
Level of
- 15% total force
Participation
Type of
- 5.5% of combat arms
Participation
- Concentrated in Naval and Expeditionary Forces
Overseas
- 7-10% of deployed forces
Participation
At the end of the Cold War, France reasserted its focus on collective security,
peacekeeping, and humanitarian operations. Conventional military operations and nuclear
deterrence took a further back seat to actions designed to promote international peace and
stability. The 1994 Defense White Paper focused on a need to promote democracy around
the world. This was again affirmed in the 2012 White Paper which also noted that
national security issues often begin far from France’s boarder. The role of women in the
military was largely a result of the focus on expeditionary human security, peacepromoting and goodwill training missions that may prevent some of the causes of
conflict. Coined by President Chirac, France committed itself to becoming experts at
“Chapter VI-1/2 Missions,”81 as they fit with both the value base of the country and the
training and force structure abilities of the military.
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Missions that straddle the UN Charter’s Chapter VI (Peace Keeping) and Chapter VI (Peace
Enforcement) missions.
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In response to both the military downsizing and the emphasis on values-based
deployments, when the end of conscription was announced, a 50,000-person strong
expeditionary unit was formed that could sustain itself for at least 1 year in overseas
operations. The purpose of the unit was to be “on patrol” around the world for crises
response and humanitarian intervention. President Chirac hoped that this force would
help to establish France as a leader in promoting stability and security (Isnard, 1996). To
compensate for downsizing the military while having a more expeditionary focus, France
offloaded immediate territorial defense issues to the European Defense Community.
Though a Western nuclear power, France decided to downplay its conventional forces
and focus on strengthening its role in peacekeeping and human security.
During the transition from conscription to the AVF and the downsizing of the
force, the military engaged in a process of direct recruitment for NCOs in order to fill
leadership roles in technically-demanding fields. In order to fulfill the expeditionary
mission the military needed not just bodies to fill ranks, but highly skilled and educated
leaders. Notably, a significant portion of the French direct recruits were women. Table
4.8 highlights the number of women in such positions.
Table 4.8: Percentage of Women NCO Direct Recruitment Candidates 1999
Army
Air Force
Navy
Gendarmerie
% Candidates
36
43
39
21
Source: (Sorin, Women in the French Forces: Integration versus Conflict 2004)
The relatively high proportion of women who were eligible for the “line jumping”
into leadership as a result of the direct recruitment program is indicative of the belief that
women played an essential and important role in military leadership. Because direct
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recruits were not part of the military system at the time of their recruitment, they were not
socialized into military culture. Indeed, the women brought in as NCOs were put in
command of junior troops strengthened the beliefs begun in the previous decades that
women had leadership value that was distinct from men. Women were not expected to
conform to men’s image, but to lead in ways that they saw as effective and efficient.
Not only did women join in leadership roles, and take on new operational
responsibilities, but they remained in the military. While the direct-recruitment of NCOs
skew the numbers of NCOs as a measure of the longevity of service, at nearly every point
in the military career there was a positive retention rate of women when compared to
men. From 1995-2015, there was an average retention rate of 6.15%, meaning that the
military retained 6.15% more women than men (NATO, 2016). In response to the needs
of post-Cold War global politics, women were stepping up to serve their country.

Claims About Women’s Service and Interaction with Military Culture
Claims about women’s service were strengthened by the focus on humanitarian
security and peacekeeping throughout the post-Cold War era. This focus also changed the
way that leadership was viewed and rewarded. While military might was favored in the
colonial wars, in the years that followed, political-military restraint surrounding the use
of force became increasingly valued. This can be seen in France’s decision to
differentiate themselves from the United States’ response to the Israeli invasion of
Lebanon in 1982. Feeling that the United States was too eager to engage in kinetic
operations, France agreed to align with the multi-national force only under the condition
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that it could maintain a distinct military presence to act as a “friend to all Lebanese
factions” (Wood, 1998). Indeed, a positive emphasis on “soldier-diplomats” emerged by
the 1990s (Coulon, 1998). Throughout the years following the end of the Cold War,
officers’ education was extended, and thoughtful response to crisis was preferenced over
brute force.82
The focus on education and restraint of violent force provided an opening for
women to re-engage with claims about their service as a woman. Given the emphasis on
the difference between men and women by the women’s movement, women were able to
capitalize on qualities typically associated with the feminine. As was discussed in
Chapter 2, the French feminist movement emphasized that society had largely been
responsible for the difference between men and women. In addition to being used as
leverage to lobby for policies that specifically addressed women’s issues, these
differences were used to highlight the importance of women’s military service. In 1998,
the first women were successful in completing commando training and serving in a
previously all-male commando unit. Much like the women of The Resistance used their
femininity to gather intelligence and conduct raids against Nazi and Vichy officers,
female commandos used the perception of their femininity to move in spaces that were
traditionally and typically closed to their male commando counterparts (Monrique 2004).
Women’s integration into previously all-male units coupled with the overall move
towards professionalization continued the process of feminization of the French military.
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In the 1990s, the requirements at Ecole d’etat-major ( the senior officers’ academies) was expanded to
include course in language, culture, negotiation, civilian protection, and natural resource mamagement in
addition to traditional tactics (Archived at www.defense.gouv.fr)
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By 2000, France had instituted gender-training in all of its units (Sorin, 2004).
Additionally, gender became part of the focus of career management. As the force
professionalized, there was a conscious effort to ensure that women’s service continued
to be valued. While there was an overall move to increase the number of women, it was
coupled with ensuring that the women recruited would stay in service. Military schools
specifically focused on targeting high-achieving women in order to ensure that there was
a large talent pool of leaders to choose from. Incoming academy classes averaged
between 17-20% female enrolment (NATO, 2016). In the 2000 report to the NATO
Committee on Gender Perspectives, a French official noted that “professional gender
equality will increase feminization, and emphasize the importance of women’s role in the
armed forces” (NATO, 2000). The continued overall stability of the post-Cold War years
allowed France to continue to emphasize their role in perpetuating values and norms.
Indeed, a mission set that allowed women to participate as women ultimately also helped
recruiting and retention efforts. Throughout the 1990s and into the early 2000s, France
scaled back its direct recruiting of women into NCO position. However, the number of
women in both the military at large, and in leadership positions in particular, continued to
grow (Schjølset, 2010). Rather than explicitly targeting women, recruitment was focused
on mission set and mission type in such a way that it emphasized that the contributions of
all French citizens were necessary to meet the challenges of the changing world.
Appealing to differences (though not explicitly targeting women) is reflective of the
claims rooted in institutional equality. Just as women’s movements focused on the notion
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that France was stronger when all citizens participated in cultural, economic, and political
life, the military appealed to the value of difference.

Outcome
By the dawn of the 21st Century, the French military was a fully professional
force that was experiencing a high level of integration. The discussions leading up to the
adoption of the French National Action Plane highlight the role that women played in
shaping French attitudes and high-level policy. French military women were included in
the drafting process, and the result was a document that had both the role of women in
managing and mitigating conflict and cultural sensitivity (especially to former French
colonies) as priority areas in the plan (Miller, Pournik & Swaine, 2014). When the Plan
was adopted, money was set aside for French military women to hold gender-based
training in French-speaking countries and former colonies.
On a tactical level, women were directly engaged in responding to the new
challenges of the post-Cold War global political environment. Ground combat units were
intentionally loaded with more women than would be otherwise the case in order to meet
the cultural challenges that arose in the post-Cold War world. For example, in Kosovo
women were essential to ensuring protection of humanitarian evacuations and provisions.
French infantry soldiers – trained to engage in the combat that they would see – were
deployed to ensure the safe evacuation civilians. Their gender helped to calm the
Kosovars and build a rapport that was important for creating a long-term relationship
between France and Kosovo (Koeth, 2010).
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Though the full extent of women’s integration in the professional military remains
to be seen, there is evidence, especially in the post-September 11th actions in
Afghanistan, that French women are in essential component of the French military.

Era 3: Post-9/11 in Afghanistan
Putting Feminization to the Test
The 2001 US-led invasion of Afghanistan to overthrow the Taliban would be the
first real test of feminization in an offensive military operation. Throughout the 1990s,
while the military had remained active, it had been in support of peacekeeping missions
and humanitarian assistance. Combat engagements were thus primarily defensive in
nature. Engaging in direct and deliberate offensive combat is something that had not been
done since the feminization of the armed forces took place. Indeed, offensive combat
could still be considered the province of men, or at least untested and un proved as
women’s work in any operational way.
The peacekeeping focus of the 1990s prepared France for parts of its role in
Afghanistan, but left it woefully unprepared for others. Indeed, much France’s initial
contribution to the US-led operations in Afghanistan were intelligence-gathering foot
patrols in and around Kabul. The nearly 4000 troops in country in the early years of the
war conducted themselves similarly to how peacekeeping troops patrolled in Africa and
Bosnia.83 However, in 2008, when President Sarkozy agreed to increase France’s
contribution to the coalition forces, they learned quickly that peacekeeping skills were
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not directly related to offensive combat. France was assigned to the Kapisa province in
the Tagrib Valley. Unlike many European countries that ran support for American
infantry groups, the French forces took operational control of the province with their
infantry units as the main focus of effort. Their first efforts at offensively-focused
infantry actions were met with disaster. On 19 August 2008, 10 French forces were killed
and 21 wounded, the most significant casualties for French forces since the Drakkar
building attack in Lebanon in 1983.
In response to the loss of life, the French revamped their fighting style both
doctrinally and technologically.84 Doctrinally they combined their intelligence (or
“human terrain”) and combat forces, integrating the gendered nature of peacekeeping
intelligence with traditional combat tactics. Because of the integration of women into
commando forces that had taking place in the 1990s, the gendered assets necessary for
intelligence gathering were organic to the units stationed there. Indeed, violence was
often inevitable in the operations in Afghanistan. However, the integrated genderedintelligence worked to mitigate causalities on both the French and Afghan side (Foust,
2012).
The best practices from Afghanistan – primarly the use of expeditionary forces
and a gendered prespective to intelligence – were codified and implemented in 2013
missions in Mali and the Central Africal Republic. One of the most important lessons
learned was in the importance of fully integrated combat and human terrain teams.
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Interview transcript with Colonel Aragons, French commander in the Tagrib Valley, that describes these
changes available at: http://www.defense.gouv.fr/operations/afghanistan/actualites/12-03-09-afghanistan-6mois-en-kapisa-interview-du-colonel-aragones
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Because of the gendered nature of COIN operations, women are essential parts of human
terrain teams. As learned in Afghanistan, such teams were best composed of individuals
who had been parts of commando units from their initial training, rather than attached at a
later date (Shurkin, 2014). As Shurkin (2014) notes, without the success of integrated
commando teams capable of simoulstanious and seamless intelligence and combat
operations, France would not habe been able to develop the expeditionary doctrine
practiced in later interventions.
France’s role in Afghanistan, and their subsequent missions in Mali, highlighted
that there is a role for women to be in modern militaries as women. Indeed, units
integrated from day one, and intentionally composed of women in human terrain and
intelligence teams, proved to be an asset for the French military. As noted in Chapter 1,
the composition of these units were so successful that President Macron has called for
specific recruitment of women to meet the challenges of ISIS and homegrown terrorist
attacks.
Today, France’s military is entering into another process of change. Though the
military is considered at a high level of integration comparatively, there are still
problems, especially with issues of sexual harassment and cultural isolation of its women
soldiers. Though instances of workplace sexual harassment and assault have declined
drastically in the French military, there historically have not been mechanisms for
military commanders to address issues that occur outside working hours. This has hit
women in the military especially hard, as they are often living with their male
counterparts and the lines between work and social situations are frequently blurred.
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Marlene Schiappa, the French Minister for Gender Equality, is working to eradicate
sexual harassment through wide sweeping social reforms to the penal code.85 She’s
working closely with the Themis Cell, and other the Ministry of Defense units that have
developed innovative techniques at combatting workplace discrimination. Though the
military is not the specific target of her actions, any measures passed will benefit the
military and continue to make a permissive environment for women.
Women are also continuing to prove essential and innovative in the national
security arena in France. In the years since France’s initial entry into Afghanistan, they
have introduced gender advisors to their ranks to ensure that a gendered perspective is
taking into account when planning and executing missions on both the strategic and
tactical level. 30,000 of France’s slightly over 200,000 troops are currently deployed in
support of international COIN operations. Nearly 7% of the forces deployed in these
COIN operations are women, with the majority of then being concentrated in the officer
ranks (NATO, 2014-2016). Notably, women are both proving strategically important in
these operations, and those who participate are more likely to remain in the military
beyond their initial obligation than those who do not deploy (Bigio, 2017). As a result,
the women currently serving in operational leadership positions have the potential to
further impact the future of French military operations.

85

Interview with Marlene Schiappa available at:
http://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2017/08/26/545297078/frances-gender-equality-minister-wants-onthe-spot-fines-for-sexual-harassers
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CHAPTER 5:
Norway
Making Soldiers and Citizens

Norway was an early leader in gender integration, with claims rooten in
citizenship equality being consistant with the internally focused values based identity of
the Norwegian Armed Forces. Indeed, as long as women claimed their sameness to their
male counterparts, a permissive environment for integration existed. Further, they types
of missions that the Norwegian military tended to participate in reinforced the benefits of
a gender neutral egalitarian force.
However, the benefits of gender-neutrality were put to the test with Norway’s
participation in ISAF operations in Afghanistan. Within ISAF Norway was seen as
progressive due to Colonel Ingrid Gjerde command of all Norwegian forces, as she was
the first female infantry commander of that level. Indeed, by many countries, she was
hailed as a model of success and evidence of gender-integration.86 However, despite the
overall commitment from ISAF to gender being an essential part of the mission in
Afghanistan, Col Gjerde was chosen by the Norwegians for her success as an infantry
officer, not her gender. Though Norway maintained a gender-neutral assignment policy
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See footage at: https://www.csis.org/events/women-combat-arms-conversation-colonel-ingrid-gjerde
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For their units, operations in Afghanistan were such that women became important not
only for their skills as soldiers but for their gender. Even moreso than in peacekeeping
missions, women provided an essential function in counterinsurgency and village
stability operations. From gathering intelligence to training security forces and
politicians, Norwegian women were essential to mission effectiveness. Special
operations, in particular realized the need for women’s unique contributions. “In
Afghanistan, one of our big challenges was that we would enter houses and not be able to
speak to the women. In urban warfare, you have to be able to interact with women as
well. Adding female soldiers was an operational need.”87
The need for women to both perform their military duties and retain some of their
gendered characteristics created a tension between claims about women’s service and
military culture. As a result, women’s integration has stalled, with women having less of
an impact on the military in the years since counterinsurgency operations have taken
center stage in global politics. To address these challenges, the Norwegian military is
restructuring and attempting to make space for the new roles that women are needed to
serve.

Norway: Moderate Level of Integration
The claims rooted in citizenship equality are largely responsible for the moderate
level of women’s integration in the Norwegian military. This is seen in both the nature of
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the laws and policies that have been implemented with regards to women’s access to and
participation in military, and the operational practices of the armed forces. Consistent
with the beliefs about citizenship equality highlighted in Chapter 2, military policy and
practice largely downplayed the difference between men and women. From universal
conscription to gender-neutral berthing, the military has become more inclusive of the
Norwegian citizenry, while remaining the institution for creating model citizens. Indeed,
women’s integration has been approached in a de-gendered manner, with both men and
women expected to converge around the norms and practice of “Norwegianness” that has
historically shaped the citizen-soldier. However, in recent years, the approach to gender
integration has begun to shift, as gender differences are becoming more important in the
changing international security landscape.
The result of Norway’s de-gendered approach is a moderate level of integration.
Norway was a pioneer in gender equality in the military. However, after initial successes
in integration, the impact that women had on the military stalled. Throughout the 20th
Century, women in the military were largely seen as symbolic of citizenship status rather
than a substantive force. Women were seen as the serving in the military to be
Norwegians, rather than for a specific strategic purpose. However, experiences in
Afghanistan have resulted in Norway pivoting away from gender neutrality in order to
leverage women in counterinsurgency operations. The inward and value orientation of the
military culture was in tension with these new claims, making it hard for women to have
an impact quickly. However, there are indications that the military is becoming more
receptive to gendered claims.
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Table 5.1 highlights the current measures of the various components of
integration in the Norwegian military.

Table 5.1 Current Measures of Women’s Integration into the Norwegian Military
Measure
Value
Legal

-

No restrictions on women’s functional or
geographic service.
- No preference given to women for infantry service
- 6 weeks Maternity / 10 weeks paternity leave
- 49 weeks of parental leave 100% paid; 59 weeks
at 80% pay
- National childcare and early education programs
- Mixed-gender training as sexual harassment
mitigation
Functional
- 9.5% of military force
- 3.5% in ground combat force
- 16% in international operational forces*
Durability
- 2% retention rate
- 2% of flag officers
- 12% of senior officers
- 36% of Noncommissioned Officer
Institutional Impact
- Women’s inclusion in conscription
- Establishment of Hunter Troop
*Includes Norther border guard units that receive a hazardous duty designation
Norway’s components of integration are themselves representative of a moderate
level of integration. However, it is the way in which they interact that highlight that
women have had a limited amount of change on the military that is the focus of this
chapter. The foundational belief that men and women are the same as citizens has guided
the process of integration of women into the Norwegian military. The laws and policies
that begun the process of integration have shaped it as a gender neutral. From the military
giving more time for paternity leave to mixed gender training and berthing in the border
units, the Norwegian military has downplayed gender as an aspect of its tactical or
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strategic initiatives. This has given women room to succeed on their merits and
achievements, with little questioning of the suitability for women in the military in
general or combat roles in particular.
In this chapter I show how the core tenants of citizenship equality, and the claims
made by women’s movements about women’s role in public life influenced the process
of integration, by engaging with the Norwegian defense culture of citizen-building before
militarism. I begin by discussing the Norwegian military culture. Next, I highlight how
the claims made about women’s participation in the military have unfolded over the three
eras of global political change noted in Chapter 1. In the first, the 1984 decision to
include women into all aspects of the professional force was a defining feature. In the
second, debates around universal conscription for all Norwegian citizens (including
women) took center stage. In both of these eras, gender neutrality coincided with military
culture to allow for women’s continued gender integration. However, in the third, gender
integration stalled, because of the change in the claims made about women’s service. In
the aftermath of actions in Afghanistan, gender-focused units, epitomized with the
creation of the Hunter Troop, the all-women special operations unit, have been
developed. While there has been success with the Hunter Troop, the claims about
women’s service continued to be in tension with military culture.

Norwegian Military Tradition: Citizen before Warrior
Though a war fighting organization first and foremost, the Norwegian armed
forces are highly regarded as “an important contributor to the formation of common
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national values” (Friis, 2000, p. 119). In addition to fighting wars, the armed forces have
been at the forefront of creating a uniquely Norwegian identity. Given Norway’s
relatively late independence, the military was a way to accelerate and codify a new
identity, giving the citizens of Norway a way to both craft a common identity, and an
institution through which Norwegian values would be transmitted to young citizens. As
Norwegian Foreign Policy Institute Historian Stale Ulriksen notes,
The Norwegian Defense Tradition is not the aggregation of
the experiences had by the Norwegian armed forces in war.
Rather, it is a result of a series of more or less conscious
choices about the historical aspects of nationalism worth
celebrating, and a gradual institutionalization of these
choices. The Defense Tradition is in part a result of the
historical experiences different actors have been concerned
about, or have chosen to emphasize, coupled with the needs
of identity in a new nation, and beliefs about how best to
represent that identity.
It has been created for a purpose. Not necessarily by one
person, or a particular group of persons, but through a
national debate or general public discourse. It has been
honed and adapted to national trends in times when
important policy choices have been taken and when the
central political ideas of what “Norway” would be were
formulated. (Ulriken, 2002, pp. 25-26)
While military victory certainly is an aim of the Norwegian armed forces, military victory
is not its primary purpose in society. Rather, it is a socializing vessel, focused on
promoting values to a domestic audience and creating a distinctly Norwegian cultural
tradition shared by all citizens.
In order to differentiate themselves from their previous colonizers (Denmark and
Sweden), a belief about “ideal Norwegian” was created. Coastal Norway was seen to be
heavily influenced by its contact with other cultures and traditions. Therefore, the
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Norwegian mountain farmer was see as “exemplary, or at least ideal, because he was a
true Norwegian” (Tordsson, 2003, p. 97). Survival skills in the harsh winters became
synonymous with the ideal citizen, and exploration, especially of previously unexplored
arctic or polar regions, became an essential function of the armed forces in the early 20th
Century (For histories of Norwegian solder-explorers see: Christensen, 1993; Pedersen,
1997). Despite its long coastline, the naval tradition in Norway has been grately
downpayed. Rather, it was the soldier on skis, with his ability to cope with rough terrain
and harsh climates, that personified the pride of Norway to its citizens (Rones, 2015).
In the early years of Norwegian indpendence, military conscription became a way
for young male citizens to be socialized into the Norwegian ideal. The purpose of
conscription in the first half of the 20th Century was character-building through
introduction to the uncivilized and harsh wilderness that was seen to be the “true
Norway” (Woodward & Duncanson, 2017). While other Western nations were engaged
in identifying their militaries through weaponry and tactical innovation, Norway focused
on those things that were the most Norwegian. Indeed, the military was more a tool of
nation building and identity conformation than offensive, or even defensive, violence.
In the latter half of the 20th and into the 21st Century, Norway became a more
prominent military power on the international stage. Officially neutral during World War
I, and occupied by Nazi forces during World War II, Norway had been able to keep it’s
military insular and focused on national identity rather than force projection for the first
several decades of independence. However, at the onset of the Cold War, it’s membership
in NATO and strategic geopolitical position with regards to Russia, made it a valuable
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ally of the United States. Yet even with this growth of prominance, military policy was
kept as soft as possible. While troops from NATO allies reguarly trained in Nowary, and
the country was a physical defense against potnetial Russian advances, Norway was
reluctant to engage in an arms race or physical force projection (Riste, 2001). Rather,
Norway largely viwed its military as an activist institution, promoting its foundational
beliefs about equality beyond Europe. The self-identification of the military’s role is best
captured by former Foreign Minister Bjorn Tore Godel: “The Norwegian society’s deep
respect for humanitarian values has made the promotion of Human Rights a cornerstone
of all our policy. This is of special importance to our military policy, where it combines
idealism and self-interest.”88
In the post-Cold War years, the Norwegian military became more involved in
using kinetic action, rather than rhetoric, to promote its values. In Somalia, Bosnia, and
Kosovo, human rights were promoted through military action. As Thune and Ulriksen
(2002, p. 15) note, Norwegian officials justified their increased deployment of troops
through a belief that “’hard security had moved into ‘soft fields, and therefore ‘hard’
means were necessary to reach ‘soft’ goals.” Participation and leadership in international
military operation was seen as an extension of building a national identity. As discussed
in Chapter 2 egalitarianism human rights were a cornerstone of national identity on which
Norwegians focused to differentiate themselves from their Scandinavian neighbors.
Military action specifically in support of such goals thus strengthened the unique
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Norwegian commitment to egalitarianism and continued to promote a unique Norwegian
identity.
Even as Norway has increased its military participation abroad, rather than
counting military success as a matter of conquests, enemy body counts, or even thwarted
foreign invasions, it is measured by the ability to spread values of egalitarianism and
secure human rights (Thune & Ulriksen, 2002; Woodward & Duncanson, 2017). A
modern example of this can be seen in a 2008 public media debate about the way that
Norwegian snipers were greeted upon their return from Afghanistan. Criticisms from the
American media that the Norwegian people did not greet the returning soldiers with a
“heroes’ welcome,” were met form a response by the Minister of Defense that Norway
did not have a warrior culture built on killing, and should not strive for one (Matlary,
2008).
The Norwegian military culture is one of citizen-building first, war-making
second. Against this backdrop, women in Norway were able to make claims that put the
Norwegian military on a trajectory of being one of the earliest adopters of codified
gender equality. Indeed, the focus on citizenship rather than violence, provided women
with an opening for the military, and lessened many of the typical military cultural
barriers to entry driven by hegemonic masculinity. Within the Norwegian military
tradition, women have been viewed as essentially equal to their male counterparts, as
citizens first (Gustavsen, 2013). In the sections that follow, I show how this was to
women’s advantage early on, but has come into tension with claims made as global
politics increasingly required the military to engage in gendered activities.
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Era 1: The final years of the Cold War: Citizen Claims for Full Inclusion
in the Professional Armed Forces (1970-1992)
The process of full integration of women into the Norwegian military began in the
1970s with the passage of the Equal Status Act (ESA). During the waning years of the
Cold War, the professional forces were opened to women a result of the ESA, though
there were restrictions on service. In 1984, all restrictions were lifted on women’s
service. In the 1970s Norway was on the forefront of gender equality and military
integration. As a result, women had a substantial impact on the military during the early
years of integration. In the years following the laws dropping any restriction for women
in the military, the percentage of women in the military jumped from 3.2% in 1980 to
upwards of 8% by 1990. By 1986, over 6% of Norway’s contribution to the UN Mission
in Lebanon (UNIFIL) were women, including the highest ranking officer in UN’s
dispersed peacekeeping operations (Karamé, 2001). The emphasis on peacekeeping and
values promotion within NATO suited Norway’s military culture, and a conducive
environment for women’s integration existed.

Structural Provisions
The Equal Status Act (1978) was the landmark legislation of women’s equality in
Norway. Beyond just guaranteeing equal economic and political rights, the law was
centered around creating a more egalitarian society. The armed forces, however, were
partially excluded from immediate full compliance with the act until 1984 when all
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occupational specialties were open to women. Yet the areas of the act that did impact the
military were important in initiating military integration.
Table 5.2: Summary of Structural Provisions during the First Era of Women’s
Participation
Component
Measure
Barriers to
- Access to professional military
Participation
- Ground combat opened 1984
- Not conscripted
Childcare / Parental
- Childcare under 1975 Law (all children up to age
Leave
6 regardless of parent’s economic status)
- Parental leave under Equal Status Act (42/52
weeks and access to job + expected benefits
when return)
Sexual Harassment
- Outlawed under Equal Status Law, but no
specific NorAF policies
Table 5.2 summarizes the structural provisions that contributed to women’s
integration in Norway’s during this first period. The Equal Status Act allowed for the
formal participation of women in the professional forces. The shape of global politics
during the end of the Cold War resulted in a shift in emphasis form conscripted troops to
professional soldiers that allowed for women to be elevated in status as a result of their
military participation.
The Equal Status Act was instrumental in solidifying a strong professional
military. After World War II, the military focused on creating a military comprised of
“robust, conscripted, and dedicated citizen-soldiers” (The Norwegian Armed Forces
Museum, 2015), save for a small professional officer corps. After the devastating
occupation during World War II,89 Norway realized that isolation and neutrality would
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not save them and sought out alliances with stronger countries. Norway’s geostrategic
position vis a vis Russia made it a valuable ally to the United States in the early years of
the Cold War. While defense policy remained focused more on soft projections of power,
the Norwegian military began to organize itself more like the United States, with an
emphasis on infantry soldiers, in order to keep in its favor (Bitzinger, 1989). The heavy
focus on conscription (to quickly build up a force) and infantry (a traditionally masculine
military role) was seen as necessary to ensure favorable standing within NATO (Græger,
2005). This twin focus, while helping to solidify the position of the military also
essentially excluded women, as they were still not part of conscription nor the infantry.
While this focus was necessary to gain standing with the United States, the military still
put a premium on the traditional Norwegian “cultural skills” such as skiing and winter
survival. Though having to adjust some of its practices to conform to the stronger allies,
the military retained its cultural focus on traditional aspects of Norwegianness.
The Equal Status Act led to a shift in the Norwegian military’s personnel
composition, with a pivot from conscripts to professional soldiers. In order to give
women equal status, it was necessary to increase the professional ranks in both size and
prominence.90 As a government department, the Ministry of Defense was subject to the
rules around gender parity in appointed government committees.91 This meant that on the
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Per the Equal Status Act: Any government committee that has 2-3 members must have both genders
represented; 4-6 members must have at least 2 people from each gender; 6-8 members must have at least 3
people form each gender; 9 members must have at least 4 people from each gender; 10 or more must have
at least 40% from each gender.
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civilian side, women were very active in the Ministry of Defense. Not only are women
active in lower level committee positions, but since the passage of the Equal Status Act,
six women have ascended to the position of Minister of Defense. Women in both lower
level and leadership positions within the Ministry helped to ease the transition from a
conscript army of men to a more professional force that practiced gender parity, as
military leadership already had experience working with women. Indeed, their presence
in matters of security and defense was not seen as out of place.
As a result of the Equal Status Act, the military began to emphasize
professionalism in order to provide more opportunities for women to both participate in
military activities and advance into leadership positions. However, the ESA also
recognized that the functional role of the military was unique and made provisions for the
“King [to] issue regulations providing that the service of women in the Norwegian
Armed Forces shall fall partly outside the scope of this Act.”92 In practice this meant that
while women were ensured the professional benefits of military service in the same way
as their male counterparts, there were restrictions to the roles that they could hold. At the
passage of the act, the King prohibited women from serving in direct ground combat
roles.
However, his decision did not go unchallenged. The decision to put restrictions on
women’s service resulted in discontent and pressure from the sorting to drop the
restrictions. The 1984 “Military Occupational Equality for Men and Women” act gave
men and women the same opportunities in the volunteer professional Norwegian armed
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forces. Legally, this decision brought the military into full compliance with the equal
status act, and therefore in line with the rest of Norwegian society in both the private and
public sphere. The dropping of gender-based restrictions on combat occupations and
postings meant that citizenship-producing and reinforcing mechanisms were now open to
both genders equally and that the military could, in theory at least, no longer be
considered a masculine enterprise (Værnø & Sveri, 1990). From the time of the passage
of the act there was an emphasis on purposefully growing the number of women in the
military in order to practically realize the theoretical equality. In particular there was an
effort to mirror the success of the civilian government to attract and retain women. The
Norwegian government has historically been the largest employer of women in the
country (Steder, 2014). This is indicative of the foundational beliefs about citizenship
equality. Women benefited greatly from the Norwegian government, and in return, they
often worked as public servants. As highlighted in Chapter 2, part of the argument used
by the Norwegian women’s movement to gain expanded economic and political benefits
was that being engaged public citizens was an obligation as members of the welfare state.
Though women were allowed to serve in all roles in the professional military,
there was a disparity in service obligation. Conscription was a requirement for men, but
not for women. The Equal Status Act only extended to access to the professional armed
forces, and excluded women from conscripted roles. While the Act resulted in a shift of
focus from conscription to professionalization, roughly 10-20% of the military remained
filled by conscripts.93 Women’s entry into the professional ranks, and their exclusion
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from ground combat, meant that more and more conscripts were used to fill infantry
ranks, and professional soldering focused on logistics, intelligence, and transport roles in
order to show competitiveness between men and women.
Members of the military, as the rest of society, were able to take advantage of the
Act’s guarantees around parental leave. In addition to a generous leave allowance (52
weeks at 80% pay or 42 weeks at 100% pay) and mandated maternity and paternity leave
periods, parents were assured not only a return to their position, but accommodation for
any “improvements in their working conditions or time-based promotions they could
have reasonably entitled to during their absence.”94 The provisions of the act thus
removed a great deal of both social stigma and professional hardship that may be
associated with parenthood.

Functional Participation
The initial entry of women into the military in the late 1970s and early 1980s, was
not in large numbers. By 1980, only 3.2% of the Norwegian military was women.
However, after all occupational specialties were open to women, their numbers increased,
reaching 9% by the mid-1990ss. Despite their relatively small numbers, they proved an
essential part to Norway’s military operations.
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Text of Acts available at: https://www.regjeringen.no/en/dokumenter/the-act-relating-to-genderequality-the-/id454568/
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Table 5.3: Summary of Functional Participation during the First Era of Women’s
Participation
Component
Measure
Level of
- 3.2% - 9% of the total force
Participation
Type of
- Primary fields: Medical and Logistics
Participation
- When infantry opened to women, proportional
representation to the medical and logistic fields
Overseas
- 5-6% (nearly identical to domestic breakdown)
Participation
Table 5.3 highlights the components of functional participation during this period.
While limited in number, they were not relegated to domestic and non-deployable jobs.
Additionally, their active role in UNIFIL would prove to be important for their claims for
dropping any restrictions on their service
Unlike many countries that kept women in domestic administrative roles (NATO,
2000-2016), Norway set women on international missions in their first years in the armed
services. Indeed, of early contributors to UN peacekeeping missions, Norway was the
only country that’s deployed demographics reflected its overall gendered composition.
Though the overall numbers were still low, the Norwegian Armed Services were
cognizant to ensure that all international missions were reflective of the overall gender
breakdown of the military.
The UN peacekeeping mission in Lebanon (UNIFIL) was one of the earliest
examples of the functional impact of women in Norwegian Armed Forces. In the early
years of UNIFIL, women were instrumental in helping to bolster Southern Lebanon’s
economy (Karamé, 2001). When, in 1980, the UN made it a policy for peacekeeping
forces to move into the community (and out of tents), the peacekeeping troops were
188

responsible for buying provisions from the local community. The presence of women in
the peacekeeping units helped to boost the economic status of many local women through
shopping for the daily necessities. Given the gender roles in the Lebanese society, there
was a dedicated “women’s section” or the commercial area. Even beyond buying the
essentials, women from the Norwegian peacekeeping battalion would socialize in these
areas, frequenting cafes and restaurants.95 In such visits not only did they help to stabilize
the economy through their patronage, but they learned valuable insights into Lebanese
culture that would help them in their day to day operations.
When the 1984 act was passed, Norway was heavily invested in UNIFIL. By
1985,96 the first Norwegian female infantry officers and soldiers arrived as part of the
mission (Karamé, 2001). The addition of women in the infantry contributed to both the
UNIFIL mandate and furthering the culture of the military in domestic life. Including
women in the infantry served not only a functional purpose (women were capable
soldiers) but also a cultural one. Women in the Norwegian military modeled behaviors of
equity to the other countries engaged in peacekeeping operation, (Værnø & Sveri, 1990).
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the majority of women in the Norwegian
military were in the medical profession and logistic communities. Though there are not
official records of the gender breakdown of each unit97 antidotal accounts of military life

95

Interview with Captain Ingrid Gjerde in Oslo, 1999 as quoted in Karme, 2001.
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The “lag” was due to the time it took to train women into the infantry.
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The Norwegian Ministry of Defense did not start keeping gender-based demographic data by occupation
specialty until 1999
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paint a picture of life in the military during these years.98 Because of the gender-neutral
language in much of the legal provisions, women experienced life much as any other
soldier would. Those that were deployed in support of operations in Lebanon or to the
Northern Border Guard described their careers as “challenging,” and lamented long
separations from their family, but at nearly the same rate as men (Steder, 2015).
While the overall percentage of women in the military was low, it is notable that the
percentage of women deployed international mirrored the overall percentage of women in
the military. Indeed, deploying a force that was reflective of the domestic breakdown of
military forces was a testament to Norway’s belief that the military’s purpose was
centered around value transmission. Additionally, the women who did join largely had
service longevity. Some of the longevity of was a result of male citizens still being
subject to conscription. Because women were part of the professional (rather than
conscripted) force, their terms of service were necessarily longer than their male
counterparts. Also, because of the restrictions put on their service, they were generally in
career fields that had a longer training pine line and therefore greater service
commitment. While exact numbers of women in leadership roles in the late 1970s and
1980s is not available, survey results put women’s average time in service as greater than
ten years (Carreiras, 2002). Additionally, approximately 5% of the leadership contingent
of Norway’s UNIFIL contribution was women.99 Given that this percentage is larger than
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the overall percentage of women in the military, it shows that women are staying in and
gaining the required skills for leadership promotion.

Claims About Service and Interaction with Military Culture
Early claims about women’s military service must be looked at from both the
supply (women choosing to join the military) and demand (the military wanting women)
side. Since the passage of the Equal Status Act and the focus on professional forces, there
has been an effort by the Norwegian government to increase the role of women in the
military (Steder, 2014; Wooten, 2014). In line with the egalitarian arguments about
women’s role in society as citizens, once women were allowed into the professional
forces, there was a push to bring them into the service in an equal way as their male
counterparts. Because of the focus on sameness between men and women, the women
who chose to enter the professional service strongly mirrored their male counterparts.
Concurrently, debates about opening all military roles to women centered around duty
and obligations to the country rather than physical attributes or warfighting experiences.
As noted above, one of the primary purposes of the Norwegian military was to
create an “ideal” Norwegian citizen, someone that was rugged and adventurous. The first
women that joined the military largely mirrored the ideal type. The overwhelming
majority of women who chose to enlist in the 1970s and early 1980s came from the
“Midt-Norge” (central) region of Norway. They were largely from families that had a
strong tradition of hunting and adventure sports, and were said to value “ruggedness and
strength” as central to their Norwegian identity (Fauske, 2015). Such women saw it as
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part of their duty as Norwegians to help perpetuate and preserve the unique Norwegian
culture. As Norway was increasingly being involved in international treaties and
operations, the military worked as a means of maintaining and perpetuating Norwegian
values (Korsvik, 2014). Women emphasized their part in maintaining “Norwegianness”
as justification for military participation.
As women started to join the professional forces, the Sorting was engaging in
debates as to whether or not to open all military roles to women. The justification to
exclude women from combat roles was initially made by King Olav V, a career military
officer before ascending to the throne in 1957.100 King Olav V’s justification rested
primarily on the fact that he had not served with any women during his tenure in the army
(Skaine, 2011). However, many members of the Sorting did not believe that his
inexperience with women alone was reason enough to exclude women in total from
infantry units. Especially members of the more liberal Labor party saw it as their duty to
“formalize gender balances” in all aspects of public life as part of their national
dedication to equality (Siim & Skjeie, 2008, p. 325). The military was seen to be a
necessary part of the formalized gender balance. Members of the Sorting drew on the fact
that women in Norway had been leaders in receiving political and economic rights to
argue that they should equally be a part of the military to fulfill their role as citizens
(Sainsbury, 2001).
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Olav attended military school in the UK and Sweden and rose through the ranks of the Norwegian
military to become a general in the army. He was known as “the people’s king” because of the fact that he
did not fulfill his military obligation in a symbolic way, but engaged in the same training and service as all
Norwegian citizens.
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From both the supply and demand side, claims about women’s military
participation focused on their role as citizens. Little distinction was made between male
and female citizens, as witnessed by the focus on being an “ideal” Norwegian, rather than
a female soldier. For the non-combat roles that women were able to join, there was one
standard for all soldiers, further strengthening the de-gendered claims. If women were to
be full citizens, then their participation in the military was necessary. Such claims were
consistent with the military’s culture focused on making citizens. Indeed, it was difficult
to discount claims that women were equal citizens and therefore should be subject to the
same military opportunities as men.

Outcome
Women’s initial entry into the professional arm of the military had a quick and
meaningful impact. The most notable change that occurred was that all restrictions to
women’s service were lifted in 1984. This decision was not made necessarily because the
Norwegian military wanted women in combat arms positions but because it would better
promote citizenship equality if men and women were subject to the same service
requirements (Kristiansen & Steder, 2015). Debates in the Sorting focused more on what
the obligations of women in Norway should be rather than on what women should not do.
The 1984 decision to open all occupations to women and hold men and women to
the same training and operational standards was exceptional in the international
environment. Not only was Norway on the leading edge of allowing women into all
military occupations, but they were also proactive in ensuring that women were a part of
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the totality of military operations in a meaningful way but setting objective standards and
fully integrating all aspects of training (Steder, 2015). Indeed, as soon as women were
allowed into combat roles they became active in the military apparatus. Women
immediately joined the UNIFIL operation as infantry officers. While women were active
in engaging with Lebanese women in the host society, during operations their actions
were dictated by “their rank and uniform, not their gender” (Karamé, 2001, p. 89).
Indeed, women’s success was largely due to their similarity to their male counterparts.
Norway’s early leadership with regards to women’s military integration was
largely due to the fact that women’s claims about service, as well as the roles they
performed matched closely with military culture and beliefs about the purpose of the
military. The experience in Lebanon gave credence to their claims, and helped to ensure
that women were included equally in all aspects of military life.

Era 2: Post-Cold War
Universal Conscription for a Citizen Army
During this era, the primary military issue women faced was around universal
conscription. From a conceptual standpoint, women transitioned from being limited
participants to being lawfully integrated into the military in the same way as their male
counterparts. This gave women the ability to claim even more citizenship rights. It is
notable that through Norway was on the leading edge of integrating women into the
military, they did not achieve the numbers of many of the Western militaries that opened
combat positions to women later did. Targets for service have ranged from 7-10%
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depending on who is in power (NATO, 2000; Steder, 2015). Though smaller in number,
the women that did join the military had career longevity and often rose to command
positions. The small, but durable, force of Norwegian women helped to solidify
egalitarian policies around citizenship and service. However, the egalitarian focus also
came under criticism for stalling women’s advancement in a changing global security
environment.

Structural Conditions
The legal and structural conditions for women in the post-Cold War military were
largely the same as those for men.

Table 5.4: Summary of Structural Provisions during the Second Era of Women’s
Participation
Component
Measure
Barriers to
- Access to professional military
Participation
- No restrictions to women’s service
- Air Defense Unit 50/50
Childcare / Parental
- Childcare under 1975 Law (all children up to age 6
Leave
regardless of parent’s economic status)
- Parental leave under Equal Status Act (42/52 weeks
and access to job + expected benefits when return)
- Life-phase oriented personnel policies
Sexual Harassment
- Outlawed under Equal Status Law, but no specific
NorAF policies
Table 5.4 summarizes the structural provisions for women’s military participation
in the Norwegian military. Notably, the provisions were aimed at promoting citizenship
equality, formally downplaying the difference between men and women.
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The changes in policies that came after the 1984 Military Occupational Equality
for Men and Women act were aimed at increasing the number of women in the armed
forces. In the two decades following the formalization of military equality, there were
199 unique suggestions – from academic, politicians, and military leaders – aimed at
increasing the share of women in the military (Værnø & Sveri, 1990; Sand & Fasting,
2012). Suggested measures include implementing gender-based evaluation measures,
engaging in recruitment in elementary schools, more direct officer commissions, and
increase diversity training for younger troops. The widespread and diverse focus of these
suggestions highlights the weight that the Norwegian government put behind wanting to
remain a pioneer in gender equity, especially among its Scandinavian neighbors. As
egalitarianism was a central part of its national identity, having a military that was
reflective of its values in practice and not just policy was important. However, most of
the suggestions were ultimately rejected on the grounds that they disproportionately
favored women and were therefore in violation with the Equal Status Act.101
The suggestions that were implemented and ended up having an impact on
women’s military service were those that fall under what is referred to as “life-phase
oriented personnel policies” (Steder, 2014, p. 303). These policies recognize that an
individual does not have the same life-family-professional balance needs throughout their
career, and make efforts to address the variations in challenges that individuals meet at
various life-stages. For example, an effort was made to give mid-level officers and
enlisted soldiers a longer time in one geographic region. This was done in recognition of
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the fact that at this time in one’s life (generally in their early – mid 30s) that it is more
critical for children to have geographic stability for both schooling consistency and the
development of social skills. It is notable that these policies were seen as equally
applicable and important for both genders. As highlighted by the impact that the “daddy
quota” has had on norms about childcare and family roles in Chapter 2, parenthood has
become increasingly de-gendered in Norwegian society. Life-phase oriented personnel
policies were thus what was the most acceptable, as they were not seen as overtly or
disproportionally favor women.
The military also used operational organization to attempt to increase the number
of women. Though a minority of the overall force, some units were intentionally
balanced at a near 50/50 ratio. In particular, the elite air defense units underwent a
reorganization in the late 1990s/early 2000s to ensure gender parity in numbers, and in all
living and operational conditions. The purpose of this reorganization was to highlight that
female soldiers were “just soldiers” and that men don’t set the tone in either military life
or operational conduct (Braw, 2017). By manufacturing an environment where men and
women were equal in all aspects – standards, living quarters, and number – the military
showed that there was little to no difference between the genders in hopes of appealing to
the beliefs about citizenship.

Functional Participation
In the post-Cold-War era, women’s participation in the military was important to
both international and domestic participation. Internationally, women’s biggest impact
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came in peacekeeping missions. As noted above, women were essential to the UNIFIL
mission. Their success in UNIFIL was mirrored in UN missions around the globe.
Table 5.5: Summary of Functional Participation during the Second Era of Women’s
Participation
Component
Measure
Level of
- Steady around 9% of total force
Participation
Type of
- Nearly even spread among occupational specialties
Participation
Overseas
- 6-9%
Participation
Table 5.5 highlights components of functional participation. While not high in
number, women’s proportion of the force did increase, and women represented an even
spread across the occupational specialties. The work that women in the military did in the
decades following women being allowed in all occupational specialties further degendered women in the service. As they took on newly opened roles, women served as
citizens, emphasizing that it was their service, not their gender that made them successful.
Norwegian women’s success in peacekeeping operations provided them with
accolades and allowed them to ascended the ranks quickly. The global emphasis on
women’s increased participation in peacekeeping operations was in line with Norwegian
views about the cultural role of the military. The military was an institution to share the
values of equality and citizenship with the rest of the world. “We did not lobby to train
women to kill,” was a common refrain of the leaders in the UN peacekeeping circles
(Skjelsbaek, 2016), emphasizing that women helped to temper the brutal nature of the
military and enhanced its role in promoting values. Though there was an emphasis on
training women in the skills required for infantry action, it was done so because it was
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necessary to ensure the peace, not because there was inherent value in killing. Infantry
officers in particular were rewarded in the Norwegian military because of their restraint
in using violence during peacekeeping operations. Women were included in these
promotions and took on important leadership roles in peacekeeping operations. In the
1990s, female officers were made commanders in the UN missions in the former
Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR) and were the leads in NATO-sponsored trainings for potential
peacekeeping forces (Norwegian Armed Forces, 2016).
Major General Kristin Lund was named the first female force commander of a
peacekeeping mission, highlighting the importance of Norwegian leadership around the
world. Major General Lund emphasized the Norwegian view of gender equality when
speaking about her role as a woman force commander. “There’s no difference in what
men and women can do in the military,” she remarked in an official UN interview
(Childs, 2017). Though the coverage of her leadership was framed as “exceptional” and
“groundbreaking” by press in the United States and throughout Europe, she viewed
herself as largely no different than her predecessors.
While internationally women were proving themselves as equals peacekeeping
missions, domestically women were making strides in the border guard units. The border
guards provided a valuable tool for the military in their role promoting the image of the
ideal citizen. During the Cold War the border guard provided a valuable physical service
in defense of the country. Yet rather than disband at the end of the Cold War, the border
guard took on a symbolic role. In the years after the Cold War it became the unit where
the ideal soldier could act. The area patrolled by the Norwegian border guard is among
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the most rugged terrain in the country. The soldiers of the border guard epitomized the
hearty ruggedness and adventuresome spirit that was part of the Norwegian identity.
Women in these units, living and working alongside their male counterparts, became
idealized by other Western nations in the process of integrating women into their
militaries. When asked by an Australian reporter if the women in the unit became “one of
the guys” when stationed on the border, a male soldier responded, “maybe you should ask
her if I become ‘one of the girls.’ We all do the same things here. Patrol the same ground
and survive in the same wilderness.”102 Though not a 50/50 split as in the case of the air
defense battalion, men and women in the border guards shared lived in mixed housing
and engaged in fully gender integrated training and patrols. They physically demanding
work was split evenly between men and women, with no special conditions made for the
female soldiers. Border patrol work was truly gender neutral and served more to be a
model of Norwegian citizenship.
Though the number of women who chose to enter military did not reach the
thresholds that leadership desired, the women who did join largely remained in at the
same rate as their male counterparts. By 2009, 10% of all flag officers were women, as
were 10% of all Lieutenants (Strand, 2015). The nearly consistent level of women
throughout the rank structure is indicative of retention policies that neither overly favored
nor harmed women. Indeed, they are consistent with other policies in Norwegian society
that were applied evenly regardless of gender.
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Norwegian Television Network. “Gender Mission: How the Norwegian military is breaking down
gender divisions in the quest for a better force.” Air Date August 18, 2014

200

Women’s retention may have in part been aided by the male conscription law. As
noted above, despite all positions being open to women, women were not subject to
conscription. Though the overall percentage of conscripts as part of the total force
remained low, conscripts only served one year. The fact that some men left after a year
due to the length of their conscription contract could artificially inflate women’s retention
rate. It is for this reason that it is important to look at the officer ranks.103
As women gained seniority, it is notable that they also gained authority. In
addition to women moving up the rank structure in a similar fashion as men, they also
gained positions of authority, command, and influence at the same rate. From
peacekeeping missions to border guard units, women held command at a proportional
rate to their male counterparts (Karamé, 2001; Strand, 2015).
Concerning retention efforts, there have been debates about whether or not to
specifically target women. As the military has been unable to hit its target percentages,
there has been discussion as to the merits of specifically using leadership to grow the
overall percentage of women. For example, a 2007 Ministry of Defense White Paper
emphasized the need for women in “management” and “leadership” roles in the military
(Ministry of Defense, 2007). As a result, women were intentionally selected for
leadership roles in schools and prominent positions in both domestic and international
units. Between 2007-2011, the number of women in leadership positions in schools grew
by 2 women per year (FFI 2015 data). By 2011 this resulted in women being
overrepresented in command positions (approximately 16-18% of O-6 and above
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obligation is fulfilled, men are not conscripted into the officer corps.
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command positions held by women). In 2011, however, the number plateaued, as
artificially inflating the number of women leaders was not sustainable given the
population of available officers. Since 2011, the number of senior officers has decreased
(8% in 2015), and now more closely mirrors overall service numbers.

Claims About Service and Interaction with Military Culture
As women established themselves in all occupational specialties in the armed
forces, both supply and demand side claims were shaped by women’s experiences in the
military. Citizenship equality remained a central tenant of the claims. In particular, the
demand side of the argument focused on universal conscription being the last remaining
difference between men and women’s service. Given the success that women had
adhering to “male” standards and berthing and bunking with their male counterparts,
proponents for universal conscription argued that it was a natural progression. Laila
Gustavsen, a long time Labour Party parliamentarian was one of the fiercest proponents
of including women in military conscription. “Rights and duties should be the same for
all,” she asserted in an interview.104 Indeed, military conscription was framed as the
dutiful counterpart to the rights afforded to all Norwegians by the welfare state.
The arguments about conscription being a duty were strengthened by changes to
military composition at the end of the Cold War. During the Cold War, Norway was an
important geopolitical ally in NATO. To that end, they established a robust border guard
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force to defend the alliance from Moscow as well as a sizable Arctic maritime
detachment. However, at the end of the Cold War, Norway substantially contracted the
size of its military. Whereas the Cold War force structure relied heavily on conscripts to
fill its ranks (60-80%), since 1993, conscripts have made up approximately 10% of the
overall force. However, eligibility for conscription remained an important part of
Norwegian citizenship. Between 2000-2013, each year there were approximately 60,000
males that qualified for the selection process for conscription. Of that group, less than
10,000 were needed to go to training and only 3,000-5,000 given operational roles
(Steder, 2015). However, the shared experience of completing the conscription
requirements created a bond between Norwegian men that reinforced citizenship and
promoted a common understanding (Kristiansen & Steder, 2015). The arguments were
therefore not made that women were necessary for fighting war, but that women should
engage with the same citizenship duties as their male counterparts.
Norway’s increased participation in peacekeeping operations further contributed
to women’s claims about military service. Indeed, in the early years after the end of the
Cold War, peacekeeping became a major part of both the UN and NATO’s agenda, with
Norway taking a lead both operationally and in training (Karlsrud & Osland, 2016). As
noted above, peacekeeping was in line with their beliefs about the role of the military as a
transmitter of values. Further, peacekeeping operations were seen as a way to “build
better citizens,” as Norway took a leadership role among its NATO allies (Khanna &
Sandler, 1997). The emphasis on building citizens continued coincide with Norwegian
military culture and values, and allowed women to have influence in the military.
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Outcome
Though it took nearly 30 years from the time that women were allowed to serve in
all occupational specialties, universal conscription including women passed the Sorting in
2013, with legislation written into law in 2014. With the passage of the legislation,
women were included in the Joint Selection Process for General Conscription (JSPGC) to
determine their eligibility and suitability for various military positions. Universal
conscription was touted as being both culturally and institutionally beneficial for the
military. In an address to the OSCE, the military advisor to the permanent delegation
asserted that conscription represented a watershed moment for Norway.
Universal conscription is important for two main reasons.
Firstly, in all parts of society women and men have - and
should have - equal rights, obligations and opportunities.
Secondly, from a military perspective, the armed forces need
to be able to recruit among the most capable candidates.
Operational demands and high levels of specialization and
technological sophistication dictate the need to recruit as
widely as possible. We cannot afford to exclude half of the
population in the recruitment process. In terms of human
resources, the state sends a very clear message that
competency is not down to gender, in this case the male
gender. (Dalaaker, 2017)
The appeal to both sociopolitical equality and military effectiveness highlights the
twin functions of the military. This appeal to equality continued the tradition of the
military being a means of citizenship socialization. Including women in the process of
conscription signified the completion of citizenship ideals. The appeal to the functional
purpose of the military, namely the focus on operational demands, signaled that Norway
was committed to its military obligations. Such a statement was essential to ease the
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concerns of NATO allies that Norway was being political at the expense of its military
effectiveness.
In the first year that women were included in the JSPGC (2015), they represented
25% of the eligible and willing conscripts.105 To qualify, individuals have to be able to
compete physically and mentally in any job that a conscript could have. In practice, this
means that all conscripts must physically meet the infantry standards regardless of what
job they ultimately have. Though only about 10% of the overall conscripts ultimately get
called into service, the presence of women in the eligible pool will necessarily increase
the number of women in the armed forces. However, more important than numbers,
women’s inclusion in the conscription pool signals the commitment to egalitarianism that
has historically been one of the foundations of national identity. The neutrality with
which conscription was applied to men and women is consistent with the claims about the
similarities between citizens.

Era 3: Post-9/11 and the Hunter Troop
New Claims for a New Model?
In both ISAF operations in Afghanistan and United States-led coalition activities
in Iraq, Norwegian women played an active role in military operations. In combat their
actions were gender neutral, performing their duties based on their assigned occupational
speciality with little regard for their gender. The result was women, such as Colonel
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Gjerde, being promoted to leadership positions. However, Norwegian forces struggled in
village stability operations, often lacking the cultural skills necessary to interact with
women in Afghanistan or Iraq. Counterinsrugency proved difficult for troops that had
emphasized gender neutrality.
As a result of the struggles in Afghanistan, discussions in the Ministry of Defense
began to center around the importance of highlighting the difference between men and
women. Particularily, there was an interest in harnessing the unique differences that
women brought to military operations. The creation of the Jegertroppen or Hunter Troop,
an all-women special operations commando unit, was a result of realizing the unique
differences between men and women, and creating a means of harnessing them. Though
special operations had been open to women since 1984, very few women had ever
attempted to join. Women had not been specifically recruited in the past, nor had a course
of training or operations been devised to differentiate between what men and women had
to offer.
The Hunter Troop was desigend to be women-only in order to both harness
women’s unique characteristscs and show that women were able to do everything that
men could in demanding environemnts. Indeed, the Hunter Troop was truly genderfocused with a Norwegian spin; though designed to capture women’s unique
contributions, the similarily in training between men and women furthered the claim as to
women’s equality. Though still in its early days (the Hunter Troop has completed its
initial year of training yet not been deployed operationally), benefits are already being
seen and the claims made about women’s service beginning to change. Through the
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training, it was highlighted that women excelled at things that men did not. In addition to
being able to access a wider percentage of the population, female trainees excelled at
shooting and scout-observation techniques (Braw, 2016).
While the domestic “experiment” with the Hunter Troop has been a success, there
is wariness to use it operationally. “It goes against our culture to have men and women be
separate,” Frank Steder remarked (August 2017). “I’ve been grappeling with the question
of increasing the number of women in the military for a long time, and while the Hunter
Troop did good work, I just don’t know if they’ll be accepted by their male comrads.
They’re too womanly now.”
The tension between claims made about the needs for the Hunter Troop and the
historical commitment to internal values and equality of the military, have resulted in a
contentious environment for what could be a third cycle of integration. Though the
program has been renewed, there are still no plans to operationalize the unit or bring its
members into larger military planning exercises. Indeed, while women in Norway’s
military were pioneers in the early years of integration, the emphasis on sameness has
resulted in a stalling of progress in the changing global security environment. In a
security environment that needed women to be different, they did not have the claims nor
the space to influence the military.
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CHAPTER 6
United States:
Ask what you can do, if you can do it like a man

In the United States, there has been much emphasis on the successes (and failures)
of prominent individual women in the military. Indeed, the United States leads Western
countries the greatest number of women general officers and senior enlisted. However
“women,” as a group, have not benefited from the successes of these prominent
individual women. Further, the lack of government involvement in issues of equality has
allowed the military to pursue its own rules with regards to women’s participation. While
women in the United States have been successful in the private sector, they have lagged
behind other Western countries with regards to women’s military integration, despite
having a high percentage of women in the organization. The United States highlights the
importance of differentiating between integration and inclusion.
The challenges faced by women in the United States military during the conflicts
in Iraq and Afghanistan highlight their low level of integration. Early on in the conflicts,
both top military officers and DoD civilians recognized the need for women’s service in
order to be successful in counterinsurgency operations. The nature of conflict in both Iraq
and Afghanistan required service members engaging with villages, at least 50% of whom
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were women. The formal restrictions on women’s service106 meant that women could not
be permanently assigned to or stationed with ground combat units in the theater of
operations. To get around the restrictions, the military created Lioness and Female
Engagement Teams (FET).107 Women in these teams would attach to infantry units for
specific missions and be co-located (rather than assigned to) with infantry units. The
women usually received less (and different) training than their male counterparts, and
were often unprepared for the combat in which they found themselves.
FET teams and the Lioness program served an important function and both
objectively and subjectively benefited mission accomplishment (Erwin, 2012). Village
Stability Operations in which FET teams were present were more likely to meet both
short and long term objectives than those that did not have women formally involved in
the operations (Harding, 2012). However, the legal restrictions around women’s service
proved problematic. Army infantry officer and Iraq veteran Steve Griffith notes that to
the general population, the restrictions on women in combat may appear to be a nonissue, but for operators on the ground, the difference is stark. “Combat units can’t “own”
female soldiers, but they can accept them on “loan” from other, non-combat units”
(Griffin, 2012). The result is that while women have been essential to the successes of
infantry units conducting counterinsurgency and village stability operations, they have
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Women were not allowed to serve in ground combat units or be stationed with units where their “risk”
of ground combat was likely.
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For overview of the FET teams see: Lizette Alvarez, “GI Jane Breaks the Combat Barrier,” New York
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not been fully accepted as part of the units.108 Though there have been a steady increase
of women in the military, they have not been integrated, that is they have not been able to
impact the military in a meaningful way. Rather, women have had to conform to male
standards in order to find success in the military.

United States: Low Level of Integration
Though there are a comparatively large number of women in the United States
military, and there are several prominent individual women in the services, the United
States has an overall low level of women’s integration. Despite their numbers, and the
prominent position of women such as General Janet Wolfenbarger,109 General Ann
Dunwoody110 and Sergeant Major Evelyn Hollis,111 women writ large have not been able
to make a substantial impact on either military personnel policies or tactics and strategies.
The women that have been successful have largely done so despite their gender, and
through adhering to masculine norms. Additionally, while the United States has a high
percentage of women in the military at any one given point in time, retention is a
challenge, with most women leaving the military after their initial contract is done.
Though in the past four years the military has dropped all formal restrictions on women’s
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The official Army position was that FET teams “do not have a combat function” and therefore did not
require infantry training
https://www.army.mil/article/101111/fet_to_fight_female_engagement_team_makes_history
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4-Star Air Force General and first woman to command Air Force’s Material Command

110

4-Star Army General and first woman to command Army’s Material Command
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Army Command Sergeant Major, first woman to be a command Sergeant Major of a combat arms
battalion (1st Bn, 31st Air Artillery Defense Brigade)
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service and women are now present in combat arms units, they are still not well
integrated. To achieve success in the military in general and combat arms in particular,
they have had to adopt and adapt to male standards and a masculine-dominant culture.
The low level of integration in the United States is reflective of the lack of
cohesive claims about gender equality. Further, the focus of women’s participation in the
military has been on emphasizing how the successes of individual women has been
within the constraints of military culture and practices. The lack of consensus about the
role of women in society, coupled with a military that is rooted in combat operations has
left little room for women to influence it.
Table 6.1 Highlights the current measures of the components of integration for the
United States Military.
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Table 6.1: Current Measures of Women’s Integration in the United States Military
Measure
Value
Legal

-

No Restrictions on Women’s functional
participation
- De Facto restrictions on women’s geographic
participation
- Service-Dependent parental leave policies (range 212 weeks)
- Privately contracted child care services with no
guarantee of availability
- Chain of command decision on sexual harassment
Functional
- 14.9% of military force
- 0% of ground combat force*
- 10.1% in international operations
Durability
- -15% retention rate
- 1% of Flag Officers
- 9% of Senior Officers
- 13% of Noncommissioned Officers
Institutional Impact
- Few Changes to policies
- Continued commitment to primary of conventional
arms
*Though women have qualified in infantry, tank, and artillery MOS’, they have not yet
been in operational units. This is primarily due to the timeline between training and
operational assignment
While the numbers of women appear high, the inability to have an institutional
impact is indicative of a low level of integration for women into the United States
military. There have been changes in laws and policies that have created more
opportunities for women in recent years, yet there have been little changes in the
supporting structures that enable women’s participation. Further, these changes have been
done in such a way that the male physical standard and masculine cultural experience is
preferenced. In the Women in the Services Review to congress, mandated by the 2012
National Defense Authorization Act, for over 90% of the military occupational specialty
standards and advanced schools, the male physical standard was listed as the “one
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standard” to which all service members would be required to adhere (Office of the Under
Secretary of Defense Personnel and Readiness, 2013). While there has been an emphasis
on counterinsurgency policy, and the importance of women in the recent conflicts in Iraq
and Afghanistan, new policies and doctrine have been written by men, and have treated
women as a group to be used in certain tactical situations rather than an integrated part of
the overall force.
In this chapter I show how the foundational beliefs that individuals are
responsible for proving their own worth coupled with the military’s culture of combat has
created a contentious environment for women’s attempts to integrate into the military. I
begin by discussing beliefs about the role of the military and military culture in the
United States, focusing on how it has continued to remain combat centric in its values
despite changes in global politics. I then discuss how throughout the three periods of
global politics, integration has not been very successful in the United States. I show how
the contention between the claims about women’s service and the military culture have
resulted in an inability for women to impact the military in a meaningful way. The
changes that have been made that have impacted women’s service have been done in a
manner that is inclusive of women at the expense of their integration. I conclude by
discussing how the conflict in Afghanistan has created an environment in which
integration may be possible, though there remain stumbling blocks for implementation.
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United States Military Tradition: Combat Tested, Culture Approved
Perhaps more than any other Western military, the United States has traditionally,
and continues, to adhere to a combat-oriented, male-oriented warrior tradition. As army
veteran Brian Mitchell asserts on his discussion on the suitability of women in the
military, “The major social value of our military is the warrior image, particularly the
masculine warrior image” (Mitchell, 1997, p. 44) He continues to decry women in the
military, emphasizing that the presence of women shifts the military’s focus away from
fighting wars and towards ensuring that women are taken care of and not subject to too
much stress. While Mitchell’s views are extreme, they are reflective of a military in
which the ideal type soldier remains male, white, conservative, and adherent to JudeoChristian values (Dunivin, 1994). Both the training for and conduct of war have
reinforced the combat-centric nature of the military tradition in the United States (Hunter,
2018). While arguments have been made for the military as a cultural socialization tool
(Krebs, 2006), the emphasis in the United States remains on combat achievement and
conventional force projection.
As one of the earliest Western militaries to abandon conscription in favor of the
all-volunteer force, the United States military has adopted a culture that is been argued to
be divergent from the majority of civilian citizens (Janowitz, 1975; Moskos, 2001).
Indeed, recent demographic work on the military reflects this. Over 80% of military
members come from a family where an immediate family member was also in the
military (Zucchino & Cloud, 2015). Nearly half of all active duty troops come from
California, Texas, Virginia, North Carolina, and Georgia, most from a town within 25
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miles of a military instillation. Further, the size of the military, both in terms of numbers
and in percentage of the population that is serving, has continued to shrink. The growing
divide between the military and the civilian population has resulted in a military that had
both developed a distinct and separate culture, and has become very entrenched in its
beliefs.
The roots of the distinct culture predate the all-volunteer force, and are largely
entrenched with the way in which the officer corps was treated as uniquely separate from
society. In a 1962 address to the cadets at the Military Academy at West Point, General
Douglas MacArthur asserted, “Yours is the profession of arms, the will to win, the sure
knowledge that in war there is no substitute for victory, that if you lose the nation will be
destroyed” (MacArthur, 1962). The emphasis on winning, and the relative separation
between military professionals and the civilian public created a culture that has
emphasized the importance of the destructive power of the military as a means of both
personal and professional survival (Janowitz, 1988).
The combat-focused identity of the military is reinforced both internally and
externally. The origin of this identity is seen, both by service members themselves and
from citizens of the country they serve, as a result of the conduct of war. When services
members are lauded by civilians as ideal citizens it is more for bravery and willingness to
fight in wars on behalf of the citizenry than it is for their possession of certain values or
characteristics. Internally, service members have used combat and militarism as a way to
distinguish themselves as the “best” among an already small and distinct group of service
members (Snider, 2000).
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The masculine and combat-focused identity is prevalent in the way that members
of the military talk about themselves and others. The roots of this identity are forged in
initial training. Broadly, the purpose of recruit training is to take civilians and turn them
into members of the military by both “indoctrinating” them into military life and
“inoculating” them from the potential horrors of their chosen profession (Mills, 2012).
The United States military is focused on creating a new moral code and identity among
its members (Toner, 2013). They are not to be ideal civilian citizens, but ideal warriors,
ready and able to do violence on behalf of the country. Even service members that are in
occupational specialties other than ground-combat undergo extensive small-arms and
hand-to-hand combat training, emphasizing and reinforcing that violence is the central
part of identity (Hunter, 2018).
The result is a group that feels a separation from, and in some cases a distain for,
the citizenry that reveres it (Ricks, 2007). The separation from the civilian population has
resulted both in an entrenchment of military culture and a hierarchy of military identities
among service members and veterans (MacKenzie, 2015). Because they are largely
separated from the civilian population, and therefore don’t often compare themselves to
civilians in a formal manner, members of the military have created an informal internal
ranking system. In line with the masculine combat-focused culture, ground combat is
seen to be the most prestigious and important job in the military. Seen as the “main
effort” in military operations, the infantry is held up as the superior to the rest of the
military. While conducting focus groups, several male soldiers and Marines wore patches
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that stated “If you ain’t Infantry, you ain’t shit,” not only affirming the primacy of the
infantry, but downgrading those not engaged in the direct conduct of war.112
Beliefs about the superiority of combat arms are reinforced by both personnel
policies and military strategy. The majority of flag officers in the Army and Marine
Corps have come from ground combat specialties. Only one Commandant of the Marine
Corps113 and none of the Chiefs of staff of the Army have been from non-ground combat
communities. Indeed, leadership sets the tone from their personal experiences, and
without diversity in leadership there is little chance that there will be change in the lower
ranks.
Strategic guidance has remained focused on ground combat operations and the
defeat of the enemy. Though recent national security strategies have noted the importance
of new theaters of war (i.e. cyber) and non-infantry tactics (i.e. cultural competency),
ground combat remains the primary focus of military doctrine. A central component of
the most recent National Security Strategy is to “defeat America’s enemies” through an
“expanded force” (National Security Strategy, 2017). Indeed, military defeat is
preferenced over restraint of force.
External civilian factors have also contributed to the military’s combat-focused
culture. Politicians, in particular, have been instrumental in propping up the idea of the
warrior-combatant has the ideal. This was best typified by Governor Mike Huckabee’s
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The Army and Marine Corps are the most severe adherents to this culture. However, in the Air Force it
exists within the fighter community and in the Navy among the Special Warfare community.
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General James Amos, the 35th Commandant of the Marine Corps was an F-4 and then later F/A-18 pilot
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response at 2016 Republican Primary debate when he asserted that, “the purpose of the
military is to kill people and break things.”114 Such a comment wasn’t made in isolation.
During the draw-down of forces in Iraq Congress pressure military leaders to return to
combat training and prepare for “real war” now that the cultural missions were over
(Brooks, 2017).
Internationally the United States has remained hawkish and emphasized the
presence of its military around the world. For example, the United States invaded Iraq
without UN approval, a move that then Secretary General Kofi Annan declared illegal,
showing its willingness to defy international norms. Additionally, the United States
maintains a sizable permanent military force around the world. From Germany to Japan,
troops have a permanent residence across the globe. Even when not actively engaged in
war, the United States military conducts regular large-scale military training exercises
that showcase the combat capability of the its forces.
Because of its size and status, the US military is able to maintain its focus on
combat even when other countries are becoming more engaged with values. As a result,
the cultural standard of the military has become that of the infantryman. Those that do not
fit the mold have a hard time being successful in the military either culturally or
professionally. As I will show in this chapter, the pervasiveness of the masculine combatfocused culture contributes to the low level of integration of women into the United
States military. The culture has resulted in practical obstacles for women that their claims
have not been able to overcome. Moreover, the women that have been successful in the
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United States military have largely done so by conforming to the traditional military
culture. While they have been individual successes, they have done little to integrate
women as a whole. Indeed, despite the inclusion of women, the military is still very much
a man’s world in the United States.

Era 1: The End of the Cold War
Equality through a Masculine Enterprise? (1970-1992)
Though discussions about and policies on women’s military service began nearly
immediately following World War II, the possibility for beginning a process of
integration emerged in the 1990s, with the opening of combat aircraft and sea service to
women, and genuine discussions about the suitability of and possibility for women in
combat roles. Though the early 1990s is the starting point for integration, it is important
to note that many of the arguments on both sides of the debate about women’s military
participation have their roots in the 1970s, in the debates over the ending of conscription
and the adoption of a all-volunteer force. Most notably, the debate around women’s role
in the professional military highlighted the degree to which both emotion and cultural
ideal types played a central role in women’s service. Since the United States lacked an
overarching equality or equal rights law, the military was not required to admit women.
This allowed the perpetuation of beliefs about the masculine nature of service, and the
resulting exclusion of women.
Concurrently, the lack of structural support, including child care and consistent
parental leave policies, resulted in many women leaving the service earlier than they
219

otherwise would have due to financial needs. The twin challenges of lack of combat
service and early departure for family obligations resulted in a dearth of women in
leadership positions where they could effectively make change.

Structural Provisions
Though women have been participating in the military in the United States since
the Revolutionary War, and the United States boasts a comparatively high percentage of
women in the military currently, the legal status and enabling structures for women in the
military are not very permissive. The United States, unlike France and Norway, does not
have a comprehensive equal rights or equal status law. As discussed in Chapters 4 and 5,
equal rights laws provided part of the baseline provisions for women to be allowed into
all military specialties. Absent such wide-sweeping legislative requirements, policies
were created specifically for and by the military and did not necessarily reflect larger
trends in policies regarding women in public life.
Table 6.2: Summary of Structural Provisions during the First Era of Women’s
Participation
Component
Measure
Barriers to
- Banned from ground combat roles, combat ships, and
Participation
combat aircraft
- Geographic restrictions on women’s service
- Segregated training
- Not included in the Selective Service
Childcare / Parental
- Child care the responsibility of individual service
Leave
members
- Parental leave left up to individual services
Sexual Harassment
- Per commanders discretion under the UCMJ
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Table 6.2 highlights the structural and legal provisions for women in the United
States military during the final years of the Cold War. There were many restrictions on
women’s service. These restrictions were largely based on emotion and historical belief
about gender roles and military culture rather than evidence on women’s capabilities or
operational performance. Additionally, women bore the burden of individually making
arrangements for most of the historical “women’s issues” such as child care and health
services. The extra work contributed to low retention rate of women and difficulty for
women in being able to change the military.
The legal provisions for women’s military service in the United States have
historically been reflective of both the military’s culture and the belief in limited
government intervention to ensure equality. Though strides were made for women’s
professional service throughout the second half of the 20th Century, women were allowed
in service positions only. The 1948 “Women’s Integration Act” allowed women to serve
in the regular military rather than auxiliary corps.115 However, there was a cap both on
the total number of women allowed to serve and the ranks they could achieve. Women
could make up no more than 2% of the enlisted ranks, officer corps, or total force.
Additionally, while enlisted were unrestricted in rank, officers could only achieve the
rank of O-6. Women were also restricted in their benefits. Children and spouses of female
service members were not considered dependents, and therefore not eligible for benefits
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such as health care or on-base housing. Enlisted women were discharged if they got
pregnant.
Public Law 90-130, passed in 1967, lifted the 2% cap on women’s service and
gave women unrestricted access to rank. It also provided limited benefits to the spouses
and children of female service members.116 However, it did little to actually elevate the
status of women in the United States military. Women were still trained separately and
had different training requirements. Despite the lifting of restrictions on rank, women
were still a segregated from and de facto subordinates to their male counterparts. As
Brigadier General Evelyn P. Foote notes:
Women … were never referred to as soldiers … they were
never trained to defend themselves or to defend their units.
They were trained for administrative, personnel, medical,
public relations work. They were not permanently detailed
to any [operational] army unit; they were detailed only
temporarily (As quoted in Katzenstein, 1998, p. 57)
It was not until 1975 that women received any weapons training, and then it was limited
to defensive tactics. These restrictions on women’s service reinforced the masculine
nature of the military culture and prevented women from attaining leadership positions.
The 1970s and the advent of the all-voluntary force provided more structural
opportunities for women. With the ending of conscription, manpower numbers
necessitated an increasing the pool from which the military could draw. Though there
were policy conversations and Congressional testimony as to the impact of the end on the
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for more than one-half of his financial support.
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draft on the need to recruit more women into the armed services (Janowitz & Moskos,
1979) there was no concrete laws passed as to what the status of women in the military
would be. Rather, it was left up to the DoD, and often the individual services to
implement their manpower plans for the all-volunteer force. Individual services launched
recruiting drives to attract women into logistics and supply positions so that male
volunteers could be concentrated into the infantry and other combat arms.
The policy changes that came in the 1970s and the professionalization of the
armed services were an important part of women having the potential to choose the
military as a career. In 1975 women began defensive weapons training in initial recruit
and officer training, and in 1977 women began going through the same initial weapons
training as men. In 1976 women were first admitted to the Service Academies, and by
1977 administrative, logistics, and medical occupational specialty training schools were
integrated. Such changes provided an opportunity for women to be seen as “soldiers”
rather than women, and the possibility to obtain the experiences and qualifications (i.e.
overseas service or ship-board service) necessary for promotion into leadership roles.
In 1978, Congress also amended the 1948 Act to allow women to serve on
noncombat ships such as tenders, repair ships, and salvage and rescue ships. Assignment
to such ships, however, was to be a “temporary duty.117 While women could serve on
ships, they were still effectively banned from holding command positions or senior
leadership roles at sea, an essential prerequisite for naval flag officers, due to the ban on
permanent stationing.
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Functional Participation
While women have been a part of every war the United States has fought since
the Revolution, both their operational participation and their formal status as service
members or veterans has been limited. To understand how the claims about women’s
service interacted with military culture to constrain integration, it is important to briefly
discuss the functional participation of women in the United States military in final years
of the Cold War. Until the last part of the 20th Century, women in the United States
military were not only banned from combat, but also given differential training, Notably,
women were not trained on how to use weapons, nor operate or survive in austere
environments. The legal restrictions coupled with lack of training severely restricted
women’s functional roles.
Table 6.3: Summary of Functional Participation during the First Era of Women’s
Participation
Component
Measure
Level of
- Approximately 8-10% of overall Force
Participation
Type of
- Primarily Medical Logistics and Administrative
Participation
- Banned from Combat Arms
Overseas
- 1-5%
Participation
Records on women’s overseas participation began in the 1960s. Approximately
7,000118 women served in Vietnam, with the vast majority as medical personnel (nurses)
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Because the Army still had a separate auxiliary corps, official DoD records are conflicting. There were
nearly 6000 active duty nurses from the Army, Navy and Air Force in country, along with 60 female
administrative Marines. Auxiliary corps histories range from 300-1500 women serving in Vietnam. 7000 is
the most commonly agreed upon number in the historian literature.
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and auxiliary corps administrative personnel (Stur, 2011). During the Vietnam War era,
women made up less than 1% of professional the active duty force, with most women
employed as contractors or on a limited auxiliary status (National Center for Veterans
Analysis and Statistics). In the operational theaters, while women were not engaged
directly in the fighting, they played a vital service to the war, despite serving in a highly
gendered capacity. Women in the Vietnam War “straddled a line between girl next door,
providing an image of home to wounded men, and a combat soldier, who came face to
face with the fear and death that accompanied the war” (Stur, 2011, p. 106). The ability to
continue to gender women’s Vietnam service, framing nursing and administrative work
as inherently “women’s work,” allowed for women to continue to be sidelined in
conversations about mainstream military service. While women had an important role, it
was a woman’s role.
Further, restrictions of the number of the women in the service and their ability to
obtain ranks necessary for leadership hindered their functional participation. Indeed,
because of the restrictions on numbers, women were primarily utilized to fill
administrative roles in the United States while men fought. Though the formal
restrictions on women’s rank were dropped in 1967 with P.L. 90-130, women still often
lacked the practical experiences necessary to achieve both rank and leadership roles. The
lack of weapons training – even defensive – meant that women were only able to have
command of units that served a purely administrative or medical function. Women who
did attain leadership posts did so as commanders of garrison bases. Such commands
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carried a de facto ceiling of the one-star rank, as combat service was seen as necessary to
be promoted into more senior ranks (DACOWITS, 1980-2000).
The expansion of women’s roles in the military, and the introduction of weapons
training for women in the late 1970s provided an opportunity for women’s expanded
functional participation. The introduction of coed military occupational specialties,
coupled with women’s training on small arms and crew served weapons began the
transition from women being viewed as “women” to “soldier.” However, this transition
period came at a time of relatively low international operations for the United States.
Between the Vietnam War and the Gulf War, the United States was not involved in any
sustained conflict. During this period, combat-focused operations were limited in scope
and personnel, with little need for support units. Therefore, given the international
environment, women still only had opportunities to lead in garrison, continuing to limit
their opportunities. The United States also did not have a large focus on peacekeeping
missions in the 1980s, limiting some of the possibilities for women that were seen in
other Western Countries.
Though women were afforded more opportunity as a result of the all-volunteer
force, they were still largely viewed as unequal members of the military under the law.
The first test of the potential for more equal policies came in 1979 with the reinstatement
of the Selective Service after the military transitioned to the AVF. Despite the fact that
the military had been struggling to retain enough men to fill the ranks in the case of a
national emergency (Janowitz & Moskos, 1979), Congress did not believe that women
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should be included in the Selective Service. In its official statement on the formation of
the Selective Service, the Senate Armed Service Committee Stated:
The committee feels strongly that it is not in the best interest
of our national defense to register women for the Military
Selective Service Act, which would provide needed military
personnel upon mobilization or in the event of a peacetime
draft for the armed forces. (Senate, Committee on Armed
Services, June 19, 1979)
The arguments on both sides of the debate around women’s inclusion in the Selective
Service will be discussed below. However, it is important to note the rationale behind the
Senate’s ultimate reasoning when discussing structural and legal provisions. The
Selective Service was envisioned to be the infantry reserve manpower that would be
mobilized in case of a total war. Because women were banned from ground combat units,
it was reasoned that they should be excluded from the Selective Service as well (Stiehm,
1989). This rational perpetuates the culture of the masculine warrior and that the military
is solely comprised of foot soldiers. As will later be shown, women’s exclusion from the
Selective Service was also used as an argument against their full integration into the all
military specialties.
The Gulf War, from August 1990 – February 1991, was the first opportunity for
women to fully participate in the United States military as regular members in an
operational capacity.119 Over 35,000 active duty service women participated in the Gulf
War (Department of Veterans Affairs, 2011; United States Department of Defense,
1992). An ABC news report called the Gulf War a “watershed” moment for women in the
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Though women were still banned form combat service, it was the first major international operation
during which there was no longer an auxiliary corps and women were regular members of military units.
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military and the United States more generally (Herf & Jacinto, 2003). Unlike Vietnam,
women found themselves in the thick of battle rather than being relegated to rear-echelon
or headquarters bases. While still barred form ground combat roles, women served as
truck drivers, logisticians, supply officers, military police, and transport pilots, in addition
to the more traditionally gendered medical and administrative roles. With the increased
participation of women also came war’s consequences. Fifteen women were killed in the
Gulf War, and three, Rhonda Cornum, Crystal Rickett, and Melissa Rathbun-Nealy, taken
prisoner of war (United States Department of Defense, 1992). The presence of women on
the battle field, coupled with the unprecedented media coverage of the Gulf War put
women in the military front and center.
Despite their participation in the Gulf War, women in the military faced both
cultural and practical barriers to service that led to their departure at higher rates than
men. Culturally, they were confronted by (male) senior leaders that did not see them as
future leaders. Women often did not have access to the mentorship or encouragement that
their male counterparts did with regards to their career progression. They were frequently
ignored, or even discouraged from pursuing service after their initial commitment. At an
Armed Services Committee Hearing, Dr. Edwin Dorn, a senior staff member at the
Brookings Institution and specialist in military and personnel issues, asserted “I was
struck by the complete failure of senior officers to assert leadership during a seminar,120
when a young woman asked a serious question about her career opportunities as a Navy
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flier and was greeted with derision” (United States House of Representatives, Armed
Services Committee, July 29-30, 1992).

Claims About Service and Interaction with Military Culture
To discuss the claims about women’s service in the United States military, it is
important to look both at the claims for women’s participation in the military and the
claims against it. The claims for and against came from both inside and outside the
military. Further, women were leaders on both sides of the argument. The tensions over
women’s military service reflects the women’s movement in the United States lack of
unified belief about the role of women in public life and the difference between men and
women, as seen in arguments for individual women’s right to serve in the military often
being in tension with claims about the role of the military or military culture.
The claims for women’s increased participation in the military largely took the
form of feminist interest-group activism, with individual women coming together to
“demand the right to job assignments based on competence, not gender … and the right
to be treated with the same respect as the men next to whom they work” (Katzenstein,
1998, pp. 46-47). In the case of women in the military, the “interest” being pursued was
individual access to jobs or careers. For those that were vocal about women’s increased
participation, it was not to further the equality of women more generally or to enhance
women’s political rights, but to ensure that each individual was able to able to achieve
her own desires based on her own competencies.
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The role of formal women’s groups in lobbying for women’s increased
participation was limited, and often surprising. Second wave feminist women’s
movements in the United States were largely anti-war, and saw “peace as a feminist
issue.”121 However, despite the general anti-war sentiment, NOW became an unlikely yet
important ally to those seeking greater opportunities for women in the military. NOW’s
1980 position paper on the “Registration and Drafting of Women” is emblematic of the
duality of impact that the women’s movement in the United States had. On the one hand,
the position paper argued for a shrinking of the military and an abolition of the selective
service all together in order to diminish the “war atmosphere” in the United States and by
extension the world more broadly. However, NOW is realistic in acknowledging that the
military is not going to disappear, nor are the militaristic aspects of government.
In the name of equality, NOW therefor argues both for the inclusion of women in
the Selective Service and expanded opportunities for women in the active duty military
forces. NOW’s logic rests on two primary aspects. First, it focuses on the operational
impact and necessity of women in the military. Women “will have to fight,” the position
asserts, “because the military has difficulty attracting sufficient numbers [of men] who
are educated and technically trainable.” As 50% of available pool of the youth workforce,
women were argued to be necessary to fill the ranks. NOW’s argument doesn’t end with
numbers. Women were argued to be better, for both the military and the country. Though
overall opposed to war, the position paper recognized that if a war was to be fought, a
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force that was the most competent and most able to handle the changing technological
landscape of war would be necessary. As women were proving themselves in university
and the workforce, the argument was made that they were better suited for the everevolving technological capabilities of the military. Yet the position paper also asserts that
including women is the only way to work towards a society “free from war.” If war is to
be stopped in a democracy, the whole of society has to be responsible for fighting it. By
including women, they would be sure to vote against going to war.
Also pronounced throughout the position paper is the idea that gender-based
discrimination in the military has an overall negative professional impact on women. The
ultimate result of restrictions placed on women, NOW argued is that “women are given
fewer training, educational, and advancement opportunities in the largest single
vocational training institution in our country.” The crux of the argument was not about
war and fighting, but about affording the opportunity for women to advance within the
military as a career, as well as receive equal opportunities for post-military employment
in the civilian world.
These claims based on occupation and economics had more staying power, and
resonated more closely with members of the military than those based purely on women’s
rights or equality. Indeed, individual women in the military were more concerned with
their professional prospects than the strategic goals of the nation. In the 1970s and 1980s,
women’s claims to service were less about their operational accomplishments and more
about their access to the professional aspects of the military. As one enlisted Air Force
mechanic put it, “there were no women on the flight line, and you can’t get to be a tech or
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master [sergeant] without leadership time on the flight line … so I knew it wasn’t going
to be a career for me” (Stiehm, 1989, p. 261).
Absent an overarching equal rights framework, those making claims for increased
women’s participation relied on the experiences and stories of individual women. For
example, individual female military aviators were crucial in gaining support for the
language in the National Defense Authorization Act that lifted restrictions on women’s
combat flight service (Gellman, 1991). In 1991, nearly a dozen female pilots flew into
Washington, DC to share their personal experiences with members of Congress on the
House and Senate Armed Services Committee. While Air Force General McPeak
publically voiced his opposition to women’s service based on his beliefs about women,
female aviators were there to give their first-hand accounts of being able to “pull-Gs”
(physically endure the gravitational force of rapid acceleration and aircraft maneuvering),
conduct bombing missions, and endure the possibility of having to survive behind enemy
lines or as a prisoner of war (U.S. Senate, June 19, 1991).
In addition to discussing their personal capabilities, women focused on their
inability to be professionally competitive with their male counterparts because of the
legal restrictions on their service. For examples, experiences and claims by women that
did not choose flying careers in the Air Force were as important as those that did in this
respect. For example, Heather Wilson,122 one of the first women to graduate from the Air
Force Academy, twice turned down appointments to flight school, despite her lifelong
love of aviation (she had learned to fly before she learned to drive). Upon being asked
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Wilson was appointed Secretary of the Airforce in May 2017, and has been a vocal supporter of
women’s increased combat participation (DACOWITS, 2018).
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why, she responded I didn't want to be kind of driving a bus from Dover, Delaware to
Frankfurt, Germany … The Air Force is about combat, you can't get around that … If
you want to command, you really need that experience. Do you want to join a law firm
when you know you'll never be a partner?" (As quoted in Gellman, 1991). Wilson left
the Air Force as a Captian in 1989, citing her belief that she could do more good for the
country out of uniform than in, due to the de facto limitations on women’s leadership
(DACOWITS, 2017). As restrictions have been dropped from women’s service, they
have been hailed as a win for women’s professional possibilities.
While organizations such as NOW and individual service women were
supporters of women’s increased opportunities in the military, not all women felt that
increasing women’s role would be beneficial for either the military or women. Both from
within and without the military there was a move to discredit those advocating for
military integration as “radical feminists” who do not have the “interests nor realities of
women in the military or military operations in general” at heart (Miller, 1998). The
tensions between feminists, largely self-identifying as liberal, and military leaders,
largely identifying as conservative played out in this debate.
From outside the military, Phyllis Schlafly, founder of the Eagle Forum, and
Elaine Donnelly, president of the Center for Military Readiness, personified what was
dubbed the “antifeminist” movement. As noted in Chapter 2, the antifeminist movement
was largely a backlash to the possible ratification of the Equal Rights amendment. It
focused on self-professed “family values,” and argued that a women’s role was that of a
domestic nurturer. Women’s increased military service, especially in positions that could
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result in combat service, was antithetical to their professed values. In a 1991 report for
the Heritage Foundation, Phyllis Schlafly asserted that
The combat exclusion laws are a rational legislative
recognition of fundamental differences between men and
women … Fighting wars is a mission that requires tough,
tenacious and courageous men to endure the most primitive
and uncivilized situations and pain in order to survive, plus
determination to kill enemies who are just as tough,
tenacious and courageous, and probably vicious and sadistic,
too. Men are attracted to serve in the military because of its
intensely masculine character. The qualities that make them
good soldiers - aggressiveness, risk taking, and enjoyment of
body-contact competition - are conspicuously absent in
women. Pretending that women can perform equally with
men in tasks that require those attributes is not only
dishonest; it corrupts the system. (Schlafly, 1991, p. 6)
Schlafly’s arguments were reflective of the masculine combat-focused culture of the
United States military. The arguments against women’s participation were based largely
on emotion rather than the experiences of women in the military or systematic
operational studies. They drew on the belief that men would be unable to perform their
duties in the presence of women, and that for society to function properly women must be
protected from war (MacKenzie, 2015).
The need to protect women, not only from war, but from what was deemed the
“reality” of being in the military was used as an argument against women’s increased
participation. Elaine Donnelley, then a member of the Presidential Commission on the
Assignment of Women in the Armed Services deemed sexual assault an “occupational
hazard” that women in the military would inevitably be exposed to not only at the hands
of the enemy but by their fellow service members (As quoted in Washington Post, June
11, 1992).
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Outcome
While the policy changes of the 1970s and the all-volunteer force provided more
opportunities for women in the military, structural enabling conditions made the reality of
service difficult. For example, women were discharged from service when they became
pregnant, and single mothers were not allowed to enlist. To address these issues, women
often took legal action against the Department of Defense or particular service. For
example, Stephanie Crawford, a 21-year old single woman was discharged from the
United States Marine Corps upon becoming pregnant. Further, she was denied
reenlistment, even when she presented evidence to a recruiter that she had secured child
care to cover any potential duty requirements. For both the discharge and the denial of
reenlistment she sued Commandant Robert Cushman, claiming that the decision to
discharge her was made solely on the basis of gender. The court in Crawford v. Cushman
(1974) found that discharging women upon the discovery of a pregnancy was a violation
of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution, yet upheld the services’ right to consider
pregnancy on a “case by case” basis.123 As a result, women could not be discharged
merely for being pregnant, but if commanders deemed that motherhood interfered with
operational requirements, women could be separated. Because neither Congress nor the
Department was willing to engage with motherhood, it was left up to the courts.
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Benefits for dependents were also decided in the courts. In Frontiero v.
Richardson (1973) it was decided that benefits could not be differentially given to service
members based on sex.124 Sharron Frontiero, a lieutenant in the Air Force, sued the
Department of Defense over the provision that she to prove that her husband was
dependent on her for more than one-half of his financial support. Notably, the case had to
reach the Supreme Court before Lieutenant Frontiero was granted benefits for her spouse.
Lower courts ruled that the provision was “reasonable” because men were frequently the
breadwinners, and women claiming support could result in frivolous expenses for the
government (Stiehm, 1989). However, the Supreme Court found that the provision
violated the due process clause, and made an arbitrary distinction between men and
women.
These course cases are representative of the legal action that service women had
to take to either receive the same benefits as their male counterparts or overcome genderbased discrimination (Stiehm, 1989). Many of the individual services’ provisions were
written by male senior officers and constructed in line with the conservative values that
military leadership has historically espoused (Janowitz, 1988). Without overarching legal
protection for gender equality, women had to make individual claims and hope to gain
structural provisions in a piecemeal manner.
The final years of the Cold War saw two major policy changes initiated from the
top-down (rather than through bottom-up pressure). First is the codification of restrictions
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on women’s occupational assignments. In 1988 the Department of Defense adopted a
universal policy on women’s occupational assignments. Deemed the “Risk Rule,” it
revised the standard to be used when determining women’s military service. Rather than
universally barring women from permanent assignment to ships or combat units, it
“excluded women from units or missions if the risks of exposure to direct combat, hostile
fire, or capture were equal to or greater than the risks in the combat units they support”
(Burrelli, 2013). This rule allowed women to be permanently assigned to support
(noncombat) units and ships so long as that unit was not under reasonable risk of
engaging in direct combat. While the rule opened nearly half of all occupational
specialties to women (U.S. General Accounting Office, September 1988), it was also
subjective, leaving it up to the services to determine what constituted “direct combat” and
“risk.” Decisions on where to assign women were left up to the male commanders who
often defaulted to conservative definitions of risk, choosing to keep women nondeployable units as much as possible. While this rule increased the professional
opportunity for women in the military, the subjectivity of assignment policies would
ultimately hinder women’s functional participation. The impact of these restrictions will
be discussed in more detail below.
Second is the dropping of some restrictions on women’s ship and aircraft service.
After the fallout from the Navy’s Tailhook scandal (Boyer, 1996) and the reality faced by
women in the Gulf War (Nantais & Lee, 1999), there was a renewed push to evaluate and
expand the formal roles open to women in the military. The National Defense
Authorization Act for FY 1992-1993 addressed this by repealing the statutory prohibition
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on women’s assignment to combat aircraft and Naval vessels. It also allowed for women
to be permanently assigned to sea-duty, increasing the potential for promotion and
command opportunities. The act also established a Presidential Commission on the
Assignment of Women in the Armed Forces to study the impact of increased
opportunities for women and offer advice and guidance as to whether any more widesweeping policy changes should be enacted.
On November 15, 1992, the Commission issues its report (Presidential
Commission on the Assignment of Women in the Armed Forces, November 15, 1992).
Among the Commission’s many recommendations are the following:
-

-

-

Military readiness should be the driving concern
regarding assignment policies; there are circumstances
under which women might be assigned to combat
positions.
The sense of the Commission is that women should be
excluded from direct land combat units and positions.
Furthermore, the Commission recommends that the
existing service policies concerning direct land combat
exclusion be codified. Service Secretaries shall
recommend to the Congress which units and positions
should fall under the land combat exclusions.
Retain the DOD Risk Rule as currently implemented.
Navy policies which implement the Risk Rule should be
modified to reflect the changes made in the NDAA for
FY 1992-1993.

It is notable that the Commission used “combat positions” in their recommendations
concerning where women would be necessary, but “direct land combat” for their
recommendations on exclusion. This continued the belief that women were unsuited for
ground combat and the protectionism spirit of the laws related to women in the military.
Indeed, the recommendations of the committee echoed those of many military general
238

officers at the time.125 Notably there was little objective research on the suitably for
women for or their impact on combat units (Harrell & Miller, 1997). Decisions were
made more on emotion and upholding the traditional military status quo.
While there were increased opportunities for women that emerged in the later
years of the Cold War, women were not able to effectively impact the military. Women’s
increased participation was predicated on women adhering to male standards and
masculine culture. For women to succeed, they had to adhere to military culture. The
structure of the military did little to accommodate women or leverage their unique
characteristics.

Era 2: The Post-Cold War World
Proving Women’s Success
In the post-Cold War World, the United States military shifted its focus from
balancing the Soviet Union to grappling with more complex and multi-dimensional
definitions of security (Buzan, 2008). The military began to shift its focus from largescale war towards “military operations other than war” and “security and stability
operations” (Moskos, 2000, p. 17). However, despite this shift in mission, the military
remained focused on combat readiness, and continued to preference conventional military
operations and forces.
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For example, in a 1991 Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing, Senator William Cohen (Maine)
asked air force General Merrill McPeak whether or not he would permit a “woman pilot of superior
intelligence, great physical conditioning, in every way superior to a male counterpart vying for the same
squadron position” to fly in combat missions. General McPeak answered “No, I would not. I admit it
doesn’t make much sense, but that’s the way I feel about it.”
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Additionally, in the post-Cold War era, women were able to take advantage of
newly opened positions on ships and in aircraft. However, the continued to face
opposition both from within and without the military. Even with women’s continued
success in the military, the United States was one of the last countries to formally allow
women access to all military occupational specialties and operational environments. The
individual success of women did little to help “women” more broadly gain access to the
military. Women were still largely expected to achieve success on their own, and the
military rarely responded to women’s presence with changes to policies, tactics, or
strategies.

Structural Provisions
At the end of the Cold War, women had access to previously closed positions on
ships and in the air. However, despite these de jure allowances, there remained many de
facto restrictions to their service.
Table 6.4: Summary of Structural Provisions during the Second Era of Women’s
Participation
Component
Measure
Barriers to
- Banned from ground combat roles
Participation
- Allowed in combat ships and aircraft
- Geographic restrictions on women’s service
- Segregated training
- Not included in the Selective Service
Childcare / Parental
- Creation of on-base child care facilities, but not
Leave
guaranteed access
- Parental leave left up to individual services
Sexual Harassment
- Per commanders discretion under the UCMJ
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Table 6.4 highlights the structural conditions at the end of the Cold War. While
gains were made that allowed women to formally participate in the military, much of the
enabling structure was left up to the individual women. Many of legal changes made at
this time were a response both to the recommendation of the Commission on the
Assignment of Women in the Armed Forces, and needs of the services in the post-Cold
War era.
In the years immediately following the end of the Cold War, then Secretary of
Defense Les Aspen issued a memorandum clarifying definitions in the Risk Rule and
offering guidance to Service Secretaries with regards to the assignment of women (Office
of the Secretary of Defense, January 13, 1994). The memo stated that effective October 1,
1994 “Service members are eligible to be assigned to all positions for which they are
qualified, except that women shall be excluded from assignment to units below the
brigade level whose primary mission is to engage in direct combat on the ground.” Direct
Combat was further defined as “engaging an enemy on the ground with individual or
crew served weapons, while being exposed to hostile fires and to a high probability of
direct physical contact with the hostile forces personnel. Direct ground combat takes
place well forward on the battlefield while locating and closing with the enemy to defeat
them by fire, maneuver, or shock effect.” Secretary Aspen further asserted that the
services could impose additional restrictions on women’s assignments when:
-

The cost of appropriate berthing and privacy
arrangements being prohibitive;
Units and positions doctrinally required to physically
collocate and remain with direct combat units that are
closed to women;
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-

Units are engaged in long range reconnaissance
operations and Special Operations Forces missions; and
Job related physical requirements would necessarily
exclude the vast majority of women Service members.
(Office of the Secretary of Defense, January 13, 1994)

While these provisions did open more positions to women, they continued to allow for
subjectivity in the actual assignments of women.
In addition to changes in what women were allowed to do in the military in the
1990s, there were also changes in structural provisions. H.R. 1277, passed as part of the
FY 1990 National Defense Authorization Act directed the Secretary of Defense to use
Department of Defense Funds for the “operation and maintenance of military child care
facilities.”126 The passage of the law was largely in response to concerns about both the
unique demands on military life and the affordability of child care for lower-paid enlisted
personnel. Unlike Norway and France, the United States did not have a national childcare
scheme, and parents were this left with the burden of both finding and paying for child
care that would cover the hours required of military work. While the act expanded the
network on on-base Child Development Centers (CDC) and created a payment scheme
based on rank and family income, it did not guarantee that childcare would be available
for all service members. Both availability127 and accessibility128 have often made utilizing
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This is included in the post-Cold War era as it was not to be implemented until 1993
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Waitlists for care are upwards of 3 years in the larger duty-station areas (DACOWITS, 2017)
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Service members are put on a waitlist for any CDC within 30 miles of their duty station, given
infrastructure constraints this can add 2-3 hours of commute time, often resulting in parents exceeding their
maximum daily allowance for child care (DACOWITS 2018)
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the facilities impractical for service members. While there were changes made to account
for child care, parental leave was up to the individual services.129
Concerning sexual assault and harassment, it was largely left to commands to
handle allegations of misconduct or abuse on a case by case basis under the Uniform
Code of Military Justice. It was argued that the mission of the military was such that
civilian interference in issues of good order and discipline would harm the unit cohesion
necessary to win the nations wars (Stiehm, 1989; Stimson, 2013). It was not until 2004
that then Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld created the Sexual Assault Prevention
and Response Office (SAPRO). Yet even with the creation of SAPRO, commanders
maintained jurisdiction over adjudicating accusations. SAPRO’s purpose was the track
incidence and create sensitivity and awareness training, not to prosecute or provide legal
assistance for victims.
Keeping prosecution of sexual assault and harassment in the hands of
commanders has been the subject of much criticism. It has been argued that the
relationship between commanding officers and their troops is such that victims will not
report incidents that happen within the unit. Further, the inherent bias that exists towards
men in the military prejudices commanders. As CEO of Protect Our Defenders asserts,
leaving sexual assault prosecution up to unit commanders results in “standalone systems
that create friction, broken processes, and victims who do not receive justice” (Jensen,
2018). This has largely undermined the contributions that women have made to the
military, and prevented meaningful change (DACOWITS, 2017).
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Functional Participation
The functional participation of women in the United States military follows
closely from women’s participation in the Gulf War. Occurring immediately before the
end of the Cold War, the increased visibility of military women on the global stage paved
the way for women’s increased participation in both domestic and international
operations. However, despite increased participation, the United States military had a
retention problem with regards to women’s service. Women were more likely than their
male counterparts to leave the service after each cycle of enlistment.
Table 6.5: Summary of Functional Participation during the Second Era of Women’s
Participation
Component
Measure
Level of
- Approximately 10-12% of overall Force
Participation
Type of
- Primarily Medical Logistics and Administrative
Participation
- Increase in aviation and surface navy
- Banned from Combat Arms and submarine service
Overseas
- 5-6%
Participation
Table 6.5 highlights the functional participation of women. Most notably during
this period the security environment necessitated a change in function of individuals in
the military, and women were often called to do things that were outside of the purview
of the MOS for which they were trained, and often skirted the laws about women’s
combat participation. The reality of women’s functional participation was thus more a
reaction to external forces than an intentionally designed military force and highlighted
the struggle that women in the United States faced with regards to integration.
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The visible and ubiquitous coverage of women’s role in the Gulf War had an
impact on their military participation. Women’s experiences in the Gulf War were used
as claims for increasing women’s roles in the military. With women accounting for
fifteen of the war’s casualties, it was hard to claim that women were not fighting or had
been free from harm’s way. As Pat Schroeder, Representative from Colorado and
member of the House Armed Services Committee asserted during a subcommittee
hearing on the ground combat ban, “Women have proved themselves in the worst
environment and dispelled the myth in this country that they wouldn’t be able to handle
it” (United States House of Representatives, Armed Services Committee, July 29-30,
1992). Given the experiences of women in the Gulf War, it was difficult to continue the
assertion that women were not suited for combat service. Additionally, having already
braved bullets, it was further difficult to claim that women needed to be protected from
war.
However, not all of women’s experiences were positive or praiseworthy. Female
POWs recalled stories of physical and sexual abuse at the hands of their Iraqi captors
(Nantais & Lee, 1999; Sciolino, 1992). A 1995 Department of Defense survey found that
more than half of the women in the military reported experiencing some form of sexual
harassment, with the percentage significantly higher for those that had deployed to the
Gulf War. This rate was nearly twice the rate of civilian women (Firestone & Harris,
1999; Bastian, Lancaster, Reyst, & E., 1996). Most of the women reporting harassment or
abuse claimed that it was perpetrated by men in their own units. The prevalence of
harassment between service members, coupled with the 1992 Tailhook Scandal
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(Zimmerman, 1995) raised questions not about women’s physical or tactical competency,
but about whether women were socially and culturally suited for war.
Largely because of the negative coverage of women’s service, in the years
between the Gulf War and the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq in the early 2000s,
women again were primarily relegated to garrison service and leadership roles. With the
combat exclusion and Risk Rule still in place, women experienced a de facto ban from
reaching most of the highest ranks in the military. However, one place where women did
make sufficient inroads in the mid-1990s was in the aviation communities. With the ban
on combat aircraft lifted women had access to fighter and attack communities, as well as
aircraft carrier service, necessary requirements for promotion to flag officer.130 The air
force was the one service that did not experience negative retention rates in the 1990s,
and has historically had the highest percentage of women service members.
Despite the limitations on women’s service, the number of women in the United
States government continued to grow. However, the percentages of women give only a
snapshot of women’s service. Women spent less time in the military than their male
counterparts and have historically been under-represented at senior ranks and in
leadership positions. Though by the mid-2000s women comprised nearly 14% of the
commissioned officer corps, they were less than 7% of senior officers. For the years that
data on women’s rank and retention has been reported131 there is a -15% retention rate
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part of their committee on gender perspectives or when specifically requested by DACOWITS.
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overall between men and women (NATO 2016). In general, the retention rate is worse
among enlisted service members than officers. Indeed, at every point in their career,
women are more likely than men to leave the service (DACOWITS 2017).

Claims About Service and Interaction with Military Culture
In the years following the Cold War, women’s service remained in tension with
military culture. Scandals such as Tail Hook were used as evidence that women didn’t
belog in previously all-male units. The small number of women in these roles also
allowed for dismissive tokenism. After combat aviation units were open to women, there
were very few women that chose to fly these aircraft. From 1994-2001, there averaged
less than one female aviator per combat unit. The small number of women made it
possible to dismiss their success as being exception and out of the norm. Women that
were successful recall being told that they were “not like other women,” or “really one of
the guys.”132
Individual women that were successful in the military further encouraged younger
service women to adopt male characteristics in order to be successful. As Kate Germano,
former commanding officer of the Recruit Training Batallion responsible for training
female Marines recounts, “my goal was to make the place training women no different
than any other place in the Marine Corps, and therefore female Marines no different than
any other Marines” (Germano & Kennedy, 2018, p. 81). From the first days of training,
women were told to be successful they were to act like men. This reinforced the
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masculine culture of the military and made it difficult for women to make inraods to
increased integration.
The masculine culture of the military strengthened physical arguments against
women’s service. Arguments were made that women were not “tough enough” to meet
the physical demands of ground combat, or would “run away” if faced with the reality of
having to kill the enemy (TRADOC Analysis Center, 2015). Further, the differential
physical fitness standards for men and women were frequently used to argue that if
women were to participate in ground combat units the standards would be lower, and
they would therefore put their fellow infantrymen at risk (MacKenzie, 2015).
During the 1990s, claims against women’s service perpetuated because there was
little operational evidence of women’s success. With the restrictions on women’s
participation, assertions that women would be ineffective in combat situations went
largely untested. It was believed that admitting women to combat positions would
weaken the military as a whole (Bell, 2013). The Gulf War forced the conversation about
both the changing nature of warfare and the reality faced by women in the military. Given
the media coverage of the event, the American people were confronted with the reality
that women in the military served an operational capacities. However, the momentum of
women in the Gulf War was short lived. While the service of women was seen as
exceptional, it was a “flash in the pan.” In the post-war years, and it was expected that
women would return to “normal” support and administrative roles when they returend
home (Nantais & Lee, 1999).
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Outcome
In the 1990s, attempts for women to claim increased participation had largely
stalled. The military downsized in the post-Cold War World, and the women were not
seen as necessary to fill the ranks. And while women were participating in previsouly
closed occupational specialities, promotion and leadership roles remained largely closed
due to perceptions of women’s service. In an interview on NPR, Major General Heidi
Brown asserted that “gender shuts the door for me.”133 Despite commanding an Air
Defense Artillery Brigade during the 2003 invasion of Iraq, MGen Brown viewed her
gender as her biggest stumbling block. Throughout the interview she recognized how
women were often “left behind” by military leadership due to the restrictions placed on
them.
The cost of childcare and the demands of family life also caused women to leave
the service at a higher rate than men (DACOWITS, 2018). Proposals to increase child
care provisions were constantly met with resistance, forcing service members to often
choose between a military career or family life. Of the women that have attained the rank
of 3 or 4 star in the United States military, most have not had children.134 Family life is
seen as largely incompatible with a military career, and often women feel that they are
rewarded for foregoing “traditional” family lives (Rollins, 2011).
Military strategy and doctrine is further reflective of women having little impact
on the military. The 2000 National Security Strategy focused on technological
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advancements and their ability to contribute to hard power projection against potential
threats (House, 1999). While other Western countries were transitioning to focus on the
human dimension of conflict, the United States remained focused on traditional military
power and technologies. While individual women may have had the ability to succeed,
women, in general, were still largely hindered from having a meaningful impact.

Era 3: Post-9/11
Finally an Opening for Integration?
The post-9/11 era, and the United States’ involvement in the Global War on
Terror (primarily in Iraq and Afghanistan) provided the testing ground for the impact that
women are able to have on the military. The level of troop commitment and the
frequency of deployments meant that over 85% of women in the armed services
participated in a combat deployment between 2001-2009 (DACOWITS, 2010). Women
now had experience to base their claims not only on acccess to a career but on operational
outcomes. Indeed, (male) commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan noted the need for women
if they were to be successful in both tactical and strategic outcomes (King, 2014;
Lemmon, 2015).
As noted in the opening of this chapter, women in Iraq and Afghanistan were
engaged in what essentially was ground combat despite the legal prohibition against it.
As a result, women’s claims evolved from demanding equal access to a career, to
demanding formal and legal access to the occupational specialities in which they were
already de facto participating. Yet depite women’s active (and often public) participation
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in combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, there remained open opposition to
formalizing women’s participation in ground combat operations.
Even in the mist of operational evidence, requirements for military participation
were a large part of claims against formalizing women’s participation in combat roles.
Though women had proven necessary, and even successful in Iraq and Afghanistan, they
weren’t infantry soldiers, and had not been through formal infantry training. The
physicality of gound combat and the infantry military occupational speciality in particular
was frequently discussed in addressing the suitability for women’s service. Fears about
“lowering standards” so that women could participate was a concern voiced by both
military leaders and civilians opposed to increased women’s participation (Schogol,
2017). Evidence used to back up these claims was based on the average physiology of
men and women rather tha the actual performance of women in ground combat training.
The reliance on averages135 was necessary because for most of the time that women’s
service was argued in the public arena, women had not had the opportunity to attempt to
meet the requirements of ground combat service.
Rebuttles to the claims against women’s physical capabilities were largely
consistent with the individualistic nature through which women have historically faught
for equality. While it was generally accepted that the average woman was less physically
capable than the average man, arguments were made that the military was not focused on
recruiting “average” citizens, but dedicated to finding the best (Schaefer, et al., 2015).
Further, proponents of more formal inclusion for women argued that gender should not

135

Often general averages among the American population, not averages of men and women in the military
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be an arbitrary barrier for women, and that qualification should be based on individual
competency.
Despite the role that women played in Iraq and Afghanistan, claims about their
participation still largely were in conflict with military culture and the belief about the
role of the military. In Afghanistan, women were called back from their missions when
members of congress became concerned about their safety and the implications of women
“being at the point of the spear” in combat operations (Bumiller, 2010). As a result, the
women were severely restricted in what they were allowed to do operationaly, causing
many of them to leave the unit. As one female Corporal noted, “I’m too much of a girl to
make a difference” (Bumiller, 2010). The feelings of helplessness of female
servicemebers was reinforced through assertions that their presence was antithetical to
the military’s “nearly spiritual glue” that enabled men to be successful in war (Newbold,
2015 ).
Yet even in this contentious environment, on December 3, 2015 then Secretary of
Defense Ash Carter announced that all military occupational specialties would be open to
women. His rational stated that opening these positions would allow the services to
“harness the skills and perspectives that talented women have to offer” (Pellerin, 2015).
Yet despite the opening of positions, the skills and perspectives of women have yet to be
made a priority.
It is notable that the decision to open all occupations to women was met with
fierce resistance both internally and externally to the military. Unlike France and
Norway, where women’s military participation was accepted as part of larger measures
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on equality, in the United States, the military was seen as different and distinct; not the
place to hold “social experiments.” In response to women’s increased participation in
Iraq and Afghanistan, lawmakers worked throughout the 2000s to reaffirm and strengthen
the “Risk Rule,” and ensure that no women were facing the potential of engaging with the
enemy on the ground (Tyson, 2005).
The tension around women’s participation in previously closed ground combat
has created an environment in which even with the opportunities to participate in the
occupations and mission sets often required for leadership, women are unable to affect
meaningful change. Much of this is a result of the way that the military has implemented
the new policies. Women who have qualified for infantry or other combat arms are
concentrated in one or two units, and are barred from operational participation until a
“sufficient number” of women have qualified (DACOWITS, 2017). This also creates the
perception of a few special “female centric” units in which standards are lower and
they’re not really preparing for combat.136 As s senior enlisted male noted, “Integration is
more about moving women around to look good, not actually make better warfighters.”
Despite both the experience of women in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the changes
in laws that have opened positions to women, emotion and opinion have dominated the
attempted integration process. Indeed, the externally combat focused culture has allowed
argument that women are a “distraction,” or antithetical to combat readiness to perpetuate
(MacKenzie, 2015). Such an environment has continued to isolate women, rather than
leverage their skills and perspective. A 2016 internal DoD survey found that nearly 70%
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Fort Hood, Texas focus group with first integrated unit.
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of women did not feel that their perspectives were valid when it came to either day-today operations or tactical missions (Fairley, 2017). Indeed, despite continued increased
participation, women are still largely unable to make the change indicative of integration.
Women continue to express that they feel rewarded for acting like their male
counterparts and conforming to a culture that “accepts that boys will be boys and that’s
how you fight.”137 The culture of masculinity has indeed persisted, keeping women on
the outside unless they are willing to conform.
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Senior Enlisted female, Camp Pendleton, CA
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Chapter 7:
Conclusion

In July 2016, civilian and military leaders from all NATO countries gathered in
Warsaw, Poland to lay out its future security vision. It addressed issues ranging from
cyber security to increased Russian militarism and aggression to how to address the selfproclaimed Islamic State. While each country brought its own specific geographic
concerns, and political and military solutions to the table, there was one overarching
consistency among participants: the importance of women to the future of both NATO
and global security. In the official Communique from the Warsaw Summit, leaders of
NATO nations professed:138
Empowerment of women at NATO and in our militaries
makes our Alliance stronger. We attach great importance to
ensuring women's full and active participation in the
prevention, management, and resolution of conflicts, as well
as in post-conflict efforts and cooperation. Since our last
Summit in Wales, we have made good progress in
implementing UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace and Security
(WPS) and related resolutions. Yet, more work is to be done,
which requires enduring leadership, transparency, and
accountability. We welcome recent high-level appointments
in both NATO's civilian and military structures. However,
there are still shortfalls in the representation of women at
NATO that need to be addressed. … Our Strategic
Commands are now operationalizing the approved Military
Guidelines on the Prevention of and Response to Conflict138

Speeches Archived at: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133169.htm
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Related Sexual and Gender-Based Violence. … Our ongoing
efforts and commitment to integrate gender perspectives into
Alliance activities throughout NATO's three core tasks will
contribute to a more modern, ready, and responsive Alliance.
Women’s participation, but more importantly their perspectives, was recognized to as
essential not just for women’s issues, but for global security as a whole. However, the
member states do not have a unified or consistent history with women’s integration, nor
do they operationalize it in the same way. While several member states have National
Action Plans, six still do not. Additionally, several of the National Action Plans are
primarily externally-facing, highlighting how gender and women’s issues will be factored
into their interaction with post-conflict societies or in international affairs, not with their
domestic governments.139 Further, it was not until 2016 that the gender advisor program
was streamlined within NATO. And while all but two countries140 are currently
participating in the program, it also fails to address improving domestic integration or
representation in either military or high-level civilian positions.
The high-level emphasis on the need for increased women’s participation yet lack
of meaningful details on how to do so is representative of the divergent histories with and
understanding of women’s integration into the military specifically and thereby the
formal security sector more broadly. It has been largely accepted that women are not only
a positive force, but a necessary one for enduring peace and security (Simić, 2010;
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For examples, the NAPs of the United States, Canada, Norway, Denmark, France, and Germany all
emphasize the importance of “promoting women’s rights around the world. The focus of domestic
representation is on their country’s representation to organizations such as the UN and NATO, with little to
address how to increase women’s integration at home.
140

Hungary and Luxemburg
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Paffenholz, 2018; Willett, 2010; Hudson, 2012). However, how to ensure women’s
participation in a sustainable and meaningful way still remains a question. Both civilian
policy makers and senior military leaders have committed to increasing the number and
influence of women in the military, yet even with increased targeted recruitment
campaigns have met with little success (Yeung, Steiner, Hardison, Hanser, & Kamarck,
2017). A contribution of this dissertation is in confirming that culture and meaningful
structural support for women, matters. A one-size fits all approach to increasing the
impact of women, even among NATO countries, will not be successful due to historical
and cultural drivers that have and will continue to shape women’s engagement with and
integration into the military.

Integration: Slow Moving and Impactful
One of the driving motivations for this dissertation was to understand why
women’s integration has been so divergent among Western militaries when several other
aspects of military policy and doctrine have greatly converged. From air power, to
ground scheme of maneuvers, to rules of engagement and escalation of force policies,
ISAF countries have adopted nearly identical tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs)
in the past fifteen years.141 This convergence largely emerged out of operational
necessity, allowing for militaries to work together in a joint environment towards
common tactical and strategic outcomes. Given that gender perspective and increased

141

See reports from the Joint Air Power Competence Center, and NATO and Afghanistan topic cell for a
broader discussion on the convergence of tactics.
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women’s rights were an espoused goal of military operations in Afghanistan, the
convergence of the use of women in combat could be expected. Yet where operational
decisions on the use of aircraft and tactical ground formations were easily adaptable, the
cultural norms surrounding women made it harder to pivot both policy and practice
towards convergence. Indeed, foundational beliefs about equality are entrenched, and
even the exceptional nature of war cannot overcome them.
Notably, the external demands of warfighting in Afghanistan drove the
convergence of many of the tactics and strategies of many ISAF countries. Whether the
mountainous terrain (Posen, 2002) or the simultaneous kinetic military operations and
state building actions (Capstick, 2007), ISAF countries reacted to the environment and
worked together to come up with innovative and effective solutions to work jointly.
Historically, the exceptional nature of the external demands of warfighting have been
argued to be strong enough to overcome norms about women’s participation in the
military (Goldstein, 2001). However, such studies focused almost solely on the wartime
participation, and women’s participation in specific moments of fighting. Indeed, the
exceptional nature of the war in Afghanistan did lead to women’s increased participation,
and women engaging in combat activities at an increased rate. However, despite an
increased participation by women in nearly every ISAF country, there remain variations
on how women were used, the impact that they had, and their experiences in the military.
Despite the exceptional nature of war, and the joint tactical and strategic aims, the
underlying beliefs about gender equality were stronger than the external factors and these
differences endure.
258

The stickiness of the beliefs about women’s equality highlights that integration is
a slow-moving process that unfolds gradually overtime. It cannot be understood by
looking only at how many women are in the military at a snapshot in history, but requires
a holistic and qualitative view of the impact that women have on the military. The twin
forces of beliefs about gender equality and military culture interact to create conditions
that are either permissive or restrictive for women to integrate. Internal factors and beliefs
are more important than external necessities, and are hard to overcome. The process does
not happen quickly. As Ronald Inglehart (1977) observed several decades ago, Western
values are slow to change, and even when there are shifts in priorities, underlying beliefs
and sociopolitical organizing frameworks, including gender roles and hierarchies, endure.
The case of women’s integration confirms this, in that even in the face of a changing
international security environment beliefs about equality endure and greatly influence
women’s ability to integrate into the military. Additionally, integration as a slow-moving
process confirms the assertions by March and Olsen (1989) as to the iterative nature of
institutional change. The institutional nature of military culture is an important part of a
country’s sociopolitical identity. Changing it results in a “series of actions and reactions
that need to be calibrated before the ultimate consequences can be understood” (March &
Olsen, 1989, p. 56). Integration is a cumulative and cyclical process that requires taking
history into account to better understand it.
Further, the dominance of domestic beliefs over international factors during war
emphasizes the importance of focusing on the impact that women have, rather than the
rate at which they are included. During war, there is often an increase in the number of
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women. Women’s participation is often highlighted during war, as women’s presence on
the battlefield is a stark contrast to the traditional image of the soldier. The number and
prominence of women during war makes it an attractive course of study. They also
provide quick and easily digestible snapshots into a complex and slow-moving process
and have given policy makers a platform to tout successes in women’s recruitment in the
past decade (Schjølset, 2013). However, these quantifiable moments in time do not
explain the variations in either the tactical impact that women have had or their
experiences in the military. By focusing on how women have shaped military policy and
practices I have differentiated between inclusion and integration. Truly, if women are
having an impact we can assume that they are more fully integrated as a part of the
institution from which they were previously excluded. The experiences of France,
Norway, and the United States highlight how integration is not something that can be
accomplished quickly nor be measured by the numbers of women or laws pertaining to
their involvement.

Understanding Women’s Integration in a Global Context
In this dissertation I focused narrowly on three Western militaries. However, the
lessons about the interaction between beliefs about equality and military culture are
important in a global context. In recent years, nearly every NATO and NATO partner
country has opened all military occupations to women142 (NATO, 2017). Additionally,

142

Turkey is the only country that has not yet opened all positions to women and does not have a timeline
for lifting of occupational specialties.
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the overall number of women in militaries is continuing to increase. However, the
experiences of women in the military, and the role and impact that women are able to
have in the military remains varied across countries. As laws and numbers become more
and more convergent, it becomes more important to understand the drivers of the
difference.
While the specific experiences with integration in each of the countries presented
here are unique to historical and cultural context, there are lessons learned about
integration that can be applied to and tested in a broader empirical context about the
interaction between beliefs about equality and military culture and tradition. As Western
countries are increasingly emphasizing the importance of joint missions,143 better
understanding an aspect of the military that has not converged will be important for both
military commanders and policy makers. While the emphasis of military operations is
often on understanding the cultural nuances of the environment in which the military is
operating, my findings show that the cultural differences among militaries required to
work together is also important.
The findings from the cases of France, Norway, and the United States are
highlighted in Table 7.1.
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In 2006 and then again in 2016 NATO countries took a pledge for “Interoperability in Joint Missions.”
All NATO members as well as the Partnership for Peace nations signed on to the pledge that their domestic
training would be conducted in such a way as to ensure joint operating possibilities.
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Table 7.1: Summery of Findings
Country
Claim
Military

Integration
Outcome
Permissive
environment
that allowed the
cycles of
integration to
occur

France

High Difference
High
Government
involvement

Rooted in
change and
responsibility to
former colonies

Norway

Low Differences
High
Government
involvement

Focused on
making
Norwegian
citizens

Initial leader
into integration
and then stalled

United
States

Mixed
Difference
Low
Government
Involvement

Continued
emphasis on
conventional
military force

Non-permissive
environment
that made it
hard for women
to integrate
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Key
Findings
The value
placed on
women acting
as women
created an
environment
where women
were able to
drive change
and easily
adapt to
changing
external
necessities.
The value
placed on
women as
citizens
created initial
expansive
opportunities
for equality
but were
slower to
respond to
external
needs
The value
placed on the
success of
individual
women led to
a disparity in
experiences
and slower
advancement
for women
overall

In France, the claims about women’s difference and the view that the government
played an active role in promoting and ensuring equality interacted favorably with the
military’s culture to create permissive conditions for integration. Women were able to
draw on their experiences in the past to emphasize the importance of the unique
contribution that they bring. This was echoed in the specially selected units in
Afghanistan that ensured that women were present as infantry soldiers. The doctrine
around values promotion and the definition of national security as being related to peace
and democracy emphasized in the 2012 White Paper on National Defense further reflects
the impact that women’s service has had on the military. While there were initial setbacks
because of the focus put on the difference between men and women, the national
structure that provided for the unique needs of women made a culture of finding equality
in the difference possible. This allowed for adaptability when a women-focused unit was
necessary.
In Norway, the claims about women’s similarities and strong role of the
government in social policies made it an initial leader in women’s integration. The
military, like much of Norwegian society, as a model of egalitarianism and an incubator
for the de-gendering society. However, the emphasis on the de-gendered aspects of
service made it difficult to address the changing needs of gender in geopolitics as seen in
the response to the cultural needs of women in Afghanistan. Though Norway had one of
the most senior female combat commanders in Afghanistan, cultural norms made it hard
to leverage gendered aspects of service in the operational environment. When external
conditions dictated that women were needed to leverage their unique characteristics, there
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was not the language or the claims to express this. This has resulted in a stalling of
women’s integration. However, new efforts to revamp the military structure through
efforts like the Hunter Troop, and universal conscription’s influence in increasing the
visibility of women in the armed forces may be ushering in a new cycle of women’s
integration into the military.
In the United States, the individual focus and lack of congruent claims about
equality, and a lack of government involvement in promoting equality, coupled with the
military’s combat focus hindered women’s ability to have an impact and truly integrate in
the military. Individual women achieved great success, though largely conformed to the
conventional military culture to do so. While continually a leader in the number of
women in the military at any given point in time, there has been little progress with
regards to policies that impact women or tactics reflective of women’s unique
contribution. Further, while great progress was made with FET and Lioness teams, there
has also been backlash due to the temporary nature of the programs and the enduring
legacy of the combat exclusion and risk rule policies. Despite the United States being a
leader in several areas of military innovation, domestic beliefs have hindered women’s
integration. It remains to be seen how the roles newly opened to women in the combat
arms will either allow claims to be made more strongly or allow those successful in
combat arms to serve as a basis on which future claims for increased integration will be
made.
Bringing these findings into a broader empirical context further highlights the
importance of the nuance of the interaction between beliefs about equality and military
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culture. Looking broadly across NATO, we see that France, Norway and the United
States are representative of general trends in Western Democracies. One way to see this
is through quantifying the measures of gender integration. Quantifying integration
provides a helpful visualization of grouping countries for further study, yet is limited in
its application. By assigning values144 to each of the components of integration discussed
in Chapter 3, I am able to index the various components in order to quantify the variation
between NATO countries.
Figure 7.1: Quantified Women’s Index for Select NATO Countries 2016
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The quantification of women’s integration is most helpful as a visual
representation for the variation that is present in advanced Western democracies,
countries are frequently grouped together because of both their mutual security
guarantees as part of NATO and their democratic political systems. It also allows for
grouping of countries for future, more in depth study.
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See Appendix B for an explanation of measurement
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However, the quantification of women’s integration suffers from several datadriven limitations. Fist is the lack of standardized definitions or reporting about women’s
participation. NATO did not standardize their annual report form until 2016. Prior to that,
there was no standard for how women’s participation was operationalized. For example,
conscripted forces were often excluded from reports on the percentage of women in the
services artificially inflating the number of women in the services (Schjølset, 2013).
Additionally, for several countries, demographic data on members of the military was not
kept until after the passage of UN Resolution 1325. As Frank Steder noted, “the number
were so small that demographic data wouldn’t be very helpful.”145 Given the limited
uniformity of the data, an historical comparative quantitative analysis is difficult. Indeed,
the quantitative representation only presents a current snapshot of integration without
taking historical progress into account.
Additionally, much of the data, specifically that concerning the use of child care
and parental benefits, as well as instances of sexual harassment or assault, rely on selfreporting by service members. Similar to the reporting about women’s participation, there
was no standardized method of collecting this data until NATO’s 2016 annual report.
While there is value in being able to see the progress of a country over time in this data, it
the historical lack of standardization makes comparing across countries difficult. It also
carries a potential self-selection bias of those that choose to participate in surveys or feel
comfortable enough to report harassment or abuse. As a result, countries with strong
norms around reporting harassment and a strong track record of prosecuting offenders
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(such as Denmark) look “worse” than countries in which harassment is not reported
because it is believed it will not be properly adjudicated (such as Italy), despite antidotal
evidence that the problem is wide spread.
The observable difference in women’s participation highlights the importance of
taking an historical institutional approach to studying integration and to more closely
examining the variations in beliefs about equality that exist between Western countries.
While there is value in observing the current variation, rather than focusing on laws or
numbers, beliefs about the nature difference between men and women and the
government’s role in ensuring equality need to be further examined. The process, and the
path that a country took to integration is important for understanding the longevity and
durability of integration. There are several countries that have recently opened their
militaries to women (for example, Italy), and have achieved a seemingly very high level
of integration in a very short time. However, without a greater understanding of the
cultural and political history, and the degree to which the claims about women’s
participation match with military culture, it will be difficult to determine whether or not
integration is truly lasting or merely temporary. Further, with converging policies, yet
continued variation, understanding political culture is increasingly important to both the
study and practice of military integration.
In addition to highlighting the importance of viewing integration as a slowmoving process focused on qualitative outcomes, this dissertation makes contributions to
both the scholarly and policy communities. From a scholarly perspective, it contributes to
both the study of women in public life and the study of the military and war. From a
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policy perspective, it has implications for the internal military policies as well as the
future of joint operations.

Other Limitations and Possibilities for Future Research
The small number of women that have served and the lack of historical dataconsistency presents challenges in researching women in the military. Indeed, due to the
small numbers of women that have historically served, many countries have not
quantified their contributions outside of war-time participation (Steder, forthcoming).
Historical accounts are thus reliant on narratives from women that served or those that
served with women. Most often such accounts come from more senior women or
exceptional cases. While their stories and perspectives are important for understanding
women in the military, their experiences may not be generalizable. Military structure
preferences seniority, and junior members may not either feel comfortable speaking out
or have the mechanisms through which to honestly share their experiences. Similarly, the
writings and statements from women’s movements often have an elite-bias. The
“feminist consciousness” has primarily been recorded by women that have had the access
to formal channels of power, or the means to self-publish and promote (Katzenstein,
1987). Additionally, they are also centered on the concerns of more upper class women,
often leading to divisions and fissures among women in a particular country (Banaszak,
Beckwith, & Rucht, 2003). For this reason, the writings used to inform the claims about
women’s role in public life may not be reflective of the broader beliefs held by all women
in society.
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The shifting culture to the all-volunteer force may exacerbate the elite bias in
future research. For Western countries in particular, the all-volunteer force is creating a
widening cultural and socioeconomic gap between officer and enlisted classes (Griffith &
Bryan, 2016). As this gap widens, intersectional forces such as poverty, race, the urbanrural divide, familial affinity for military service, and educational attainment may
overshadow gender in their stickiness with regards to the ability of certain groups to
impact the military as an institution.
However, this dissertation also creates much opportunity for future and follow on
research. First, with the standardization of data collection by NATO, there is an
opportunity to more quantitatively track integration, and expand the work done.
Especially for countries that have newly opened positions to women, tracking future
changes will help to more robustly test the relationship between political culture and
women’s integration.
Additionally, there is work to be done in testing the impact that female leaders
have on the military. While there is a growing body of literature on the impact of
women’s role in politics, senior military leaders are largely absent from these studies.
While there is currently a very small cohort of female senior military leaders, there is an
opportunity for systematic engagement at this early time to measure impact on military
practices and policies.
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Broader Implications of the Dissertation
Implications for Scholarship
From a scholarly perspective, there are two primary areas in which this
dissertation has important implications. First is the study of women in political and public
life. Second is the study of militaries and war. While these areas are seemingly
contradictory, there are important lessons for each to be gleaned from the process of
integration.

For the Study of Women
Viewed as part of the broader studies on women in public life, this dissertation
contributes in two important ways. First, it highlights the importance of viewing women’s
movements not as isolated events, but as part of a broader social and political dialogue
and tradition. Indeed, women’s movements are isolated events, nor do they exclusively
impact “women’s issues.” In this dissertation, I show how even though not explicitly
targeted by the women’s movement, the military was impacted by the types of claims
made and the policies for which women’s movements successfully lobbied. Indeed,
women’s movements are part of a culturally dependent and broad sociopolitical beliefs.
Further, the military is a form of political participation by women that is still
largely under-studied. As I noted in Chapter 3, most studies of women in the military
focus on the relationship as being one way, emphasizing how the military impacts
women. However, as I showed in this dissertation, women can have an impact on the
military as well. In order to more fully understand the impact of women in public life, it
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is important to look not just at how women come to participate in traditionally masculine
institutions, but at how they shape and change them. Further examination of women’s
choice to join and remain in the military, and the ways in which they can impact military
life is thus important to more complete understanding of women’s public and political
participation.
Finally, it emphasizes the importance of qualitative studies of women’s roles in
public life. The surge of quantitative studies in the mid-2000s were an essential step in
emphasizing that “women matter” to and have a positive impact on public and political
life (Caprioli, 2005; Melander, 2005; Hudson & Den Boer, 2002). However, despite the
near-universal rise in women’s participation in public life around the world, there
remains variation in the degree to which women have been able to impact their societies
and democratic institutions. A more in-depth examination of the process by which
women came into public life, and the variations in the culture and institutions is
necessary to unpack the impact that women in politics and the public arena have had.

For the Study of the Military and War
Though charged with the monopoly on the legitimate use of political violence, the
military is more than just killing people and breaking things. The military serves both a
domestic and international purpose that is beyond violence. Understanding women’s
integration in the military helps to further illuminate the role of the military in society,
and sheds light on the lasting impact that military culture has on the political process.
Indeed, militaries often take the culture of the environment in which they are fighting into
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account, however rarely evaluate the role of domestic culture in shaping tactical
outcomes. The study of women’s integration highlights the role that the culture of those
fighting is as important as the place where the fighting is being done.
As Risa Brooks notes, political culture, social structures and institutions
contribute to military effectiveness (Brooks, 2007). While she was primarily focused on
the outputs of the military, and military power, in this dissertation I showed that culture,
social structure and institutions are also important for the inputs to military activity. This
highlights the important of studying women in the military outside of war, and
incorporating women’s integration as part of the broader study of military effectiveness.
Understanding the role of domestic civilian culture helps to better understand
what tactics and strategies are transferrable between militaries. In the era of increased
joint fighting, there is an increasing push for cross-national military studies (Welle, 2010;
Rietjens, 2008; Alford & Cuomo, 2009; Larsdotter, 2011). Women’s participation in the
military has been no exception to this (McBride & Wibben, 2012; Erwin, 2012).
However, there is often a lack of cultural context to such studies. In this dissertation, I
showed that cultural context and institutional history is an important part of
understanding of not just integration, but the resultant variations in military tactics and
strategies as well.

Implications for Policy Makers
In addition to scholarship, this dissertation contributes to the policy discussions
around women’s participation in the military. Especially since the passage of UN
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Resolution 1325, increasing the number of women in militaries has been a priority of
virtually every country. Indeed, NATO as a whole has made increased gender
representation a priority of its leadership core. Numerous countries have commissioned
studies on either how to increase the share of women in their military or the lessons to be
learned from other countries (Burrelli, 2013; Berkshire Consultancy Ltd, 2010; Cawkill,
Rogers, Knight, & Spear, 2009). The most common approach to “solving” the problem of
women in the military or responding to internationally-focused studies has been to create
new laws that increase opportunities for women, or adopt recruitment policies aimed
specifically at female recruits.
However, as I showed in this dissertation, laws alone do not mean that a military
is integrated. While important initial conditions, the sociopolitical culture and the military
history plays an important role in ultimately determining integration. This helps to
explain why despite a convergence of laws still there has still been a divergence of
outcomes in integration. Indeed, implementing a law will not be effective if the claims
needed to support it are not present. The most evident example of this is seen in the
dropping of restrictions on women in combat roles. Despite the convergence on the
decision to drop the restrictions on women’s service, women have not joined at similar
rates. Indeed, several countries146 still do not have any women in combat arms positions.
Laws and policies must be supported by claims that are compatible with military culture
if integration is going to be successful.
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There is no mandatory reporting on the breakdown of occupational specialties. For those that did report,
United States, Germany, and Denmark reported no women in ground combat arms. It is reasonable to
assume that there are others as well.
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Senior military leaders can also benefit from an increased understanding of the
troops with which they’re working. Understanding the nuance of the variations in
integration will help military leaders to better utilize troops under their command in the
most effective ways possible. Indeed, militaries could benefit from cultural studies of
their allies as well as their adversaries.

My Commitment to Women, Peace, and Security
I came to this dissertation out of a desire to better understand my personal lived
and observed experience as part of the United States Military who has taken part in
several joint-ISAF combat missions. When I began work, I focused almost exclusively on
military policy, and viewing the military as a unique institution in the WPS framework.
Through the process, however, I came to better understand the importance of placing the
military as an institution on equal footing with others, especially when advancing a
comprehensive WPS research and practice agenda.
Especially in Western democracies, WPS is most often viewed as something that
is required for international work, especially in newly emerging democracies, or postconflict societies. However, as shown through the historical-institutional approach to
gender integration, cultural learnings are essential for ensuring WPS at home. If we are
going to use international frameworks to encourage culturally-appropriate mechanisms
for gender integration abroad, we must do so at home.
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APPENDIX A
FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS

I use a structured focused comparison to evaluate the variations in women’s integration in
the militaries in France, Norway, and the United States. The below framework is used in
each chapter.

1. Military Culture
a. What are the historical beliefs about the role of the military?
b. How does the military view itself? (internal vs external orientation)
c. How does the civilian population view the military? (internal vs external
orientation)
d. What types of missions is the military typically involved in? (values vs
combat)
e. How are individuals promoted and rewarded in the military?
f. What is the connection between military service and citizenship?

2. Structural Conditions
a. What are the laws concerning women’s military participation?
b. What are the policies around child care?
c. What are the policies around parental leave?
d. What are the policies around sexual harassment / assault?
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3. Functional Participation
a. What role did women play in the military?
b. What occupational specialties did they hold?
c. What was their role in overseas operations (training, peacekeeping,
humanitarian assistance, war)?
d. What was their role in domestic military life?

4. Durability
a. How long did women typically stay in the military?
b. How many women were senior officers? Staff noncommissioned officers?
c. What leadership roles / command possessions did women hold?

5. Claims about Service
a. How did women frame their service?
b. What did they call upon to make claims about service (historical events,
women in other aspects of public life)?
c. How did the claims about service coincide or conflict with military
culture?

6. Outcome
a. What impact did women have on the military?
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b. What policies were made to make it easier for women to serve?
c. What tactics reflected women’s roles in the military?
d. What strategies reinforced women’s participation?
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APPENDIX B
CODING SCHEME FOR QUANTITATIVE MEASURES OF INTEGRATION

Legal
Component
Barriers to
Participation

Description
• Occupational fields closed to women
• Geographical restrictions on women’s
service
• Quotas/limitations on number of women
able to serve in a given unit

Childcare

•
•
•

Provisions for childcare during all
operational hours
Provisions for childcare during
deployment
Equality in maternity / paternity leave

Value
0 = Women excluded from the
military
0.25 = Women Auxiliary /
Limited ranks
0.5 = Women allowed in
gendered roles only
0.75 = Women allowed in all but
ground combat
1 = No restrictions on women’s
service
Division of Parental Leave
0 = No parental leave
0.25 = Maternity leave only
0.5 = Maternity + Paternity, but
paternity optional or negligible
0.75 = Maternity + Paternity, but
paternity significantly less
1 = Equal maternity + paternity
leave
Child Care
0 = No formal child care
policy/private care only
0.5 = Mixed public/private care
1 = Nationalized child care

Sexual
Harassment

•
•
•

Laws on harassment / assault (military
and national)
Number of allegations of harassment or
assault
Nature of investigation and prosecution
of alleged instances of harassment or
assault

Laws
0 = No formal laws
0.5 = Military policies that put
prosecution in the hands of
commanders
1 = Laws that require third-party
review

Functional Participation
Component
Level of Participation
Operational
Participation

Definition
• Women’s Participation as percentage of total
force
• Women’s Participation in overseas missions
• Breakdown of combat vs peacekeeping vs
training missions
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Value
Percentage as a
decimal
Percentage as a
decimal

Durability
Component
Staff Noncommissioned
Officers
Field Grade Officers

Definition
• Percentage of SNCOs that are women
•

Flag Officers

•

Retention Rate

•

Percentage of field grade officers that are
women
Percentage of field grade officers that are
women
Percentage more/less that women reenlisted
compared to men

Value
Percentage as
decimal
Percentage as
decimal
Percentage as
decimal
Percentage as
decimal

Values
COUNTRY

Legal
Restrictions

USA
CAN
UKG
FRA
SPA
POR
BEL
NTH
GMY
DEN
NOR
ITA

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

Level of
Participation

0.159
0.151
0.101
0.152
0.126
0.11
0.078
0.095
0.113
0.064
0.107
0.041

Flag
Officers

0.0068
0.008
0.0008
0.0007
0
0
0
0.0003
0.0001
0
0.0054
0

Senior
Officer

0.1253
0.082
0.1055
0.0406
0.0243
0.047
0.089
0.1054
0.0696
0.039
0.249
0.019

NCO

0.3466
0.354
0.205
0.5147
0.0853
0.2558
0.3935
0.3761
0.548
0.2315
0.2026
0.127

Durability

Operational

Retention

Childcare

Parental
Leave

Sex
Assault

Integration
Index

0.4787
0.444
0.3113
0.556
0.1096
0.3028
0.4825
0.4818
0.6177
0.2705
0.457
0.146

0.18
0.117

-0.15
0.068

0
0.5
0
1
0.5
0.5
1
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.5

0.5
0.75
0.75
1
0.75
0.5
0.75
1
1
0.25
1
1

0.5
0.5
0.5
1
0.5
1
1
0.5
0
0.5
0.5
0.5

2.6677
3.53
2.6623
4.84
3.1272
3.4428
4.3605
3.6619
3.2867
2.7098
3.658
3.34
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nd

nd
0.066
0.069
0.06
0.05
0.071
0.056
0.077
0.077
0.045

0.066
0.0726
-0.03
0
0.0141
0.0483
0.017
0.108

